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

# ANSELM'S THEORY

OF

# THE ATONEMENT

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## The Bohlen Lectures, 1908

By GEORGE CADWALADER FOLEY, D.D.

*Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Care in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia*

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# THE

# JOHN BOHLEN LECTURESHIP

John Bohlen, who died in this city on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1874, bequeathed to trustees a fund of one hundred thousand dollars, to be distributed to religious and charitable objects in accordance with the well-known wishes of the testator.

By a deed of trust, executed June 2, 1875, the trustees under the will of Mr. Bohlen transferred and paid over to "The Rector, Church Wardens, and Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Trinity, Philadelphia," in trust, a sum of money for certain designated purposes, out of which fund the sum of ten thousand dollars was set apart for the endowment of The John Bohlen Lectureship, upon the following terms and conditions: —

The money shall be invested in good substantial and safe securities, and held in trust for a fund to be called The John Bohlen Lectureship, and the income shall be applied annually to the payment of a qualified person, whether clergyman or layman, for the delivery and publication of at least one hundred copies of two or more lecture sermons. These Lectures shall be delivered at such time and place, in the city of Philadelphia, as the persons nominated to appoint the lecturer shall from time to time determine, giving at least six months notice to the person appointed to deliver the same, when the same

may conveniently be done, and in no case selecting the same person as lecturer a second time within a period of five years. The payment shall be made to said lecturer, after the lectures have been printed and received by the trustees, of all the income for the year derived from said fund, after defraying the expense of printing the lectures and the other incidental expenses attending the same.

The subject of such lectures shall be such as is within the terms set forth in the will of the Rev. John Bampton, for the delivery of what are known as the "Bampton Lectures," at Oxford, or any other subject distinctively connected with or relating to the Christian Religion.

The lecturer shall be appointed annually in the month of May, or as soon thereafter as can conveniently be done, by the persons who, for the time being, shall hold the offices of Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese in which is the Church of the Holy Trinity; the Rector of said Church; the Professor of Biblical Learning, the Professor of Systematic Divinity, and the Professor of Ecclesiastical History, in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia.

In case either of said offices are vacant the others may nominate the lecturer.

Under this trust the Reverend GEORGE C. FOLEY, D. D., Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Care in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, was appointed to deliver the lectures for the year 1908.

# PREFACE

For a full discussion of the subject under review, it was thought best to cast it in the form of a treatise, from which selections were made for the lectures required by the terms of the Bohlen foundation. The work is not a constructive statement of the doctrine of the Atonement; it is a critical and historical study of the claim that the Reformation dogma is the Catholic doctrine. As this has long been regarded as the test of orthodoxy, and has been in a multitude of instances a painful obstacle to faith, the evidence that it is absent from the ancient and patristic teaching is offered as a useful apologetic, which may clear the way for a simpler, more rational, and more Scriptural expression of the redemptive work of Christ. The general facts here presented are familiar to the students of the history of dogma and to the readers of modern books on the Atonement. But the effort has been made to bring them together in the convenient form of an argument more complete than any with which the writer is acquainted. The average Christian may thereby understand how valid are the revulsion from long dominant theories,

and the attempt in our day to restate the truth of Atonement in ethical and spiritual terms.

The traditional statement of the doctrine has undoubtedly developed much devout and consecrated life; but its religious power has not lain in its crude form, but in its emotional witness to the fundamental reality of Incarnate love and sacrifice. It is demonstrably not the faith of the universal Church, or the continuous and unvarying formula of Christian thinkers. To insist upon it as essential to Christianity is to insist upon being "wiser than the universal Church of Christ." As Dr. Dale has said: "The Fathers attempted to explain why it is that through the death of Christ we escape from the penalties of sin, and their explanations were rejected by the Schoolmen. The Schoolmen attempted to explain it, and their explanations were rejected or modified by the Reformers. The Reformers attempted to explain it, and within a century Grotius and his successors were attempting to explain it again." The very diversity of the explanations proves that none of them is necessary, as Christian life seems to have been as well sustained under one as another; and there is quite as much reason and Christian propriety in rejecting that which began with the Reformation as in disclaiming any which preceded it. Its rejection is not to be discredited as the desire for a "new theology," since it is due to the recovery of earlier

and juster views which prevailed in Alexandria and Antioch. The upholders of the Latin theology in general, and of the Anselmic, Reformation, or Grotian theories of Atonement in particular, are the real neologians.

The primary purpose of this study therefore is negative, to exhibit the lack of authority for the theory framed by the Reformation divines. It will be a genuine relief to many troubled minds to be made fully aware of this; they will then be able to appreciate the best Greek thought which is so much nearer the teaching of St. Paul. The whole effect however is intended to be positive and constructive by showing the identity of the great Christian fact through all the mutually contradictory explanations. The divergence of the theories is no indication of the "discontinuity of Christian thought"; for the continuity of belief in the fact of Christ's redemption is more essential than the persistence of any ideas about it whatsoever. Moreover, the theories themselves, however inadequate and open to criticism, when traced from Origen to Moberly, are seen to illustrate what Dr. George Harris calls "a progressive moral evolution." In a wide circle they have returned very nearly to the simplicity and vitality of the Scriptural conceptions.

The writer is under great obligations to the Rev. Alex. R. DeWitt, LL.M., of Muncy, Pa., for many

scholarly and fruitful suggestions. Grateful acknowledgment is also made for a number of helpful references to authorities furnished by the Rev. Dr. J. Cullen Ayer, Jr., and the Rev. Dr. Andrew D. Heffern, of the Faculty of the Divinity School. The Rev. Edgar Campbell, of Philadelphia, has given valued assistance in the reading of the proofs.

The Divinity School, Philadelphia, Pa.
August, 1908.

# CONTENTS


PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1

II. THE PATRISTIC TEACHING . . . . . 13

1. General Characteristics . . . . . 15
2. The Apostolic Fathers . . . . . 19
3. The Post-Apostolic Fathers . . . . . 25
   *a.* Justin Martyr . . . . . 26
   *b.* Irenæus . . . . . 29
   *c.* Clement of Alexandria . . . . . 37
   *d.* Origen . . . . . 39
4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers . . . . 46
   *a.* Eusebius of Cæsarea . . . . . 47
   *b.* Athanasius . . . . . 48
   *c.* Later Greek Fathers . . . . . 60
      Gregory of Nyssa . . . . . 60
      Gregory of Nazianzus . . . . . 63
      Chrysostom . . . . . 66
      Cyril of Alexandria . . . . . 68
5. The Latin Fathers . . . . . 75
   *a.* Tertullian . . . . . 77
   *b.* Cyprian . . . . . 82
   *c.* Augustin . . . . . 86

PAGE

III. THE ANSELMIC THEORY . . . . . 101

1. PATRISTIC AND MEDIÆVAL ANTECEDENTS . . 103
*a.* Antecedents affecting the substance of the theory . . . . . 103
(1) A racial characteristic . . . . 103
(2) Ecclesiastical ideas and discipline . 105
(3) German criminal law . . . . . 109
(4) Feudalism . . . . . 113
*b.* Antecedents affecting the form of the theory . . . . . 115

2. "CUR DEUS HOMO?" . . . . . 120
*a.* Preliminary to the argument . . . . 121
*b.* The argument . . . . . 124
*c.* Some valuable features of the theory . . 132
*d.* Defects of the theory . . . . . 143
Three general defects . . . . . 143
Criticism in detail . . . . . 147
(1) The idea of Honour . . . . 147
(2) The idea of Satisfaction . . . 154
(3) The forensic form of the theory 167
(4) The latent Dualism . . . . . 173
(5) The Nestorian element . . . 179
(6) Satisfaction considered as Substitution . . . . . 181
(7) The purpose of the Incarnation 187
(8) The purely objective character of the theory . . . . . 190
(9) A pernicious effect of the theory 193

PAGE

3. Anselm's Contemporaries and Successors . . 194
*a.* His adherents . . . . . 195
Hugh of St. Victor . . . . . 195
Alexander of Hales . . . . . 196
Bonaventura . . . . . 196
Thomas Aquinas . . . . . 197
*b.* His opponents . . . . . 201
Abelard . . . . . 201
Bernard . . . . . 206
Peter Lombard . . . . . 207
Duns Scotus . . . . . 209

4. Anselm's Relation to Reformation Theology 212
*a.* Basis of Protestant Soteriology . . . . 212
*b.* Antithesis of Protestant Soteriology . . 216
(1) Passive satisfaction . . . . . 216
(2) Penal satisfaction . . . . . 219
(3) Endurance equivalent to eternal death . . . . . 223
(4) Imputation . . . . . 226
*c.* The modern development and reaction . 231

IV. ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE TREATISE . . . . . 251

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Appendix . . . . . 265

Index . . . . . 321

# I

# INTRODUCTION

# ANSELM'S
# THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT

## I
## INTRODUCTION

David Friedrich Strauss said: "The true criticism of a dogma is its history." The unlearned are apt to think of the dogmatic formulas with which they have been acquainted as fixed and immutable; but the history of doctrine shows that they have most of them changed their form from age to age, and of none is this more true than of the doctrine of redemption. The history of change in these intellectual forms is a legitimate and necessary occasion of criticism. We can tell the very time when a particular mode of thought first arose, and we are obliged to consider whether it is a normal development of the conceptions of the New Testament. We can see when the main stream was joined a long way from its source by a tributary; and when we perceive the distinctly new colour given to the stream by the outpouring into it of the washings of an apparently diverse soil, we are able to estimate whether this

muddy current can fairly be called the same as the original pure brook whence it flowed.

Not all the varying formulations of theology can claim to express the essential and ultimate truth, and we are forced to separate these historical variations from the truth itself. In different ages, different aspects and understandings of truth come to be emphasised and made prominent, owing sometimes to their denial and the subsequent controversy, and sometimes to the prevalence of ideas which inhere in the intellectual conditions of the age. When we discern the contemporary causes for a particular statement, we are led to inquire whether it be a natural and inevitable inference from truths hitherto awaiting coördination; as, for example, in the Nicene definitions concerning the deity of our Lord. At other times, however, we are compelled to discriminate between the original and permanent essence of a truth and the temporary and imperfect interpretation of it. The mere systematic statement of a doctrine, therefore, is of little value until the formula has been subjected to the criticism based upon the history of its successive stages. The scholastic spirit is the exact opposite of the critical and historical spirit; but the latter is the spirit of our time, and its method is our accepted method of arriving at the truth.

It is generally admitted to-day that a thinker can be judged only by means of the ruling ideas of the

age in which he lived, by the intellectual antecedents which insensibly but inevitably have moulded his thoughts. Even the Apostles used rabbinic thought-forms which were convenient vehicles for the new revelation that had come to them, but by no means all of which are to be regarded as permanently valid. What Sabatier says of all dogma is especially true of the doctrine of salvation: "It is ever a product of a blending of Christian feeling with conceptions and phrases borrowed from the atmosphere of contemporary culture."[1] The whole environment has to be taken into account as affecting the angle of observation from which the idea is conceived and the phraseology in which it is presented. The cast of theological thought developed in the Western Church has certain well-defined characteristics, which strikingly differentiate it from that of the Greek Fathers, notwithstanding their common possession of fundamental Christian truths. It moves to a large extent in a different realm of ideas, which are attributable to the racial and personal conditions of its authors. Our Soteriology has been almost exclusively Latin, and has grievously suffered from the defects which mark the Latin type of mind, as well as the habit of mind belonging to a particular profession. The limitations attending this derivation of our thoughts of redemption are no discredit in themselves; but they need to

[1] A. Sabatier, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 199.

be remembered and to qualify our estimate of the final product of the Latin influence. They must themselves be tested before we can determine whether the theories of Thomas Aquinas or of the disciples of the Reformers are Catholic and Scriptural. When we note that, under that influence, the later thought got farther and farther away from the figures and analogies of Scripture, and became more and more juristic and speculative and abstract and transcendental, our suspicions are awakened that the theology of Latin Christianity is not to be trusted as having developed along lines which make practicable a satisfactory explanation of the Atonement.

The principles applied so well by Canon Mozley to the understanding of Old Testament characters must be combined with the canon of Dr. Strauss, in order to form a true judgment of the *Cur Deus Homo* and its place and value in the development of the doctrine concerning the work of Christ. This treatise is selected for special study, first, because, having been published in 1098, it stands midway in the history of thought upon this subject, which began early in the third century; and secondly, because it is central to the historical inquiry. It is contrasted with the patristic teaching from which it is not derived, and with the Reformation theory to which it contributed the leading idea. It marks the turning-point at which the legal and external and purely logical and

objective conception of God's relation to us displaced the personal and organic and biological, after which the theology of the Atonement takes an entirely novel direction. While it has had little force or acceptance in itself as a consistent theory, it has largely moulded Western thought through its most significant word. Its influence cannot be underestimated even by those who have departed most widely from its thought; while those who still hold to its root-idea naturally esteem it of capital import. *The Catholic Encyclopædia* says: "It may be said, indeed, that this book marks an epoch in theological literature and doctrinal development." [1] And it is thus appreciated by an earnest advocate of the common Protestant position: "The *Cur Deus Homo* is the truest and greatest book on the Atonement that has ever been written." [2]

In order to make the ensuing study intelligible, it is necessary to indicate in the briefest way the three great stages in the movement of speculation. In the

[1] Art. "Atonement," II. 56.

[2] Dr. James Denney, *The Atonement and the Modern Mind*, p. 116. Abbé Rivière gives far more space to Anselm than to any other author, thus indicating his sense of the importance of the treatise (*Le Dogme de la Rédemption*, pp. 291-324). On the other hand, Canon Moberly, while admitting its "importance as the first formal attempt to philosophise the whole subject," regards it as a conspicuous failure: "nothing could be more simply arithmetical, or more essentially unreal" (*Atonement and Personality*, pp. 367, 370, 371).

patristic period, the death of Christ was conceived as a ransom paid to the devil, as with Origen, or as a fulfilment of the law of holiness, as with Athanasius, with his rich, sympathetic insight into the mysticism of St. Paul. With Anselm, it was a satisfaction rendered to the honour and the justice of God. With the Reformers, it was also a satisfaction, but passive, penal, substitutionary, and in this form it has remained the dogma of traditional orthodoxy to the present time. It is found in its least objectionable expression in the chief Anglican authors, and Bishop Pearson may be quoted as an example: "We all had sinned, and so offended the justice of God, and by an act of that justice the sentence of death passed upon us; it was necessary therefore that Christ our surety should die, to satisfy the justice of God, both for that iniquity, as the propitiation for our sins, and for that penalty, as He which was to bear our griefs. God was offended with us, and He must die who was to reconcile Him to us."[1]

To those who have never known any other mode of describing the work of Christ, it will seem unsettling and perilous to challenge it. But it may be historically demonstrated that it is not Catholic doctrine, and that it is only "imagined orthodoxy,"

[1] *Exposition of the Creed*, Art. iv.; see also Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. iv. c. v.; Butler, *Analogy of Religion*, pt. ii. c. v.

a mere "provincialism in Christian theology."[1] Its late rise is felt by the modern thinker to be proof positive that it cannot be inherent in the Christian revelation, since it is in the highest degree unlikely that the Church should have to wait a full millennium before its first utterance. A recent writer says: "But when a dogma is presented as a first principle of Christianity, and is affirmed to be a plain and explicit doctrine of Scripture, if not an absolutely self-evident truth, the fact that it was first articulated by a Schoolman of the twelfth century is at least a presumptive argument against its claims."[2] Similarly, one of the pioneers in the critical reaction against the Reformation theory said in 1860: "I may appeal to this fact of its being modern as an argument that, even if true, it cannot be essential; and that they to whom it presents insuperable difficulties, they who fail to find it in Scripture, and they who feel too uncertain about it to adopt it, are not, therefore, to be pronounced heretical, or regarded as strangers to that vital and central truth of redemption by the blood of Christ which may be dearer to them than their lives."[3]

The dogma, which seems so harmless and even comforting to those who have not thought about

[1] Dr. George B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, p. 252.

[2] T. Vincent Tymms, *The Christian Idea of Atonement*, p. 38.

[3] Francis Garden, in *Tracts for Priests and People*, I. 129 *sq.*

what it involves, has been a serious obstacle to the faith of many. In its crudest form, as preached by the Salvation Army, it revolts the conscience; the highest consciousness of our time finds it morally impossible. Yet to most Christians it has been presented as the very marrow of the Gospel; and even when modified and refined, it has come to seem too unreal and paradoxical for acceptance, and many of them are forced into an apparent rejection of Divine revelation. The harm that has been wrought by the hard, remorseless processes of cold and passionless intellect is incalculable. It is believed therefore to be a useful apologetic to recover the truth of Atonement from conceptions that are misleading and dishonouring and inhibitive to faith. It may at least clear the way for a simpler and more Scriptural expression of the redemptive work of Christ.

We must discover, then, the connection of Anselm's theory with the Soteriology of the Fathers, whether by affinity or by contrast; we must seek in the patristic ideas for any possible antecedents and anticipations of it. We must trace its genesis from the principles and practices of the centuries immediately preceding its composition. We must indicate its effect upon subsequent thought, especially during the Reformation, and finally the reaction against it in our own day. This reaction will be seen to have made its way through painful experiences of dis-

illusionment to comparative peace, to readiness for a new construction of thought by means of the modern understanding of ethics and personality; which will probably, after all, be found to be a return to primitive Greek conceptions of Christ as the express image of the Father and the mystical Sponsor and Representative of men.

# II

# THE PATRISTIC TEACHING

# II

## THE PATRISTIC TEACHING

### 1. General Characteristics

There is no necessity for a complete statement of the doctrine of the Fathers. It will suffice to point out those details in which their point of view is different from Anselm's, and those in which they have been supposed to anticipate him. Mr. J. J. Lias divides the writers in the early Church concerning our Lord's redemptive work into two classes: those who explained it wrongly, and those who did not explain it at all.[1] The first is represented by those who interpreted it as a ransom paid to the devil; the second by the Apostolic Fathers, and others in the patristic period who did not discuss the meaning and reason of the death of Christ.

It is universally confessed that the Fathers generally were not concerned with what we should now call the philosophy of the Atonement. Many of them never in any form raised the question, How did Christ redeem us? They accepted the fact, but evidently had no clear, coherent theory of the process,

[1] *The Atonement*, p. 66.

and no notion that any such theory was in any wise necessary. Its absence from the creeds, except in the simple expressions, "who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man, and was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate; He suffered and was buried, and the third day He rose again," proves that they could not have regarded any explanation of it as essential to orthodoxy, or as the corner-stone of the Christian faith. Its omission by the Apologists, and the fact that no council formulated any statement of Atonement, also indicate that the Church of the first seven centuries believed the question of the *modus* of Redemption to be infinitely less vital than it has been regarded by the churches of the Reformation.

The patristic controversies were Christological and anthropological; nevertheless, Soteriology occupied the minds of the best of the Fathers, so distinctly and intelligently, that their common mode of explanation must be considered to unite them in a class additional to those mentioned by Mr. Lias. They explained the Redemption by the Incarnation, in direct antithesis to theologians of more recent times; that is, they made the Incarnation primary and the Redemption secondary.[1] Their theology dealt with the

[1] Dr. Littledale in *The Atonement: A Clerical Symposium*, pp. 7, 8.

Nature of God and the Person of Christ. Dr. George P. Fisher says that they gave themselves so intently to the questions relating to the Divinity of Christ, because the significance of His saving work was inseparably involved in them.[1] But they did not separate the Person from the work, as was afterwards done; on the contrary, some of them made the two practically identical. "The quite subordinate place allotted to the Atonement," which Dr. Fisher remarks as such a striking phenomenon, is really due to their definite conviction that, in essence, the Incarnation was itself the Atonement.

Some spoke as though the very assumption of human nature rescued man from corruption. But, as a rule, the death of Christ was included, as bound up with the idea and purpose of the Incarnation. The death was not expressed as the *end* for which "the Word was made flesh." The Incarnation was not reduced to a mere means to that end; for it was sometimes intimated that God would have become incarnate, even if there had been no sin. The death, however, was looked upon as the necessary and effective means of our rescue from the bondage of corruption, and the resurrection as the condition of our participation in the divine life. Sometimes, salvation through the historic Christ was made equivalent to a divine revelation, ac-

[1] *History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 161.

cessible to all. Again, the Incarnation was treated as the predestined mode of perfecting our nature and bringing us into full communion with God. Further, it was held that Christ renewed us by mystical union with Himself, and that the "deification" of humanity was consequent upon the Incarnation of Deity.

So that, although the period of the Fathers was not an age of dogma upon this particular subject, it is manifest that there was an attempt to explain the Atonement by the Incarnation. Dr. Shedd laments the absence of exact and logical formulation of this doctrine by the Fathers: that they present "no scientific construction" of it, that they "attempted no *rationale* of the dogma"; that they made no reference to "the judicial reasons and grounds of the death" of our Lord.[1] This simply means that he does not find the scholastic theory in the Fathers — which is quite true; but it also indicates the happy distinction between their theology and that introduced by Anselm and continued by the Reformers. We shall find in them nothing of satisfaction, active or passive, nothing of real appeasement of the Father's wrath (except in the Latins), nothing of substitutionary suffering, nothing of the imputation of our sins or of Christ's merits, nothing of justice as the characteristic attribute of God's nature, nothing

[1] *History of Christian Doctrine*, II. 204, 207, 211.

legal or metaphysical or artificial in the description of Christ's work.[1]

## 2. The Apostolic Fathers

The immediate successors of the Apostles confine themselves to the language of Scripture, without exegesis or theorising. Some apply passages of the Old Testament to the death of Christ; as the scarlet thread of Rahab, Psalm xxii., and Isaiah liii. Some make large use of sacrificial language, finding in Christ the fulfilment of the types in the Jewish ritual.[2] Others again use analogies of a rhetorical or pictorial kind, to describe the effect of the Saviour's work upon us. Their frequent references to the cross have been interpreted as indicating the *ground* of our forgiveness; but they seem rather to express the *means*.

The *Didaché* has no mention of a saving work of Christ, more than of "the knowledge and faith and immortality made known" through Him (10). Hermas alludes to it only in connection with His whole

[1] H. N. Oxenham, *The Catholic Doctrine of Atonement*, pp. 128, 129.

[2] It cannot be assumed that these sacrifices connote expiation. Says Dr. A. A. Hodge (Schaff-Herzog, Art. "Atonement"): "It is certain that, more or less clearly, they always held the doctrine of expiation and satisfaction subsequently held by the whole church." His references show merely that they employed Scriptural phrases, and nothing can be less certain than Dr. Hodge's statement.

activity.[1] Clement of Rome says that "the blood of Christ . . . having been shed for our salvation, has conferred upon the whole world the grace of repentance."[2] He says again: "On account of the love He bore us, Jesus Christ our Lord has given His blood for us by the will of God; His flesh for [ὑπέρ] our flesh, and His soul for [ὑπέρ] our souls" (xlix). But his main thought is ethical, chapter xvi. being a description of Christ as an example of humility, the whole of Isaiah liii. and parts of Psalm xxii. being quoted in illustration. He has no doctrinal explanation of the death of Christ, referring to it simply as "the constraining motive to gratitude, reverence, and self-sacrifice."[3]

Barnabas regards the death of Christ as the fulfilment of prophecy: "The prophets prophesied concerning Him. . . . It was necessary that He should suffer on the tree" (Ep. v). He also says: "The Son of God could not have suffered except for our sakes" (vii); but he dwells especially on the analogy of the Levitical sacrifices, applying the figures of

[1] *Pastor*, iii. Simil. v.

[2] *I ad Cor.*, vii. Lightfoot reads "ὑπήνεγκεν, 'offered.'" The alternative reading, ἐπήνεγκεν, has the meaning given in the text; although Canon Moberly prefers "won" or "rescued" for either reading (*Atonement and Personality*, p. 326). The translation in T. and T. Clark's *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* evidently agrees with Lightfoot, rendering, "has *set before*" (I. 12).

[3] J. S. Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, p. 421.

the scape-goat and the red heifer as types. There is no attempt beyond this to enter into the reasons for Christ's sacrifice.

Ignatius frequently speaks of the sufferings and death of Christ "for our sakes," [1] but connects them specifically with forgiveness in but one passage in the traditional formula: "the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins." [2] He dwells upon the manifestation of love in Christ's Passion, which has the life-giving power of making us like Him: "be ye renewed . . . in love, that is, the blood of Jesus Christ." [3] But, above all, he thinks of the personality of Christ as the nourishment of the soul: "I desire the bread of God, the heavenly bread, the bread of life, which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, . . . and I desire the drink of God, namely His blood, which is incorruptible love and eternal life." [4] The symbol and means of this nourishment are the Eucharist, which he declares to be "the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ." [5]

The beautiful Epistle to Diognetus, which Dr. Fisher calls "the pearl of the Apologetic literature," is much more explicit in its reference to the Atonement than other writings of this period. It contains

[1] *Ad Smyrn.*, ii; *ad Polyc.*, iii; *ad Magn.*, ix; *ad Trall.*, ii.
[2] *Ad Smyrn.*, vii.
[3] *Ad Trall.*, viii.
[4] *Ad Rom.*, vii.
[5] *Ad Smyrn.*, vii.

some striking and unusual expressions, which have been interpreted as conveying the later idea of substitution. The author speaks of "*punishment* impending," of Christ as a "ransom for us," of His taking the burden of our iniquities, of His *covering* our sins by His righteousness; and exclaims: "O sweet exchange! O benefits surpassing all expectation! that the wickedness of many should be covered by the One righteous, and the righteousness of the One should justify many unrighteous!" (ix). Dr. Stevens asserts that this means "a transfer of our iniquities to Christ and of His righteousness to us."[1] If so, it is certainly astonishing that it should have found so little response in the subsequent discussion, or indeed for many centuries thereafter. But it seems extremely unlikely that it means anything of the sort, however familiar the language may sound. The allusions to "punishment and death" as the "reward" of our wickedness, and to the covering of our sins, are Scriptural enough; the latter being the Hebraism rendered in our version of the Old Testament by "make atonement for." The whole connection shows that it is a reminiscence of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans: "For what else could cover (or, make atonement for) our sins but His righteousness? In whom could we wicked and ungodly men be justified, save in the Son of God alone?"

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

The expressions, λύτρον ὑπὲρ and ἀνταλλαγή, cannot be made to do service for the idea of substitution. The Biblical words must stand or fall with their Biblical use; ὑπέρ means only "in behalf of," and λύτρον is constantly used for "the condition upon which a thing is granted." The "exchange," in a Calvinistic statement of the Atonement, would have meant an exchange of place, a transfer of merit and demerit. But here it manifestly means the exchange of righteousness for wickedness, of justification for condemnation, an exchange of situation in the sinner himself brought about by the love of the Father who gave His own Son for us and by the righteousness of the Son who willingly offered Himself. The entire chapter is very eloquent, and is clearly rhetorical and devotional rather than dogmatic.[1]

The Epistle bases redemption, not upon God's need of reconciliation, but upon His clemency and kindness. "As a king sends his son, who is also a king, so sent He Him; as God He sent Him; as to men He sent Him; as a Saviour He sent Him; as

[1] Archdeacon Norris understands the "exchange" to be the inspiring fact that God became man in order that we might become the children of God (*Rudiments of Theology*, p. 273). Abbé J. Rivière interprets the Epistle as saying that the holiness of Christ is the "compensation nécessaire et efficace de nos fautes," and calls this "le grand principe paulinien de la substitution du Christ à l'humanité coupable" (*Le Dogme de la Rédemption*, p. 111). But these ideas belong to later ages, and may not be attributed to this author.

persuading, not as forcing; for mere force belongeth not to God. He sent Him as calling, not persecuting; as loving us, not as judging us" (vii). The whole atmosphere is vitally different from that of the legal theory of retributive justice and vicarious satisfaction.

Dr. Shedd claims, however, that the latter idea "is *distinctly enunciated* by the Apostolic Fathers." But again He says: they "merely repeated the Scripture phraseology which contained the truth, . . . but did not *enunciate* it in the exact and guarded statements of a scientific formula." [1] "Taken as a whole, the body of patristic theology exhibits but an imperfect theoretic comprehension of the most fundamental truth in the Christian system." [2] Now, no inference can be built upon the connection of forgiveness with Christ's death in the very language of the Scriptures; for that simply remands the inquiry to what the Scriptures themselves mean, and it is a too common tendency to read later theories into the New Testament writers. The abundant references to the sufferings and death of Christ are quite indeterminate. These earliest writers stop with attributing the familiar valuation to them, but they attempt to give no reason for their saving efficacy. The slight similarity of a few expressions to later formulations cannot be regarded as in any way characteristic in an age of

[1] *Op. cit.*, II. 265, 211, 264.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

"simple affirmations." Neander says of this period: "Of a satisfaction paid by the sufferings of Christ to the Divine justice not the slightest mention is as yet to be found." [1] A French author quoted by Rivière speaks of "the power of platitude or dullness suited to the epoch of the Apostolic Fathers." [2] All these candid admissions by very conservative writers are a sufficient answer to the assertion that any theory of satisfaction, Anselmic or Reformation, can be found in the Apostolic Fathers.

### 3. The Post-Apostolic Fathers

The conception of redemption during the second and third centuries was partly ethical, as the obedience of the new law and the entrance by faith into eternal life through a true knowledge of God; it was partly idealistic and mystical, as the change wrought in human nature by the Incarnation. The Fathers of this period made little of the guilt of sin, but much of its spiritual effects. The absence from them of fear of the Divine displeasure and of the need of its placation is remarkable, considering how universal these ideas were among the pagans. In direct antithesis to Anselm and the moderns, they do not deal with the objective effect of Christ's work upon God.

[1] *Church History*, II. 385.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

a. *Justin Martyr* (*ob.* 164?).

Dr. Fisher says: "It is the Incarnation rather than the Atonement that interests him."[1] This is true, but he saw a redeeming and reconciling efficacy in the Incarnation, in and of itself. *E. g.*: "Corruption then becoming inherent in nature, it was necessary that He who wished to save should be one who destroyed the efficient cause of corruption. And this could not otherwise be done than by the life which is according to nature being united to that which had received the corruption, and so destroying the corruption, while preserving as immortal for the future that which had received it. It was therefore necessary that the Word should become possessed of a body, that He might deliver us from the death of natural corruption."[2] He sometimes speaks as though we were saved by the *teaching* of Christ. "Becoming man according to His will, He taught us these things for the conversion and restoration of the human race."[3] In the *Dialogue with Trypho*, he describes his studies in philosophy with the Peripatetics, the Stoics, the Pythagoreans, the Pla-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

[2] Fragment in Vol. II., *Ante-Nicene Library*, T. and T. Clark, p. 358.

[3] *Apol.*, I. xxiii. "It is the teaching of Christ which holds the central place in Justin's thoughts" (Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 62).

tonists, and then narrates his conversion to Christ, by means of which he learned things which Plato and the others never knew. Hence, Christianity was to him the divinely revealed philosophy: "I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable. Thus, and for this reason, I am a philosopher" (viii). Redemption, to him, therefore, was the result of perfect revelation. Irenæus quotes him as saying in his lost work against Marcion: "*summing up* His own handiwork in Himself." [1] This is the *recapitulatio*, which was so radical in Irenæus's own exposition of the Atonement, and which represents Justin's special emphasis upon the Incarnation.

Yet he also speaks of "the bloody passion of Christ on the cross." [2] He refers many times in the *Apologies* and the *Dialogue* to the death as the necessary preliminary to the resurrection (as in *Apol.*, I. lxiii); but Professor Harnack says that he "nowhere gives any indication of seeing in the death of Christ more than the mystery of the Old Testament, and the confirmation of its trustworthiness." [3] This is evident when any attempt is made to draw modern inferences from his language. He says: "The Father of all wished His Christ for the whole human family to take upon Him the curses of all" (*Dial.*,

[1] *Adv. Haer.*, iv. 6, 2.
[2] *Ante-Nicene Library*, II. 357.
[3] *History of Dogma*, I. 220.

xcv). But he specifically denies that any "curse lies on the Christ of God" (xciv); he speaks of "the seeming curse" (xc), and, "as if He were accursed" (xcv). He even says: "Our suffering and crucified Christ was not under the curse of the law" (cxi), and holds with Tertullian that the curse was laid on Him by men (xcv). The "curses of all" which Christ took upon Him, then, must refer to the evils incident to man's sinful condition, and means no more than the equivalent expression which Justin uses in the following sentence: "He suffered these things in behalf of the human family." The redemption was by means of Christ's identification with the sufferings of the race on account of sin.

Neander says: "In Justin Martyr may be recognised the idea of a satisfaction rendered by Christ through suffering — at least lying at the bottom, if it is not clearly unfolded and held fast in the form of conscious thought." [1] This is one of those instances of reading into an author ideas which belong to a much later age, from the assumption that what is now regarded as orthodox *must* have been held by the primitive writers. We look in vain for any trace of satisfaction, or even expiation, which must have

[1] *Church History*, I. 642. Similarly Rivière: "Nous avons là déjà l'idée de substitution, qui sera si féconde dans la tradition postérieure" (*Le Dogme*, etc., p. 115). But Rivière admits that we are cursed for our sins; Justin regarded the curse on Christ as having been laid on Him by men.

been found in the *Dialogue* if he had accepted it as Christian doctrine.[1]

### b. *Irenæus* (*ob.* 202).

Dr. Lindsay says, in his article on Irenæus in the *Encyclopædia Britannica:* "It is difficult to state with any precision what Irenæus holds about the nature of the effect of Christ's work of reconciliation upon man. He makes great use of metaphor, and evidently had not learned to express himself otherwise. The doctrine is still in its pictorial state in his mind. Still, traces appear of that tendency afterwards common in the Greek Church to make the Incarnation rather than the crucifixion and ascension of our Lord the most important part of His work, and to look upon the effect of that work as a transfusion of the Incarnation through redeemed humanity" (XIII. 274). It may be said, however, that amid the variety of his figures may be discerned a consistent adherence to this root-thought which he derived from Justin.

Occasionally, he seems to fall to a lower level. "Propitiating God for men, . . . that exiled man might go forth from condemnation." [2] "Propitiating

[1] Rivière admits of Justin, as of his predecessors: "Pour en expliquer la vertu, il n'y a pas encore de théorie propriément dite" (p. 115).

[2] *Adv. Haer.*, iv. 8, 2.

for us the Father against whom we had sinned, and cancelling [consolatus] our disobedience by His own obedience; conferring also upon us the gift of communion with, and subjection to, our Maker." [1] Yet, as Dr. Fisher admits, this is not dwelt upon or definitely worked out (p. 86); and in any case he makes the central and reparative element in the work of Christ to consist in His obedience, which he illustrates by the temptation (v. 21, 2). On the other hand, in answer to the question, "Why did the Saviour descend into the world?" he says that it was to give the knowledge of the truth; that is, He is Redeemer as Teacher, which we have already found in Clement and Justin (ii. 14, 7).

He views the saving work as completed in the passion and death.[2] But elsewhere he makes Christ's body and blood the means of our redemption, because they were the *means of communion* between God and man. "If the Lord became incarnate for any other order of things, and took flesh of any other substance, He has not then summed up human nature in His own person, nor in that case can He be termed flesh. . . . He had Himself, therefore, flesh and blood, recapitulating in Himself not a certain other, but that original handiwork of the Father,

[1] *Adv. Haer.*, v. 17, 1. See also iii. 18; xvii. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, ii. 20, 3; iii. 16, 9: "who did by suffering reconcile us to God."

seeking out that thing which had perished. And for this cause the apostle, in the Epistle to the Colossians, says, . . . 'Ye have been reconciled in the body of His flesh,' because the righteous flesh has reconciled that flesh which was being kept under bondage in sin, and brought it into friendship with God. . . . For that thing is reconciled which had formerly been in enmity. Now, if the Lord had taken flesh from another substance, He would not, by so doing, have reconciled that one to God which had been inimical through transgression. But now, by means of communion with Himself, the Lord has reconciled man to God the Father, in reconciling us to Himself by the body of His own flesh, and redeeming us by His own blood. . . . And in every epistle the apostle plainly testifies, that through the flesh of our Lord, and through His blood, we have been saved" (v. 14, 2, 3).

Thus, he distinctly lays stress upon the Incarnation itself as the Atonement, by its manifestation of God and man actually at one in Christ, and by its restoration of communion between man and God. In this connection, we have the first expression of the idea, so often repeated in the Greek Fathers: "Our Lord Jesus Christ became what we are, that He might bring us to be even what He is Himself." This may be regarded as a fundamental Greek thought, more

[1] *Adv. Haer.*, v, preface; also, iv. 6, 2: "He was made that which we are, that He might make us completely what He is."

fully developed than any other; so that to most of those Fathers the essence of the Atonement lay in the Incarnation itself. With Irenæus, this is not a mere inference; it is expressed in so many words: "the Lord has restored us into friendship through His Incarnation, having become the Mediator between God and men" (that is, the medium of communication).[1]

It may be said that Irenæus's characteristic word is the one he borrowed from Justin, "recapitulatio, ἀνακεφαλαίωσις," which he also calls "the adoption."[2] It was to him thoroughly realistic, and seemed to be warranted by St. Paul: "that He might sum up in one all things in Christ" (Eph. i. 10). Sin was separation from God (v. 27, 2); what was lost in Adam was the image and likeness of God (iii. 18, 1); so that Rivière is right in making the word include both "résumé" and "restauration" (p. 120). Christ saved men by identification with them; "attaching

[1] *Adv. Haer.*, v. 17, 1. See iii. 18, 7: "For it was incumbent upon the Mediator between God and men, by His relationship to both, to bring both to friendship and concord, and present man to God, while He revealed God to man."

[2] *Ibid.*, iii. 16, 3 and 6; 18, 1 and 7; 21, 10; 23, 1; iv. 38, 1; v. 14, 2; 16, 2; 18, 3; 19, 1; 20, 2; 21, 1, 2. See also Hilary (*De Trin.*, ii. 24): "He did it that by His incarnation he might take to Himself from the Virgin the fleshly nature, and that through this commingling there might come into being a hallowed Body of all humanity, that so through that Body which He was pleased to assume all mankind might be hid in Him, and He in return, through His unseen existence, be reproduced in all."

man to God by His own Incarnation" (ii. 20, 3). "By His birth as man" He reunites things unnaturally separated, and "first and alone realises the hitherto unaccomplished destination of humanity." [1] Dr. Dorner says that "the idea of *substitution* is common to all the Fathers," and then quotes Irenæus on recapitulation to prove it.[2] But that is the very antipodes of substitution, which is equivalent to putting Christ in the place of others, whereas Irenæus thought of His solidarity with them by His mystical reception of them into His Divine Person.[3]

Irenæus also says that Christ gave Himself as a *redemptio* or ransom: [4] although he never represents this as paid to the devil.[5] He says further: "Therefore by His own blood the Lord redeemed us, giving His soul for [*ὑπέρ*] our souls, and His flesh for [*ἀντί*] our flesh" (v. 1, 1).[6] It has been frequently asserted that, while he may not have explicitly stated that the ransom was paid to the devil, "the early hints of this theory are to be found in his writings." [7] There can

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.*, II. 238–242.

[2] *System of Christian Doctrine*, IV. 8; italics his.

[3] "Nous sommes solidaires du second Adam comme nous l'étions du premier—solidaires jusqu' à l'identité" (Rivière, p. 123). "In the second Adam we were reconciled, *we being made obedient* even unto death" (*Adv. Haer.*, v. 16, 3).

[4] Probably *λύτρον* in the lost original.

[5] *Contra* Harnack, II. 290.

[6] *Ἀντί* is probably the preposition of *price*, after *λυτρωσαμένου*.

[7] A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 358.

be no doubt that Satan was from this time very conspicuous in patristic thought, and that deliverance from the fear of him was the practical import of the ensuing doctrine. But it was Origen who first formulated this unfortunate theory.[1] Irenæus held that men were *God's* debtors, unjustly kept in captivity by Satan, although their having yielded themselves to him made it unfair for them to be rescued by the mere exercise of Divine power. This is vitally different from Origen's recognition of the devil's rightful claim. Moreover, the only two passages referred to in proof of the derivation from Irenæus are *Adv. Haer.*, v. 1, 1 and v. 21, 3; and neither of them will bear out the contention.

The crucial passage is the former, especially in the sentence: "The Word of God . . . dealt justly even with the apostasy itself, redeeming from it His own property, not by violent means, . . . but by means of persuasion, as became a God persuading and not using violence to obtain what He desires." [2] The question is, to whom does "persuasion" (suadela) refer, to the devil or man? Many apply it to the devil, as though God recognised certain rights

[1] Harnack, III. 307; Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 279.

[2] "Non cum vi, . . . sed secundum suadelam, quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim inferentem, accipere quae vellet." Translated: "as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent means to obtain" (*Ante-Nicene Library*, IX. 56); and: "as became God, by persuasion rather than by violence regaining what He sought" (Norris, *op. cit.*, p. 276).

of the "apostasy," notwithstanding the fact that it had originally gained its mastery over us by violence and "tyrannised over us unjustly"; among these are Baur and Neander.[1] F. Huidekoper contrasts the injustice of the apostate in acquiring his mastery over us with the just behaviour of "the Word" even to the apostate, in redeeming His own, "not by force, but by persuasion and as became a Divine Being, persuading *him* without violence to *accept* what *he* wished."[2] Mr. Oxenham understands by "persuasion," "a method which convinced Satan his rights were at an end"; and translates: "as it became God to receive what He willed by persuasion and not by force" (p. 132).[3]

The language, however, is susceptible of a different rendering. Dr. Shedd gives the substance thus: "Mankind did not apostatise through compulsion, but by persuasion (suadendo); consequently their redemption must take the same course."[4] Archdeacon Norris also applies it to man, and says its meaning is "that Christ obliged the tyrant to surrender his captives not by violence, but by inducing those captives to forsake him."[5] Dr. Tymms inter-

[1] F. C. Baur, *Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 28; A. Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas*, I. 212.

[2] *Christ's Mission to the Underworld*, p. 90.

[3] Also, apparently, Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, p. 11.

[4] *Hist. Christ. Doctrine*, II. 222.

[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 274–279.

prets that Satan had no rights over us, but a forcible snatching of man from his grasp would not be a real redemption. Our rescue, therefore, is by the persuasive power of Christ's death, whereby we are induced to forsake voluntarily the service of the Evil One, so reversing the process by which we came into bondage.[1]

It has been happily suggested that Irenæus was simply repeating the familiar expression of the Epistle to Diognetus: "ὡς σώζων ἔπεμψεν, ὡς πείθων, οὐ βιαζόμενος."[2] The twenty-first chapter of this same fifth book, "Against Heresies," seems to render the above conclusion certain. "The apostate angel of God is . . . *vanquished* by the Son of man keeping the commandment of God" (v. 21, 3); and Section 2 applies this, not to the passion, but to the temptation, wherein Satan tried to persuade our Lord as he had previously enticed man. Neither in the temptation nor in any other relation did Christ try to persuade the devil. On the contrary, "the Word bound him securely as a runaway slave, and made spoil of his goods. . . . And justly is he led captive" (*Ibid.*). Our Lord's

[1] T. Vincent Tymms, *op. cit.*, p. 24. A similar view is taken by Dorner, Gieseler, and Hagenbach (see I. 83); Young, *The Life and Light of Men*, p. 438; Fisher, *Hist. Christ. Doct.*, p. 17; Harnack (*cf.* II. 290 and III. 307); Allen (*Christ. Instit.*, p. 357, note); Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, p. 431; Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, p. 139.

[2] In fact, Dorner uses this very passage to refute Baur.

relation to the devil was one of conquest; the moral suasion was addressed to man. The influence of His death was on mankind, not on the devil; so that the idea to that extent is one of moral influence. The concession of the devil's claim was in reality a Gnostic heresy; and Baur applies "suadela" to Satan, because he supposes that Irenæus had substituted the devil for the Demiurge. But few will believe that the opponent of the Gnostics should have differed from them only nominally on this point.[1]

### c. *Clement of Alexandria* (*ob. circa* 216)

This Father alludes to several New Testament figures, but lays no emphasis upon them by working them out. He also quotes without explanation: "He is the propitiation for our sins, as St. John says." [2] Some of his expressions suggest the traditional language of later times. Thus he makes Jesus say to the Christian soul, "I have fully paid for thy death which thou didst owe for thy sins"; and he recounts

[1] The proofs adduced for the hints of Origen's theory in Irenæus are wholly inadequate, and are obtained by separating the first chapter of the Fifth Book from all the rest of the argument. In any case, a method of "persuasion" is radically different from one of literal "ransom," whether actual or deceptive; the only point of contact would be the recognition of Satan's rights over man. As the theory had undoubted recognition for over eight hundred years, it is only a question of criticism whether Irenæus should be freed from any sympathy with it.

[2] *Paed.*, iii. 12.

the legend of St. John saying to the chief of the brigands: "I will render account to Christ for thee; if need be, I will voluntarily suffer thy death, as Christ suffered death for us; I will give my life in exchange for thine." [1] This no doubt speaks of a proposed substitutionary endurance of penalty; but it refers to following the spirit of Christ, not to a precise similarity of the two acts, and is so purely incidental that it cannot be quoted as evidence of a definite anticipation of the later vicarious satisfaction.

He devotes the eighth chapter of the First Book of *The Pœdagogue* or *Instructor* to the truth, so often forgotten afterward, and particularly by Anselm, that justice and love are identical. His essential thought was the indwelling God, and the natural alliance of humanity with God. Hence, the readjustment, made necessary by sin, is brought about by the knowledge of the truth concerning God. The whole treatise shows that he looked upon forgiveness, not as the remission of penalty, but as the cure of ignorance which is the cause of sin.[2] The very title exhibits Christ as the incarnation of truth, and Christianity as the revealed philosophy, following Justin;

[1] *Quis dives salvetur*, 23, 49; P. G., IX. col. 628, 649. When a translation is inaccessible, references are given to Migne's *Patrologia*.

[2] "It is for him a revelation rather than a restoration" (Cruttwell, *The Literary History of Early Christianity*, II. 455).

and in a fragment on the First Epistle of St. John he makes the blood of Christ equivalent to His doctrine.[1] Christ's death was an example of beneficial martyrdom, "in imitation of whom the apostles . . . suffered for the churches which they founded."[2] He went a step farther than Irenæus, and said that Christ "became man in order that thou mayest learn from Man, how man becomes God."[3] His point of view is therefore as distant as possible from that of the theory of Anselm.

### d. *Origen* (*ob.* 253)

As the first great dogmatist, Origen was naturally "the first to attempt a philosophy of the Atonement."[4] He sympathised with Clement's conception of Christ's work as an *illumination*, and with other phases of his thought.[5] He spoke of Christ's suffering on our account in this wise: "Who bore our sins and infirmities, because He was able to pay for (or loose, λύσαι)

[1] P. G., IX. col. 735.

[2] *Stromateis*, iv. cap. ix.

[3] *Protrep.*, i. 8. The idea of the deification of our nature by the Incarnation is frequently found in the writers of this period. *Cf.* Hippolytus: "γέγονας γὰρ θεός . . . ὅτι ἐθεοποιήθης, ἀθάνατος γεννηθείς" (*Philosoph.*, x. 33, 34; P. G., XVI. col. 3450–3454 *ter*).

[4] C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 210.

[5] "If we inquire for the work of Christ, we find the dominant thought to be, that Christ was physician, teacher, lawgiver, and example" (Reinhold Seeberg, *Text-Book of the History of Doctrines*, I. 153).

the sin of the whole world received into Himself, and to consume and destroy it." [1] Again he says: "It is clear that he actually suffered punishment"; but this is only to prove that the sufferings were actually "painful and distressing." [2] Dr. Harnack says that he "propounded views as to the value of salvation and as to the significance of Christ's death on the cross, with a variety and detail rivalled by no theologian before him." [3] But his real originality lay in his combination of propitiation and literal ransom, of the expiatory sacrifice with the Marcionite notion of a payment to the devil. The introduction of these two elements into Christian theology has been rightly characterised as "of epoch-making importance." [4]

Not only are they mutually exclusive as parts of a theory, but Origen is not consistent in his doctrine of sacrifice. A death that is offered to the devil in payment of his claim cannot be at the same time an offering to God of a piacular sacrifice. Then, Dr. Bigg emphasises the fact that Origen "held the sacrifice of Christ to have consisted not of His Body but of His Soul," [5] and He could not have offered His Soul to the devil; although Origen escapes this difficulty by making the offer insincere and fraudulent.

[1] *In Johann.*, xxviii. 14; P. G., XIV. col. 720.
[2] *Contra Cels.*, ii. 23.
[3] II. 367, note.
[4] *Ibid.*, III. 308.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 222; see P. G., XIII. col. 1397; Harnack, III. 307.

Moreover, he taught that the value of the sacrifice lay in its purity and voluntariness. And yet, commenting upon Rom. iii. 25, he approximates the heathen modes of thought so notably absent from St. Paul, when he says that the Apostle "adds something more sublime, and declares that God set Him forth a propitiation, by which, indeed, He would *make God propitious* to men by the offering of His own Body"; and again: "The true High Priest, He hath made God propitious to thee by His Blood." [1] There can be no doubt that this feature of the Atonement was in his mind with several others, but undigested and inharmonious.

The Christian idea of sacrifice is a transfiguration of the lower idea contained in Judaism; but the pagan connotations were wonderfully absent even from the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament. In Origen, however, we find the pagan thought of expiation still surviving, just as we find Gnosticism intruding into his interpretation of ransom. Dr. Harnack thinks that he also regarded sacrifice as, in the strict sense, vicarious; but the two passages which he cites from *Contra Celsum* can by no means be accepted as proof-texts (II. 367). The only sentence that is pertinent in vii. 17 has nothing whatever

[1] *In Rom.*, iii. 8; P. G., XIV. col. 946. *Hom. in Lev.*, ix. 10; P. G., XII. col. 523; see also col. 755. See Charles Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, II. 566; Bigg, 211; Hagenbach, I. 186; Rivière, p. 138.

to do with what we understand by substitution. "There is nothing absurd in a man having died, and in his death being not only *an example of death endured for the sake of piety*, but also *the first blow in the conflict* which is to overthrow the power of that evil spirit the devil." And in i. 31, his saying that "this is analogous to the case of those who have died for their country in order to remove pestilence, or barrenness, or tempests," suggests the modern distinction between vicarious and substitutionary — the one describing a fact of common experience, the other a figment of theological metaphysics.[1] Too much importance may therefore be attached to single expressions of this unsystematic author. Rivière says of this: "If we demand the final reason of this mysterious and indispensable substitution (?), Origen does not give it to us; he does not dream of disclosing to us the indefeasible exigencies of the Divine justice. We see that the bottom of the mystery is not reached, and that Origen, on the whole, perceives only the exterior face of it. . . . Origen often speaks of sacrifice and of victim; he fails to investigate the moral realities which these words conceal" (pp. 138, 141). Dr. Shedd recognises that his fundamental principles are so "incompatible with the doctrine of

[1] See also his explanation of Is. liii. 3 by I Cor. iv. 13, making our Lord's suffering of the same kind, but of a higher degree (Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, I. 185).

a satisfaction of Divine justice," or "of Christ's expiation," "that we are compelled to give these passages a modified meaning." [1]

His theory of Christ as our Ransom is a misinterpretation of a metaphor. It was natural that the figure should be literalised into rigid fact, owing to the familiar custom of ransoming captives taken by brigands or in war.[2] As soon as the question was asked, to whom was the payment made? the only possible answers were Origen's and Anselm's.[3] The theory that the ransom was paid to the devil was, of course, not invented by him, but borrowed from Marcion. He was the first, however, to give status and currency to the idea that the devil had a rightful claim upon us, which could not justly be overlooked. He says: "If therefore we were bought with a price, . . . we were bought doubtless from some one whose slaves we were, and who demanded such a price as he pleased for the release of those whom he held. It was the devil, however, who held us, to whom we had been allotted (or into whose power we had been

[1] *Op. cit.*, II. 236 *sq.*

[2] "Here all that is metaphor and illustration in St. Paul seems to be regarded as hard scientific statement" (J. H. Wilson, *The Gospel of the Atonement*, p. 67).

[3] It is remarkable that the Biblical conception of a redemption by war and victory should have been so completely lost. See especially the uses of λυτροῦν in LXX. Here also is the first intrusion of the commercial idea, and also of the weakness of a Redeemer who was compelled to pay, and could not conquer.

dragged) by our sins. He therefore demanded as our price the blood of Christ." [1] He also adopted from the Basilidians the disgraceful addition of God's intentional deception of the devil. Nothing could show better than this the low moral ideals of the age in which the theory was framed. He says: "To whom did [Christ] give His soul as a ransom for many? Not, of course, to God. Was it then to the Evil One? [Certainly,] for he held us in his power until the soul of Jesus should be given him as our ransom, he being *deceived* by the supposition that he could hold it in subjection, and not perceiving that it must be retained at the cost of torture which he could not endure." [2] It may be noted that ἀντάλλαγμα has no meaning if the price was not really paid; which makes this ransom very different from the substitution taught by the Reformers.

The Divine bargain and deception are alike mythological and dualistic. This thought was not made so prominent as afterwards in Gregory of Nyssa. But the general theory prevailed, with but

[1] *In Rom.*, lib. ii. 13, *opp.* 4; quoted in F. Huidekoper, *Christ's Mission to the Underworld*, p. 88. He also quotes the following description of the price: "The soul of the Son of man was given as our ransom; but not His spirit, for He had already committed that to His Father, saying, 'Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit'; nor yet His body, for we nowhere find any such thing written of Him." *Cf.* Bigg, *op. cit.*, p. 222: Oxenham, *Cath. Doct. of At.*, pp. 136, 137.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 91; P. G., XIII. col. 1397.

few protests, until it was overthrown by Anselm.[1] The significance of this fact must be remarked, because the payment of Satan's claim is wholly inconsistent with a payment to justice or a satisfaction of the demands of God.

While the period of the Post-Apostolic Fathers gave rise to a theory of ransom, which was more or less prevalent for a thousand years, it cannot be said to have contained any distinct germs of the later dogmatic teaching. The problem of redemption was studied with little attention by the writers preceding Athanasius, probably because the questions involved had not yet become the subject of controversy.[2] Their emphasis was upon the Incarnation.[3] "The Incarnation itself, the union of the Divine and human natures, was the great saving act. Christ redeems us by what He is, not by what He does." This, which is Dr. Hodge's description of the mystical theory of the Middle Ages, is involved in Justin's

[1] See references in Sabatier, *The Atonement*, pp. 66, 145.

[2] "Le problème de la Rédemption est partiellement touché à propos d'autres questions; il n'est pas encore abordé pour lui-même" (Rivière, p. 142). "En un mot, les historiens les plus catholiques n'hésitent pas à le reconnaître, les Pères se sont souvent contentés sur la Rédemption de vues fragmentaires et, pour tout dire, superficielles: ils n'ont jamais fait de cette doctrine l'objet spécial de leurs recherches" (*Ibid.*, p. 101).

[3] "To them it was not the Atonement, but the Incarnation, which was the centre of Christian faith as of Christian life" (Oxenham, p. 166).

and Irenæus's idea of Christ's recapitulation of the race in Himself, and is more than once asserted in so many words by the latter.[1] The point of view is so distant from the idea of a satisfaction of justice that Dr. Shedd expresses the contrast thus strongly, as an adherent of the satisfaction theory: "Only a very defective and erroneous conception of this cardinal truth of Christianity is to be found in the Alexandrian Soteriology."[2]

### 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers

The Greek Fathers of this period generally conceived of sin as a disease or corruption of human nature, which was cured by Christ's incorporation of mankind in Himself. This was a continuation of the thought of the preceding century. They are especially distinguished by their different views of the meaning of "ransom." Some laid stress on the indemnification of the rights of the devil, while Athanasius most nearly approached the Scriptural conception of ransom as a condition of our redemption, which he considered to be the fulfilment of the requirement of the Divine consistency. The ruling idea of the Atonement was the restoration of human-

[1] Chas. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, II. 585. Among modern authors, Archdeacon Wilson frankly accepts this interpretation of the Atonement (*Gospel of the Atonement*, p. 88).

[2] *Hist. Doct.*, II. 237.

ity to a Divine life. There was an increasing use of expressions which have become familiar to us in the later theology; but it will appear that they are usually charged with a quite different significance.

### a. *Eusebius of Cæsarea* (*ob.* 340)

Some of the phrases of this writer were unusual. In the *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*lib.* x), he speaks of the Lamb of God as punished for us, and as paying a penalty;[1] also, of "attributing to Him the sins of us all";[2] and he constantly uses such common words as *ἀντίψυχον* and *ἀντίλυτρον*, which are interpreted together with the others referred to as clearly substitutionary.[3]

All such single words, however, must be conditioned by the author's fuller exposition of his thought. Taken by themselves, they might seem to suggest penal substitution. But they must be taken in connection with the universal Greek idea of Christ's identification with our humanity. Eusebius attributes the sufferings of Christ, not to the Father, but

[1] *κολασθεὶς καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑποσχών*; P. G., XXII. col. 724. He also says: "*καὶ μόνος αὐτὸν τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐμενῆ καὶ ἵλεων παρέχων* (*Ibid.*, col. 280). "Rendering the Father propitious," is an intrusion of a heathen notion.

[2] *ἐπιγράψας*; *Ibid.*, col. 89.

[3] Similar language is quoted by Rivière from Theodore of Heraclea (p. 165). It undoubtedly contributed to the support of literal substitution, when that thought was finally entertained.

to "those wicked men and powers of darkness"; and he thus expounds Christ's relation to us: "The Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world hath become a curse for us; whom, though He knew not sin, God made sin on our behalf, giving Him for all of us, His life for our life" (ἀντίψυχον). Manifestly we have here no theory of substitution or imputation, but St. Paul's conception of mystical union; for he goes on to say: "But how does He appropriate our sins, and how is He said to bear our iniquities, unless it be by virtue of our being called His Body — even as the Apostle says, 'Ye are His Body, and members in particular'? And, as, when one member suffers, all the members suffer with it, so when the many members suffer and sin, He, too, Himself suffers, according to the relations of sympathy in which He stands to us. Since He was pleased, being the Word of God, to take the form of a servant, and join Himself to us by tabernacling in our common nature, He gathers up into Himself the sorrows of the suffering members, and makes His own our sicknesses, and suffers pain and sorrow for us all, according to the laws of His lovingkindness to man."[1]

### b. *Athanasius* (*ob.* 373)

The treatise *De Incarnatione* has been called "the first attempt that had been made to present Chris-

[1] P. G., XXII. col. 724.

tianity under a scientific aspect." [1] This indicates its importance in connection with the doctrine of the Person of Christ; but, with reference to the Atonement, it is not the first theoretic statement, and it occupies a far nobler point of view than that of Origen. "The relation of the work of Christ to Satan retires into the background." [2] The author is definitely engaged with Anselm's inquiry, Why did Christ become man? but he answers it in a very different way.

The indwelling Logos is the natural representative of humanity, because He reveals a vital kinship or relation between God and man. His mere presence in a human body was "the essential factor in our restoration." The Incarnation itself restored to humanity the Divine image. "He, the incorruptible Son of God, being conjoined with all by a like nature, naturally clothed all with incorruption, by the promise of the resurrection." [3] "For the coming [presence] of the Saviour in the flesh has been the ransom and salvation of all creation." [4] "For the union was of this kind, that He might unite what is man by nature to Him who is in the nature of the Godhead, and his salvation and deification might be sure." [5]

[1] *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, I. 181.
[2] Fisher, *Hist. Christ. Doct.*, p. 162.
[3] *De Inc.*, 9. 2, 3.
[4] *Ep. ad Adelph.*, 6.
[5] *Contra Ar.*, ii. 70. See Hilary, *De Trin.*, ii. 24. On these sayings Rivière remarks from the traditional standpoint: "On n'est

Athanasius seems to make the Incarnation dependent on man's sin: "For the need of man preceded His becoming man, apart from which He had not put on flesh." [1] He repeats the well-known patristic audacity, by which again he makes the Incarnation itself the Atonement, and the work of salvation to consist in our deification: "He was made man that we might be made God." [2]

He presents also the Pauline conception of union with the Head, by which a new principle of life is imparted, thus making the relationship between Redeemer and redeemed vital and organic; which is equivalent to the recapitulation of the whole race in Himself.[3] The cross was not central with Him, except as the means of death, by which Christ entered

pas éloigné de croire que la condition arrive à se confondre avec la cause efficiente" (p. 148).

[1] *Contra Ar.*, ii. 54; iii. 34.

[2] θεοποιηθῶμεν, *De Inc.*, 54; and many times in the *Letters* and *Discourses against the Arians*, especially in this peculiar form: "the flesh being no longer earthly, but being henceforth *made Word*, by reason of God's Word who for our sake became flesh" (iii. 33). See *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV. p. 386, note 1. *Cf.* also Gregory Nazianzen: "until He made me God by the power of His Incarnation" (*Orat.*, xxx. 14; also, xl. 45; but see xlii. 17); Gregory Nyssen: "He was transfused throughout our nature, in order that our nature might by this transfusion of the Divine become itself divine" (*Catech. Magn.*, xxv): Basil (P. G., XXX. col. 834); Chrysostom (*Hom.* in I Tim. xi): John Damasc. (*De Fide Orth.*, iii. 17); Hippolytus (P. G., XVI. *ter* in col. 3450–3454); Augustin (*De Trin.*, iv. 1 and 2; *Serm.*, cxix. 5; cxxi. 5; cxcii. 1; cxciv. 3).

[3] *Contra Ar.*, ii. 21, 69. See also Justin and Irenæus.

completely into the human condition. God *could* have undone the curse by the word of pardon; "but we must consider what was expedient for mankind." [1] That is, the difficulty was not on the side of God, but of man; which is the direct contrary of the principle of the penal theory.

Dr. Harnack intimates that Athanasius, together with Origen, "approximates to the idea of a vicarious suffering of punishment" (III. 308). This is indeed clear enough, if we keep in mind the difference between his idea and the substitutionary penalty which is generally understood by those words. He says that Christ died *ἀντὶ πάντων* (instead of all, or as a price for all; *Inc.*, 8. 4; 9. 1); that He offered His Body for the life of all, or as a ransom for all (*ἀντίψυχον*, 9. 2); that "He put away death by the offering of an equivalent" (*προσφορᾷ τοῦ καταλλήλου*, 9. 1). But the whole argument, which will presently be summarised, shows that this is intended to express sacramental union, not substitution; that is, the precise opposite of what a modern writer would mean by those terms. Athanasius does not hold that Christ died in our place, but that the law of corruption was repealed because we all died *in Him* (*Inc.*, 8). He asserts also that Christ died *with us*, and so rescued us from

[1] *Contra Ar.*, ii. 21, 67, 68; *De Inc.*, 7; see also Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.*, 9; Augustin, *De Trin.*, xiii. 10.

the continuance of death ; the modern would mean that Christ suffered instead of us that we may not suffer. Christ's death was not substituted for ours, since His redeemed all die, and hence He did not die physically and literally in our stead.[1] Nor did He suffer any other penalty than other men suffer in dying; since the only other penalty referred to by Athanasius is the abiding for ever in corruption, and, even in our stead, such an experience would have been impossible to Him.

On the other hand, His death was vicarious, in our stead, in the sense that, if He had not died, we should have been held under the sentence of corruption. That is, man was sentenced to die, and he must and does die, and Christ does not save him from that; but He does save him from the *continuance* of the law of corruption, in life and after death, by incorporating humanity with Himself, by our participation in His immortality. He illustrates by a king dwelling in one of the houses of a large city, and thus giving to the whole city high honour, so that no enemy may descend upon it and subject it.

[1] Athanasius represents Christ's sufferings as confined to temporal death; the penalty for sin extending far beyond physical death is removed by the power of Christ's resurrection. The very essence of the later statement is wanting in him; he nowhere speaks as though our Lord sustained the Father's wrath or underwent the worst part of the penalty of sin — the perdition of the spiritual nature.

"So has it been with the Monarch of all. For now that He has . . . taken up His abode in one body among His peers, henceforth the whole conspiracy of the enemy against mankind is checked, and the corruption of death which before was prevailing against them is done away. For the race of men had gone to ruin, had not the Lord and Saviour of all, the Son of God, come among us to put an end to death." [1]

But Dr. Hagenbach says that we find in Athanasius the *premises* of the later theory of Anselm (I. 348). And Dean Stanley avers that he introduced the idea of satisfaction, though incidentally and subordinately.[2] Moreover, there are single words and expressions which, taken out of their connection, would appear to indorse this judgment. He speaks of "fulfilling the obligation in His death" (*ἐπλήρου τὸ ὀφειλόμενον*, 9. 2); using the Scriptural figure of debt in a sense different from that of Anselm. The word is frequently repeated: "For there was need of death, and death must needs be suffered on behalf of all, that the debt owing from all might be paid." [3] He

[1] *De Inc.*, 9. 4. For the justification of the above statements, see the ensuing analysis of the argument of Athanasius. See also *Contra Ar.*, i. 41, 47–49; ii. 60–70; iv. 6, 7.

[2] *Eastern Church*, p. 350.

[3] *De Inc.*, 20. 2, 5. See also *Contra Ar.*, ii. 66: "paying the debt in our stead" (*ἀνθ' ἡμῶν*, which makes us doubt whether *ἀντί* could have had the rigid significance of "instead of"). Rivière says: "Ces deux aspects de la question [*le désordre metaphysique du péché* and *les consequences pratiques*] ne laissent pas

speaks of God's consistency;[1] and Oxenham quotes the following from the doubtful treatise, *In Passione et Cruce Domini:* "Seeing the impossibility of our paying an equivalent penalty, He took it on Himself" (p. 145).

Let us, however, consider what Athanasius really says. This is the substance of his argument in sections 3–10. — The love of God is the source of our redemption (3. 1–3). He graciously warned man of the result of transgression, and death came as the penalty of disobedience (3. 4). "But by 'dying ye shall die,' what else could be meant but *not dying merely, but also abiding ever in the corruption of death*" (3. 5). As God created man for incorruption, the same Word by whom man was created became Incarnate in order to fulfil that purpose, notwithstanding sin and its penalty (Sections 4 and 5). All sinners then are subject to death, according to the law. "Death having gained upon men, and corruption abiding upon them, the race of man was perishing. . . . For death, as I said above, gained from that time forth a legal hold upon us, and it was impossible to evade the law" (6. 1, 2). Here arises a

que d'introduire quelque flottement — pour ne pas dire une réelle incoherence — dans son système"; and calls his explanations "rapides et superficielles" (p. 151). This is an acknowledgment that the later ideas are not really found in Athanasius.

[1] τὸ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὔλογον, 7. 1, 3; translated, "the just claim of God" in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV.

dilemma between God's veracity and His goodness: it were monstrous and unseemly that either should fail. It would be monstrous for Him to threaten and not to punish: that would prove Him false and be a relaxation of His law, and His holy law *must* be fulfilled and the penalty paid. But it would be unseemly that His children "should go to ruin, and turn again toward *non-existence* by the way of corruption. For it were not worthy of God's goodness that the things He had made should waste away, because of the deceit practised on men by the devil. . . . It was then out of the question to leave men to the current of corruption" (6. 3–10).

He cannot let things take their course; His love demands the rescue of the sinner. But how shall that be made compatible with "what is reasonable with respect to God"? [1] "What possible course was God to take?" To demand repentance "fails to guard God's consistency," since He would be "none the more true, if men did not remain in the grasp of death"; and, secondly, it would not rescue them from corruption, for "it merely stays them from acts of sin" (7. 1–3). Only the Word can recall men to the image of God, Who originally created them in it. "His it was to bring back the corruptible to incorruption, and to maintain intact the consistency of the Father [*i. e.*, with respect to His laws] in behalf

[1] See Dr. Robertson's translation in preceding note.

of all." He alone was "able to recreate everything, and worthy to suffer on behalf of all, and to be the ambassador for all with the Father" (7. 4, 5).

But why should He become Incarnate? In order that, as man, He might undergo man's sentence of death, and so fulfil the law and sustain its constancy (8).[1] Since "no otherwise could the corruption of men be undone save by death as a necessary condition," the Word "to this end takes to Himself a body capable of death, that it, by partaking of the Word Who is above all, might be worthy to die in the stead of all, and might, because of the Word which was come to dwell in it, remain incorruptible, and that thenceforth corruption might be stayed from all by the grace of the *resurrection*.[2] Whence, by offering unto death the body He Himself had taken, as an offering and sacrifice free from any stain, straightway He put away death from all His peers by the offering of an equivalent," and "fulfilled the obligation" of the law (or, "paid the debt," *ἐπλήρου τὸ ὀφειλόμενον*). "Conjoined with all by a like nature," He "naturally clothed all with incorruption, by the promise of the resurrection. For the actual corruption in death has no longer holding-ground against men, by reason of the Word, which by His one body has come to dwell

[1] See also, 25. 2.

[2] Note that the resurrection is the proof that corruption had lost its sway, because His body was incorruptible, and He was one with man.

among them" (see also 10. 5). Then follows the illustration of the king (Section 9).

His conclusion is: Death must still be endured, but it has wholly changed its aspect. "Now that the common Saviour of all has died on our behalf, we no longer die the death as before, agreeably to the warning of the law; for this condemnation has ceased; but, corruption ceasing and being put away by the *grace of the resurrection*, henceforth we are only *dissolved*, agreeably to our bodies' mortal nature, at the time God has fixed for each, that we may be able to gain a better resurrection. For like the seeds which are cast into the earth, we do not perish by dissolution, but sown in the earth, shall rise again, death having been brought to nought by the grace of the Saviour" (21. 1, 2).[1]

Now, does this statement contain the premises of any theory of satisfaction? The debt spoken of by Athanasius is an obligation resting upon humanity as a whole, on account of sin, and hence every man must pay it, and Christ pays it with us, in order that corruption may not issue in permanent death.[2] Nothing more than this can be meant by Athanasius

[1] The summary has been made full, because it is such a beautiful and wholesome exposition of this doctrine, as compared with many theories of later ages.

[2] Here it must be noted that sin is treated chiefly under the category of disease, and not only as debt; the objective was the *recreation* of man by Him who had created him.

— however different it would sound in Luther or Calvin — in *Contra Ar.*, ii. 66: "*ἀνθ' ἡμῶν τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδούς.*" The translator of Athanasius, Dr. Robertson, frankly admits that "of the forensic view he is indeed almost clear. His reference to the 'debt' (*Incar.*, 20; *Orat.*, ii. 66) which had to be paid is connected not so much with the Anselmic idea of a satisfaction due, as with the fact that death was by the divine word (*Gen.* iii) attached to sin as its penalty" (*Prolegom.*, p. lxx). The only satisfaction he thought of was a fulfilment of the law of holiness. The coincidence with Anselm is verbal, not substantial. With Anselm, the debt was owed to God's justice; it was wholly cancelled by the obedience of Christ, the equivalence or superabundance of whose merit arose from the voluntariness of His death. With Athanasius, the debt was the just claim of God's law; it was the necessity of death, but not the necessity of abiding in death for ever; it was paid so far as to sustain God's law, but not so as to relieve man of its rigorous exaction just as before Christ's death. But His death, completing His *ἕνωσις* with humanity enabled Him to triumph over death as a continuing power, by permitting men to share His immortality; and His ability to do this arose from His being the Incarnate Word of God.[1]

[1] See an admirable treatment of the whole subject in Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, pp. 282–293; and Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 349–365.

Dr. Shedd says of the position of Athanasius: "This is the strongest possible statement of the doctrine of penal satisfaction"; [1] but this seems to be a complete misunderstanding. The figures, which are supposed to contain the premises of the later theory, are quite incidental, and are not urged as though the death of Christ were an equivalent of value that could be separated from humanity and substituted for it. The sharing of the penalty of sin with mankind is really the opposite of penal substitution; it is the Pauline and general patristic truth of God's self-identification with mankind, the vital renewal of humanity by the presence in it of the God-man and His oneness with it. It is not an act of one member of the race for the rest, not an act external to humanity, but the act of One in whom humanity is "summed up"; so that the dying and exaltation of Christ were corporate and inclusive, were ideally and potentially ours. Here is the point of this Father's emphasis, and not upon the idea of a substituted punishment whose infinite value satisfied the Divine claims upon us.[2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, II. 243. It needs to be said that both Shedd and Rivière are much given to inserting misleading words and ideas that are foreign to the patristic authors whom they purport to translate.

[2] Rivière makes out as good a case as possible for finding traces of the traditional view in Athanasius; yet fairness compels him to say: "Mais quand il s'agit d'expliquer pourquoi ce décret inflexible . . . saint Athanase ne s'élève pas jusqu' aux saintes

### c. *Later Greek Fathers*

Gregory of Nyssa held the Athanasian theory that our human nature is deified by its union with the Logos, and this deification is completed in the resurrection.[1] He also accepted the theory of Origen, which was ignored by Athanasius. He not only states it clearly, but gives the explanation which Origen omitted, and justifies it. "It was by means of a certain amount of *deceit*," he says, "that God carried out this scheme on our behalf. For that not by pure Deity alone, but by Deity veiled in human nature, God, without the knowledge of His enemy, got within the lines of him who had man in his power, is in some manner a *fraud* and a *surprise*. . . . Whereas he, the enemy, effected his deception for the ruin of our nature, He who is at once the just, and good, and wise one, used His device of deception for

exigences de la justice (?), il s'arrête au point de vue tout extérieur de la véracité divine. . . . Athanase ne se préoccupe pas de justifier autrement ce point d'honneur obstiné: c'est dire qu'il effleure à peine le problème et qu'il n'en donne qu'une solution insuffisante, si seulement on peut dire que c'en est une." Of the "synthèse spéculative" of Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa, he says: "C'est dire que leur synthèse était prématurée et sans doute mal construite, puisqu'elle n'embrasse pas tous les éléments traditionnels. Mais il faut bien avouer aussi que l'idée de la Rédemption par la croix ne domine pas plus leur esprit que leur système et que, s'ils ne l'ont pas ignorée, le principal de leur attention était ailleurs" (pp. 151, 159).

[1] *Catech. Magna*, xxv, xxxii.

the salvation of him who had perished, and thus not only conferred benefit on the lost one, but on him, too, who had wrought our ruin." [1] This coarse and repulsive notion is supposed to have been a misinterpretation of I Cor. ii. 8: "which none of the princes of this world knew; for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory." The conception of the righteousness of God must have suffered a serious degeneration before such an idea as this could have had vogue. The method of the deceit was the veiling of the Godhead in humanity so that the devil was surprised into exacting a penalty from One who had not deserved to incur it.[2] But this entirely destroys the reality of the ransom, or compensation to the devil. If he was himself defrauded at the moment of his "unjust overcharge" (Leo, *Serm.*, xxii. 4), the price was not paid. Yet Origen's word, *ἀντάλλαγμα*, was insisted upon as a true description of Christ's ransom. There was no sensitiveness to the imputation upon the Divine character involved in such a transaction, or to the essential dualism involved in the justice of Satan's claim upon man. The theory, therefore, is logically incoherent, and "beset with difficulties, both intellectual and moral, of the gravest kind." [3] It involves something

[1] *Catech. Magna*, xxvi.
[2] J. J. Lias, *The Atonement*, p. 47.
[3] Oxenham, p. 154.

of the idea of an equivalent, but nothing in the way of a satisfaction.

In this form, it lasted until the century after Anselm, and was accepted by most of the succeeding Latin Fathers. Ambrose referred to the incident as a "pious fraud." [1] Leo I. said that the Incarnation deceived the devil by hiding the power under the veil of weakness. Augustin called the cross a "mouse-trap," [2] in which he was followed by Peter Lombard.[3] "Isidore of Seville adopted the image of a bird caught in a net." [4] Rufinus and Gregory the Great spoke of Christ's human nature as a "bait," and of the devil as captured on the hook of the Incarnation, as grasping after the bait of the body and transfixed by the sharp hook of the Divinity.[5] John of Damascus also speaks of Christ's Body as a bait transfixed on the hook of Divinity, but with reference to death, not to the devil.[6] Even Luther seems to have been fascinated by the homiletical advantages of the idea, as he

[1] Harnack, III. 307; Oxenham, p. 147. Also, "Fefellit ergo pro nobis, fefellit ut vinceret"; "Oportuit igitur hanc fraudem diabolo fieri" (P. L. XV. col. 1553, 1616).

[2] "Ad pretium nostrum tetendit muscipulam crucem suam"; "muscipula diaboli" (P. L., XXXVIII. col. 726, 1210).

[3] "Tetendit ei muscipulam crucem suam; posuit ibi, quasi escam, sanguinem suum" (P. L., CXCII. col. 796).

[4] Simon, *Redemption of Man*, p. 406.

[5] "In hamo ergo ejus Incarnationis captus est, quia, dum in illo appetit escam corporis, transfixus est aculeo divinitatis" (P. L., LXXVI. col. 680; Hagenbach, I. 346).

[6] *De Fide Orthod.*, iii. 27.

quotes this language of Gregory with apparent approval; although his use of the figure was probably rhetorical, while the patristic use corresponded to a real conception, at once immoral and grotesque.[1]

There is one striking difference between Gregory Nyssen and Athanasius. The latter figured the presence of God among men as similar to the residence of a king in a city. Gregory made humanity divine by Christ's intermixture with it, not with a human individual, but with human nature (*Catech. Magna*, 25).

Gregory of Nazianzus indignantly repudiates the theory that the devil had any claim upon us, or that the precious Blood was offered to him as a ransom.[2] Nevertheless, he admits the self-deceit of the Evil One, which implies something of the nature of an artifice on the part of Christ: "Since the deceiver thought that he was unconquerable in his malice, after he had cheated us with the hope of becoming gods, he was himself cheated by God's assumption of our nature; so that in attacking Adam as he thought, he should really meet with God" (xxxix. 13).

He suggests, as an alternative theory, that the ransom was paid to God, although he puts it tenta-

[1] D. W. Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

[2] "I ask, to whom was this ransom offered, and for what cause? If to the Evil One, fie upon the shameful thought!" (*Orat.*, xlv. 22).

tively and without entire conviction, and indicates it as fitting rather than necessary.[1] "But if it was paid to the Father, I ask first, how? For it was not by Him that we were being held captive. And next, on what principle did the Blood of His only-begotten Son please the Father, who would not receive even Isaac, when he was being offered by his father, but changed the victim, putting a ram in the place of the human sacrifice? Is it not evident that the Father accepts it, having neither asked for it nor needed it, but on account of the dispensation (or economy of salvation), and because it was befitting that humanity should be sanctified by the humanity of God (or the human element in God), that He might deliver us Himself, having overcome the tyrant, and draw us to Himself through the mediation of His Son, who also arranged this (*οἰκονομήσαντος*) to the honour of the Father, whom it is manifest that He obeys in all things?"[2] Accordingly, he did not regard this mode

[1] This representation, under the terms of sacrifice instead of ransom, is familiar in many of the Fathers.

[2] *Οἰκονομία* is variously translated; as, "l'économie du salut," by Rivière and Sabatier; "the government of the universe," by Shedd; "that the Scriptures might be fulfilled," by Harnack; "on account of the Incarnation," by the translators of Gregory, in the *Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. VII. Professor Gwatkin says that *οἰκονομία* was distinguished from *θεολογία*, the doctrine of God being divided in two parts — God in Himself, and God in relation to men (*The Knowledge of God*, II. 280). On "the humanity of God" ("du Sauveur," in Rivière, p. 178): "Have we not here the germ of the idea, afterwards known as the Scotist, that the

of redemption as an absolute necessity: as God had made all things by His word, He might have saved us by His will.[1] As to the effect of the sufferings of Christ, he says that by them "we were all without exception *created anew*, who partake of the same Adam, and were led astray by the serpent and slain by sin, and are saved by the heavenly Adam and brought back by the tree of shame to the tree of life from whence we had fallen" (*Orat.*, xxxiii. 9).

He affords a good illustration of the common mistake of attributing substitution to the Greek Fathers. He says in the Fourth Theological Oration: "He makes my disobedience His own as Head of the whole body . . . He was in His own person *representing* us . . . That He may be as a leaven to the whole lump, and by *uniting to Himself* that which was condemned may release it from all condemnation. . . . Until He make me God by the power of His Incarnation" (xxx. 5, 21, 14). Although he shrinks from fully interpreting the ransom, because the work of Christ is transcendent and ineffable, yet he thinks one may make mistakes about it with impunity:

Incarnation was the purpose of God independently of the Fall, for the perfecting of humanity; but that the Passion and death of the Incarnate God were the direct result of the sin of man?" (Note by the translators, *ad loc.*)

[1] *Orat.*, ix. This was the unanimous opinion of the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries (Oxenham, p. 149).

"Philosophise about the world or worlds, about matter or soul, . . . about resurrection, retribution, or the sufferings of Christ; for in these subjects to hit the mark is not useless, and to miss it is free from peril" (*Orat.*, xxvii. 9). He was no doubt referring to speculations on these subjects; but, as all the theories are matters of speculation, he regards them as open to discussion, distinguishing between theory and fact.[1]

The other Greek Fathers contain very little that is additional to what we have already considered. Chrysostom used the expression, "How wilt thou be

[1] It has been claimed that John of Damascus accepted the theory of Gregory Nyssen, in the words: "Since the enemy snares man by the hope of Godhead, he himself is snared in turn by the screen of flesh, and so are shown at once the goodness and wisdom, the justice and might of God. . . . The tyrant would have had a ground of complaint, if, after he had overcome man, God should have used force against him" (*De Fide Orthod.*, iii. 1, 18). But in chapter 27 he says: "He makes Himself an offering to the Father for our sakes. For we had sinned against Him, and it was meet that He should receive the ransom for us, and that we should thus be delivered from the condemnation. God forbid that the blood of the Lord should be offered to the tyrant"; which certainly is much more like Gregory Nazianzen. He evidently means that God did not "rescue man out of the hands of the tyrant" by His omnipotence; but that "He became man in order that that which was overcome might overcome." "He wished to reveal fallen man himself as conqueror, and became man to restore like with like." Chapter 27 contains his real thought. See Shedd, I. 252; Hagenbach, II. 41, 42; Oxenham, p. 144; Dale, *The Atonement*, p. 274; Harnack, III. 308: "John of Damascus felt scruples about admitting God and the devil to have been partners in a legal transaction."

able to render God propitious to thee?"[1] which Hooker takes to mean "the very same with the Latin Fathers, when they speak of satisfying God."[2] But Chrysostom knew nothing of this Latin use of the word, which, with perhaps a single exception, was long subsequent to him.[3] Dr. Harnack finds in him an obscure trace of substitution (III. 309), and refers to Homily x. on Rom. v. 17. In that place, he is illustrating what St. Paul calls a "superabundance of grace," and he says: "As then if any were to cast a person who owed ten mites into prison, and not the man himself only, but wife and children and servants for his sake; and another were to come and not to pay down the ten mites only, but to give also ten thousand talents of gold, and to lead the prisoner into the king's courts, and to the throne of the highest power, and were to make him partaker of the highest honour and every kind of magnificence, the creditor would not be able to remember the ten mites; so hath our case been. For Christ hath paid down far more than we owe, yea as much more as the illimitable ocean is than a little drop." But Harnack admits that "the idea is emotional, and not the starting-point of a philosophical theory. It is different with

[1] Hom. viii. on I Cor.

[2] *Eccl. Pol.*, bk. vi. c. v.

[3] He uses the unscriptural phrases, καταλλαγή Δεσπότου, and οὗτος καταλλαγὰς Θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐποιήσατο (P. G., XLIX. col. 407, 408).

the Westerns." [1] Apart from being a rhetorical analogy of the abundance of grace beyond the evil of sin, it is apparently a reference to the Athanasian thought of Christ's death as paying the debt due to the law, and not part of a defined theory of a literal payment of debt. It is similar to the statement in Hom. v. on Eph. ii. 16: "Might reconcile them both in one body, and that His own, unto God. How is this effected? By Himself, he means, suffering the due penalty." He also refers to the curse endured by Christ, as the substitution of one kind of curse for another. "As then both he who hanged on a tree, and he who transgresses the law, are cursed, and as it was necessary for him who is about to relieve from a curse himself to be free from it, but to receive another instead of it, therefore Christ took upon Him such another, and therefore relieved us from the curse. It was like an innocent man's undertaking to die for another sentenced to death, and so rescuing him from punishment. For Christ took upon Him not the curse of transgression, but the other curse, in order to remove that of others." [2]

Cyril of Alexandria made a similar statement, not affirming that Christ became a curse, but that He endured what one burdened with a curse must suffer. Dr. Harnack says that he "shows most clearly the

[1] *Loc. cit.*, note.
[2] In Gal. iii. 13. See also Hom. xi. on II Cor. v. 21.

vicarious idea of the passion and death of the God-man in connection with the whole Christological conception": "Because all human nature was purified and transfigured really and physically in Christ, He could, *regarded as an individual*, be conceived as substitute or *ἀντίλυτρον*; see Cyril on John i. 29 and Gal. iii. 13 (III. 309, note)." He would probably refer also to Cyril's repetition of such a phrase as *εἷς ὑπὲρ πάντων*. There is a great difference between the Pauline idea of identity or mystical union and the Reformation idea of substitution. The Greeks are full of the former idea; but we see how the necessity of exhibiting the deification of Christ's human nature in the Christological controversy led more and more to language appropriate to a real substitution of one person for others who were separate from Him, not in union with Him. Rivière calls attention to this expression of penal substitution: "We in the person of Christ have fully paid (*ἐκτετικότων*) the penalties due to our sins" (p. 197). It certainly contains the penal idea, but the wide interval between the Greek and the Reformers is shown by the phrase of mystical identification, "*we* in the person of Christ have paid." He constantly uses the adjective *ἀντάξιος* for the equivalence of Christ's offering, but it is with reference to the exaltation of His Person, and not particularly to a theoretic statement upon the Atonement. "Christ would not have been equivalent

[as a sacrifice] for the whole creation, nor would He have sufficed to redeem the world, nor have laid down His life by way of a price for it, and poured out for us His precious Blood, if He be not really the Son, and God of God, but a creature."[1] Cyril may be regarded as evidencing the deterioration in thought and language of the Greek Fathers of the fifth century.

The tendency to modes of statement unfamiliar to the Scriptures is observable in the preceding century, as we have already seen. Basil speaks of our Lord offering to God an expiation (ἐξίλασμα) for us all.[2] Cyril of Jerusalem adds that it was more than equivalent: "The transgression of sinners was not so great as the righteousness of Him who died for them; the sin which we committed was not so great as the righteousness which He wrought who laid down His life for us."[3] These ideas of equivalence, however, were not the same as those to be found in the Latin Fathers, and were not worked up as parts of a theory of Atonement as they would have been in later times. They rather belong to a Christology,

[1] Quoted in Liddon, *The Divinity of our Lord*, p. 485.

[2] P. G., XXIX. col. 440.

[3] *Catechetical Lectures*, xiii. 13. "C'est, avec les termes techniques en moins; la première affirmation théologique de l'infinie surabondance des satisfactions de l'Homme-Dieu" (Rivière, p. 169). It will be observed that the technical term, satisfaction, is absent, and it may not be assumed that Cyril meant what was afterwards described by it.

which was chiefly concerned to exalt the supreme worth of the Person of Christ.[1]

The deterioration among the later Greek Fathers is manifest. By the fifth century, the figure of a debt was becoming literalised, the quantitative measurement of guilt was becoming familiar, together with the necessity for compensation for man's obligations, and the consequent treatment of the sacrifice of Christ as equivalent to the debt contracted by man, and as the endurance of the very penalty merited by man. The phraseology grows more open to objection, although it may still be interpreted in partial agreement with the earlier conception of a penalty shared with man and not borne in his stead. The lowering of the ethical tone in such definitions is very clear, when they are compared with the noble thought of the restoration and deification of our nature by Christ's presence in it. The historians of dogma seem to think that they are not so real and precise as similar representations among the Latins. It may even be that by that time the Latins were beginning to have some influence upon the ideas of the Greeks, although their forms of thought were strikingly different, and they were far beyond the latter in the employment of legal categories. Some of the minor elements of Anselm's speculation are seen to have

[1] The Oriental liturgies are devoid of the idea of equivalence (Dr. Neale, in Allen, *Christ. Inst.*, p. 10).

been derived from this debasement of the original high thinking upon the work of redemption. Among these are the penalty of sin considered as a debt which did not have to be paid by the debtor (contrary to Athanasius), but from which he could be relieved by another's payment; the requirement of compensation by the sinner or some one better able to render it; the arithmetical rather than qualitative computation of both debt and payment, and the transcendent value of what Christ offered in lieu of the claim upon the sinner. Anselm was not directly influenced by these Greek theologians, and he parted from them absolutely in his omission of the idea of appeasement, and of any penal character in the satisfaction made by our Lord. Yet these conceptions, which were well-known to him through the later Latin use of them, formed the atmosphere in which grew up his unique and original interpretation.

When we compare the earlier and more significant Greek theology, we discover an almost complete absence of those forms of thought which are fundamental to the satisfaction theory, whether of Anselm or the Reformers. It furnishes no elements for the construction of that theory, in the way of premises or antecedents. The apparent points of contact are in no instance essential; even the notion of equivalence referring rather to the adequacy of Christ to His work of redemption than to the mere equation

of debt and payment. In all vital particulars, the point of view is antithetic. A sacrifice is offered to God; but, when these Fathers rigidly apply the other Scriptural figure of ransom, they represent it as paid to the devil. They recognise death as the punishment of sin, a debt which man owes to the law of God; and they conceive Christ to have voluntarily shared that punishment, and to have paid that debt. But they agree neither with Anselm who made the satisfaction of death a substitute for punishment, nor with the Reformers who regarded the sufferings and death as a literal penalty visited upon Christ. Nor do they imagine Him to have paid the debt in our stead; on the contrary, they admit that every one of us has to pay it, and He simply shared our lot and paid it with us — the *continuance* in death not being a necessary part of the obligation. So far from considering the Redeemer as One who performed a work as a substitute for ourselves, they dwell upon His mystical recapitulation and incorporation of all humanity in Himself, so that He was not other than man, but all mankind was one with Him. We must therefore look elsewhere for the origin of the theory propounded in the *Cur Deus Homo*.

It may be well to supplement these conclusions with some admissions by competent critics, as to the incidental character of many patristic expressions, and

their consequent failure to confirm the continuous and Catholic authority of the idea of satisfaction. Archbishop Thomson says that "none of these writers worked out into a system the doctrine of the substitutive sacrifice of Christ."[1] On the failure to formulate any coherent theory, Professor Harnack says: "The inability of theologians to recognise, expose and dispute the differences in their divergent conceptions is the strongest proof that they were not clearly aware of the bearing and weight of their own propositions" (III. 310). Rivière says even of the eighth century: "In this résumé [of John of Damascus] one remarks first and foremost that redemption does not occupy a distinct place, which proves that the Greek Church did not discover on this point any definite theory, or, in other words, that the theology of the dogma was not yet developed" (p. 206). Similarly, Dr. Shedd: "The judicial reasons and grounds of this death of the most exalted of personaages were left to be investigated and exhibited in later ages and by other generations of theologians" (II. 212). Abbé Rivière is confident that the idea of satisfaction is to be found in the patristic writers; but he refuses to "torture grammar and good sense to ascribe to the Fathers of the Church a word which they did not employ, solely to obtain for our dogma an illusory identity of formulas" (p. 105). Until

[1] *Aids to Faith*, p. 346.

the time of Cyril of Alexandria, the Greek theology "groped and fumbled" in dealing with this question (p. 201); which, of course, he asserts from the point of view of traditional ecclesiastical and Roman orthodoxy.

### 5. The Latin Fathers

In coming to the Latin Fathers, we find ourselves in an entirely different atmosphere. Many of the Greek ideas were of course part of the common stock of Eastern and Western Christianity. The West, however, never quite appreciated the theological spirit of the East. Oriental questions never acquired the same interest for the Western mind. To the Cappadocians and Alexandrians, the Incarnation was a splendid end in itself; to the Latin thinkers, it became more and more a means to an end. To the Nicene theologian, Christ was supremely significant; to the Carthaginians, He was not of cosmic import, because man could make satisfaction for his own sins, and humanity as a whole was not redeemed. The God-man was not a bond uniting God and man, manifesting their essential likeness and kinship, but a witness of their disunity and a means of creating union. "The empire of evil weighed on the spirits of those men as a dread reality," [1] so that redemption was not the full and inspiring reality that it was to

[1] Lidgett, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

the Greeks. They laid great stress on the sufferings and death of Christ, and were particularly full in their comments on Gal. iii. 13. But they treated the subject under such limitations, with their ideas of personal merit and the efficacy of sacraments, especially the two earliest of them, that their phraseology eventually gave rise to a theory of the Atonement which would have been quite congenial to them, but which, strangely enough, never entered their minds.

The Latins, equally with the Greeks, made the person and work of Christ central, describing the results chiefly in the language of Scripture, but making no systematic attempt to define the process.[1] The contemporary development of the Eucharist into an expiatory sacrifice makes the absence of any detailed definition of the Atonement all the more striking. The three famous Carthaginians did so much to give theology a fatal twist, that it is fortunate that their attention was not particularly directed to this theme; although it must be admitted that Augustin was far more ethical and evangelical in his references than his predecessors. Tertullian and

[1] "En somme, ni les Pères latins ni les Pères grecs n'ont traité directement le problème de la Rédemption; ils y ont seulement touché en passant, à propos des textes scripturaires ou des vérités dogmatiques connexes. . . . Ils ont beaucoup parlé de substitution (?) et de sacrifice, ils en ont affirmé le fait ou décrit les effets; ils n'en ont pas cherché la nature intime ou la cause dernière. Ce progrès était réservé au Moyen Age" (Rivière, pp. 277, 278).

Cyprian were the contemporaries of Irenæus and Origen, although their thought moved generally on a very different plane: it would have been most unhappy if their logic had been more rigid, and they had explicitly applied their penitential theories to the sacrifice of Christ. The North African environment was so totally different from the Egyptian and Eastern, that it had the most radical effect upon the Latin theology. Yet it is important to realise that its Soteriology had no vital relation to Anselm's, which was indeed partly derived from their speculations on quite another subject, but which was conceived under notably different categories. After rehearsing the special views of the most prominent Western Fathers upon Christ's redeeming work, we shall be still further prepared to appreciate the absolute novelty of Anselm's theory.

### a. *Tertullian* (*ob. c.* 220)

In the treatise *Against Marcion*, the transcendent value of the death of Christ is asserted. "Christ's death, wherein lies the whole weight and fruit of the Christian name, is denied, although the apostle asserts it so strongly as undoubtedly real, making it the very foundation of the Gospel, of our salvation, and of his own preaching" (iii. 8). The same importance is attached to the death in the tract, *De Patientia*, 3: "For this was the end for which He had come." In

his *Answer to the Jews*, he makes much of the Old Testament types of the cross, as the means of restoring the lost image of God, particularly all the references to "wood" or "the tree." Thus, the bestowal of new life is taught from the loss of the axe-head while the sons of the prophets were cutting "wood," and its recovery through Elisha's casting "wood" upon the surface of the water: "What is more manifest than the mystery [sacramento] of this wood . . . that what had formerly perished through 'the tree' in Adam should be restored through 'the tree' in Christ?" (xiii).[1] But again, after the unsystematic manner of the Fathers, the redemption is virtually made the result of Christ's teaching.[2] There is therefore nothing upon this subject additional to what we have already found in the Greek Fathers of the same period of the third century.

It is, however, the word, "satisfaction," which he was the first to employ, that has made him appear to anticipate the *Cur Deus Homo*.[3] The word is purely a Latin conception, having no equivalent in Greek; and was borrowed from the legal language of Rome.

[1] A similar argument is found in *Cur Deus Homo*, lib. 1, c. iii., *sub fine*. It may be noted that Tertullian's exposition of Gal. iii. 13 altogether excludes the idea of Christ's vicarious satisfaction (*Adv. Praxean*, xxix).

[2] *Adv. Marc.*, ii. 27; see Harnack, II. 294.

[3] Dr. Fisher says that he was "the first to make the Latin language the vehicle for theology" (*op. cit.*, p. 38). We owe to him also *Trinitas*, *Persona*, *sacramentum*, and *vitium originis*.

He applies the expression, "satisfacere deo," solely to *men's* repentances, prayers, confessions, and good works generally. On which it may be remarked, first, that satisfaction by man is the converse of Anselm's satisfaction by Christ, and, secondly, that it is significant that the idea was first applied to the wholly unscriptural and immoral idea of penance. He says: "Thus he who, through repentance for sins, had begun to make satisfaction to the Lord, will, through another repentance of his repentance, make satisfaction to the devil." [1] "At fasts, moreover, and Stations, no prayer should be made without kneeling, and the remaining customary marks of humility; for [then] we are not only *praying* but *deprecating* [*wrath*], and making satisfaction to God our Lord." [2] "Confession is the method of satisfaction"; and: "By confession satisfaction is settled; of confession repentance is born; by repentance God is appeased." [3] He believed that good works had a legal claim upon God's favour, and "that what a man's merits entitled him to from God had a fixed and regulated value." [4] "All this *exomologesis* (utter confession) [does], that it may enhance re-

[1] *De poen.*, 5; also, 7, 8, 9, 10.

[2] *De orat.*, 23; see also *de bapt.*, 20; *de pudic.*, 9.

[3] *De poen.*, 8, 9. This use of "placare" exhibits the wide chasm between the Carthaginian and the best of the Greeks, in their understanding of the character of God.

[4] Harnack, III. 311.

pentance; may honour God by its fear of the [incurred] danger; may, by itself pronouncing against the sinner, stand in the stead of God's indignation, and by temporal mortification (I will not say frustrate, but) discharge eternal punishments." [1] He uses the very words, merit and desert, thus determining an unethical quality in the moral theology of the Latin Church, and in the Soteriology which was founded upon the idea of satisfaction. "Or how will there be many mansions in our Father's house, if not to accord with a variety of deserts?" [2] Yet he once uses the cautious phrase, "so far as we can merit" (*De poen.*, 6). Undoubtedly, these conceptions were the first contribution to the idea of a "treasury of merit," which was to prove so profitable to the Church of the Middle Ages.

As a lawyer and a Latin, he was led to contemplate all moral relations from the legal standpoint, and it would have been natural for him to describe the relation of Christ to our salvation in juridical terms. He introduced the forensic conceptions which afterwards governed Western theology, and thus

[1] *De poen.*, 9.

[2] *Scorp.*, 6. See also, "meritum fidei" (*De orat.*, 2); "merita cujusque" (*Ibid.*, 4); "merita poenitentiae" (*De poen.*, 2); also, the verbs, "mereri" and "promereri deum"; as, "the catechumen covets to merit it," *i. e.*, baptism (*De poen.*, 6), and the expressions, "I shall stand with credit," "I shall deserve" (*Scorp.*, 10). For other illustrations, see Harnack, III. 294; V. 19, 20.

prepared the way for the mediæval theory of Atonement. It is remarkable, however, that he never referred to the work of Christ as a satisfaction. That he did not is the strongest possible witness that he did not reflect upon the objective character of the redemption, and that any theory of Christ's satisfaction was unknown to the Church of the third century.[1] It is evident indeed that he could not have made this application of merits and satisfaction to Christ, because he infers from our Lord's parable that sin is a debt which must be either paid or remitted — and it is remitted.[2] Moreover, he makes repentance "the price of pardon," release from penalty being the "compensatory exchange of repentance." [3]

Manifestly, his idea of satisfaction is not only different from the later theory, but it is incompatible with it.[4] Nevertheless, his use of satisfaction is a mischievous superstition, which had most disastrous results. The unethical and legal categories which he

[1] Rivière says positively: "Tertullien n'a pas appliqué cette idée à la médiation de Jésus-Christ" (p. 215). *Vide* Harnack, V. 16. The apparent contradiction in the translation of Harnack (*cf.* II. 294, note, and III. 310, where he first seems to deny, and then to assert, that Tertullian spoke of Christ as satisfying God) is due to a misunderstanding of "der Christ." The sentence on the latter page, beginning, "Christ required to be obedient," should read: "The Christian," etc.

[2] *De orat.*, 7; *de pudicit.*, 2.

[3] *De poen.*, 6.

[4] Hagenbach, I. 180; Lidgett, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

introduced afterwards dominated Western thought. The repellent extreme of their use in the Middle Ages and since the Reformation may be traced back to the fact that the first great Latin Father was a lawyer.[1] His influence was directly felt upon Cyprian, who always spoke of him as "Master."

### b. *Cyprian* (*ob.* 258)

This student of Tertullian also is said by Dr. Norris to have been a lawyer, though he is generally referred to as a teacher of rhetoric.[2] At any rate, he held the same juristic ideas as his predecessor, and developed them much further. The expressions, "satisfacere deo," and the still more gross, "placare deum," occur very frequently. He speaks of "the satisfaction and deprecation of God's anger."[3] "The Lord must be appeased by our atonement"; "we believe that the merits of martyrs and the works of the righteous are of great avail with the Judge."[4] "The remedies for propitiating God are given in the words of God Himself; the divine instructions have

[1] See *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, Prolegom., p. lxx.

[2] *Rudiments of Theology*, p. 361. Probably there was no distinction. See W. E. Ball, *St. Paul and the Roman Law*, pp. 58, 71 *sq.*

[3] *Ep.*, xi. 2.

[4] *De laps.*, 17.

taught what sinners ought to do, that by works of righteousness God is satisfied (*placari*), that with the deserts of mercy sins are cleansed." [1] As the effect of baptism was retroactive, satisfaction for sins after baptism must be made by means of meritorious deeds. Martyrdom was an especial means of grace, and among good works almsgiving held a chief place.[2] "Be earnest in righteous works, whereby sins may be purged; frequently apply yourself to almsgiving, whereby souls are freed from death." [3] "As in the laver of saving water the fire of Gehenna is extinguished, so by almsgiving and works of righteousness the flame of sins is subdued." [4]

There is also a more frequent use of "meritum" and "promereri deum." "There is need of righteousness that one may *deserve well* of God the Judge; we must obey His precepts and warnings, that our *merits* may receive their reward." [5] "If he *incline* the Lord to pardon of his sin by righteous and continual works, He who expressed His mercy in these words may pity such men (Is. xxx. 51)"; "Or if any one move Him still more by his own atonement, if he

[1] *De op. et eleemos.*, 5
[2] *Ep.*, li. 22.
[3] *De laps.*, 35.
[4] *De op. et eleemos.*, 2; also 1, 5, 6, 9, 18. The satisfactions were often church penances.
[5] *De unit. eccles.*, 15. See Harnack, II. 134 for many other references.

appease His anger, if he appease the wrath of an indignant God by righteous entreaty, He gives arms again whereby the vanquished may be armed"; "he who has thus made atonement to God, . . . shall now deserve of the Lord not only pardon, but a crown." [1] The word, "indulgence," also occurs, though this may not be in quite the sense of succeeding ages. "Man cannot be greater than God, nor can a servant remit or forego by his indulgence what has been committed by a greater crime against the Lord." [2] It is probable, however, that the term was already applied to the ecclesiastical custom, and the connection shows that Cyprian was referring to the action of the Church.

Dr. Harnack says that he described Christ's work as a satisfaction to God, but I have been unable to find any passage in which he did so.[3] It is amazing that he did not, as he had all the elements of the theory — appeasement, ascetic practices, merits and their transfer to sinners from saints and martyrs, and the church system of penance.[4] But it must be ob-

[1] *De laps.*, 36.

[2] *De laps.*, 17. Similarly, Tertullian in *De poen.*, 7.

[3] *Hist. Dogm.*, II. 294 note; III. 312. *Per contra*, Rivière, p. 218. Dr. George P. Fisher assures me that Harnack is undoubtedly wrong here.

[4] Ambrose does once employ the word "satisfaction" with reference to the death of the Saviour: "Suscepit enim et mortem ut impleretur sententia, satisfieret judicato: Maledictum carnis peccatricis usque ad mortem" (P. L., XIV. col. 618). But Rivière

served that his mind was occupied with practical questions of administration, and apparently not at all with the doctrine of Atonement. His references to it are quite commonplace, and betray no attempt to theorise. In his *Testimonies against the Jews*, he quotes texts to prove "that in the passion and the sign of the cross is all virtue and power" (ii. 21). And he says that "it behooved Him to suffer, not that He might feel death, but that He might conquer death." [1] It is true that he, together with Tertullian, provided much of the material for Anselm's speculations, but he failed to make the application to the work of Christ, which would have been so obvious and inevitable if there had been a trace of the later theory in his theology. This significant omission exhibits in the most conclusive way the novelty of the mediæval dogma and its consequent unimportance to Catholic orthodoxy.[2]

admits that he is not dealing here with a satisfaction in the actual sense, "mais d'une satisfaction donnée à la loi de mort divinement portée contre le pécheur. C'est une idée voisine du système d'Athanase" (p. 234).

[1] *De van. idol.*, 14.

[2] It is needless to multiply proofs of the prevalence of the ideas of appeasement and satisfaction among the Western Fathers. The following quotations may suffice. "For it is possible for him to be brought back, and to be set free, if he repents of his actions, and, turning to better things, makes satisfaction to God"; and again: "Why should we despair that the mercy of God our Father may again be appeased by repentance?" (Lactantius, *Inst.*, vi. 24). "This suffering . . . was freely undertaken, and was intended to

### c. *Augustin* (*ob.* 430)

The greatest of the Latin Fathers makes less of merit and satisfaction than his predecessors; but he shows traces of their influence in such statements as this from the *Enchiridion:* "Almsgiving must be used to propitiate God for past sins, not to purchase impunity for the commission of such sins in the future. For He has given no man license to sin, although in His mercy He may blot out sins that are already committed, if we do not neglect to make proper satisfaction" (70). He is very fine on reconciliation, contesting the statements that God is reconciled to us, or that He was appeased by Christ's death, because that would involve an antagonism between the Father and the Son. It could be wished that the many who have resorted to Augustin in support of very different dogmatic and ecclesiastical views had learned this truth from him. He says: "God did not begin to love us when we were reconciled to Him by the blood of His Son; but He loved us before the creation of the world, that we might be His children, together with His only-begotten Son,

fulfil a penal function without, however, inflicting the pain of penalty upon the sufferer" (Hilary, *Psalm* liii. 12). This sentence leads Ritschl to call Hilary the initiator of the Latin theology. "Fornication must incur punishment, unless its guilt is purged away by a satisfaction" (Sulpitius Severus, *Dial.*, ii. 10).

even before we had any existence. Therefore our reconciliation by the death of Christ must not be understood as if He reconciled us to God, that God might begin to love those whom He had before hated: but we are reconciled to Him who already loved us and with whom we were at enmity on account of sin."[1] And again: "What is meant by 'justified in His blood'? . . . What is meant by 'being reconciled by the death of His Son'? Was it indeed so that, when God the Father was wroth with us, He saw the death of His Son for us, and was appeased towards us? Was then His Son already so far appeased towards us, that He even deigned to die for us; while the Father was still so far wroth, that except His Son died for us, He would not be appeased? . . . Pray, unless the Father had been already appeased, would He have delivered up His own Son, not sparing Him for us? . . . Therefore together both the Father and the Son, and the Spirit of both, work all things equally and harmoniously."[2]

He also started the inquiry whether the mode of reconciliation presented in the Gospel was a necessity, and concluded it was not; because God could have saved man in some other way, though none

[1] Quoted in Calvin, *Institutes*, Book ii, ch. xi.

[2] *De Trin.*, xiii. 11. Still in *Psalm* xlviii. 9 (P. L., XXXVI. col. 549) he defines propitiation by "placatio." Also in *Enchirid.*, 33, he says of Christ, "qui hanc iram . . . placaret." But he at once explains that this wrath is not a feeling, but an attitude toward sin.

was so well adapted to man's needs.[1] This rejects the requirement of a sacrifice on account of guilt, and of any form of a satisfaction to justice. He gives an interesting interpretation of II Cor. v. 20, 21: "On account of the likeness of sinful flesh in which He came, He was said to be Himself sin, that He might be sacrificed (or meaning that He was to be a sacrifice) to wash away sin. For, under the Old Covenant, sacrifices for sins were called sins.[2] . . . He does not say, . . . 'He who knew no sin did sin for us,' as if Christ had Himself sinned for our sakes: but he says, 'Him who knew no sin' God 'hath made to be sin for us,' that is, hath made Him a sacrifice for our sins. . . . He being made sin, not His own, but ours, not in Himself, but in us, showed, by the likeness of sinful flesh in which He was crucified, that though sin was not in Him, yet that in a certain sense He died to sin, by dying in the flesh which was the likeness of sin."[3] This is in the spirit of Athanasius: Christ bore the curse of our sin by the likeness of His nature to ours, and so we become one with His righteousness by our union with Him. The absence of imputation, in the later sense, will be noticed. It was this thought, when applied to the Pelagian controversy, that made the Reformers com-

[1] *De Trin.*, xiii. 10, 13. See also *De Agone Ch.*, 10.
[2] See also *De gratia Christi et pecc. orig.*, ii. 36.
[3] *Enchirid.*, 41.

plain that he did not distinguish between Justification and Sanctification. He did not identify them, but regarded them as practically inseparable in Christian experience. He made Justification real by making it necessarily issue in the process of Sanctification; they confused the relation between them by making the former chiefly forensic.

Like Athanasius, he regarded death as "the punishment of sin": "He bore for our sakes sin in the sense of death as brought on human nature by sin. This is what hung on the tree; this is what was cursed by Moses."[1] He also spoke of Christ as "cursed, not in His Divine majesty, but in the condition of our punishment in which He hung on the tree" (chap. 7); which Harnack regards as more real than the Eastern statement of the same idea.[2] Again, in chapter 4 of the same treatise: "Christ, though guiltless, took our punishment, that He might cancel our guilt, and do away with our punishment."

[1] *Contra Faust. Manich.*, xiv. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, III. 314. The words are: "ex conditione poenae nostrae ex qua in ligno suspensus est"; which are rendered: "as hanging on the tree as our substitute, bearing our punishment," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, IV. 209. This, however, is not translation, but dogmatic interpretation of the kind so common in dealing with the Fathers. Augustin explains "cursed" by "meaning that He really died"; and he was simply repeating the Athanasian thought of Christ's identification with our human condition, to the extent of sharing our death which is to us the penalty of sin. The expression, "poenam peccati nostri suscepit," became fixed after the time of Augustin.

On the other hand, in emphasising the voluntary submission to death of which Anselm made so much, he rejects any literal significance of the penal idea: "While our death was the penalty of sin, His death was made a sacrifice for sin." "The spirit of the Mediator showed how it was through no punishment of sin that He came to the death of the flesh, because He did not leave it against His will, but because He willed, when He willed, as He willed. . . . Which death, though not due, the Lord therefore rendered for us, that the death which was due might work us no hurt." [1] Still more explicitly: "Death is the penalty of sins; in the Lord was the gift of pity, not the punishment of sin." [2] Professor Harnack says Ambrose treated the relationship of the death of Christ to sin as *guilt* (V. 54), and that "whatever occurs in Ambrose is to be found also in Augustin" (III. 313). But the latter thought of sin more especially as infirmity.[3]

Augustin's language which seems to suggest sub-

[1] *De Trin.*, iv. 12, 13.

[2] *De Johann. Evang.*, c. 1, Tractate iii. 13; P. L., XXXV. col. 1401.

[3] In contrast with the above concessions of Augustin, Dr. Shedd refers to the definite language of Gregory the Great: "Guilt can be extinguished only by a *penal offering to justice*" (II. 263). This is a conspicuous illustration of the way in which the teaching of the Fathers has been misrepresented. Gregory's words are: "delenda ergo erat talis culpa, sed nisi per *sacrificium* deleri non poterat" (*Moralia*, xvii. 46; P. L., LXXVI. col. 32).

stitution is seen to have a very different meaning from the same words in a modern writer. "He made our offences His own offences, that He might make His own righteousness our righteousness." [1] Although he uses the legal word, "delictum," and phraseology of this sort was less mystical with the Latins than with the Greeks, still it cannot be pressed in the interest of literal substitution. As the second clause cannot be interpreted substitutively, since His righteousness becomes ours not by substitution but by participation in it and oneness with it, so the first clause represents not the vicarious endurance of penalty, but the oneness with our sinful condition that made Him a participator in the sufferings consequent upon human sin.

The Greek theory of the payment to the devil recurs once more in Augustin (*De Trin.*, xiii. 14). He says that God would have been unjust to him if an equivalent had not been paid (*De lib. arbitrio*, iii. 10). The devil's claim was fully admitted, it was grounded *jure aequissimo;* [2] but he forfeited his dominion by inflicting death on One who was sinless. "The debt of death" is owed, not to the law of God, as in Athanasius, but to the devil " who holds us as debtors." The redemption is regarded as a quasi-

[1] Delicta nostra sua delicta, ut justitiam suam nostram justitiam faceret (*Psal.* xxi. 2, Enarr. ii; P. L., XXXVI. col. 172).
[2] Baur, *Die Christ. Lehre*, p. 68.

payment, but a real conquest. "He proceeds to His passion, that He might pay for us debtors that which He Himself did not owe"; "the blood of Christ was given, *as it were* (tanquam), as a price for us, by accepting which the devil was not enriched, but bound." For "the devil is conquered by righteousness, not by power"; or rather, "He conquered him first by righteousness, and afterwards by power; namely, by righteousness because He had no sin, and was slain by him most unjustly; but by power, because having been dead He lived again, never afterwards to die" (*De Trin.*, xiii. 13, 14, 15). This is certainly more coherent than the previous attempt to combine the sacrifice to God with the fraudulent payment to Satan; but Augustin undoubtedly retains the relics of Origen's theory, which is another evidence, in addition to the many in the Anti-Pelagian treatises, that he never quite rid himself of the Manichæan heresy.

Theologians have built up the most diverse systems upon Augustin's materials. The High Sacramentarian and the Calvinist alike appeal to him, because he combined the characteristics of both of his predecessors, and the two tendencies were not harmonised. Tertullian was dogmatic, Cyprian was ecclesiastical; Augustin was both. So the adherents of contradictory theories of the Atonement try to find in his contradictory statements the basis for their own con-

victions; but it cannot be doubted that the nobler and profounder part of his thought should be considered the more characteristic and determinative. As an illustration of his ability to conceive of our redemption in a manner devoid of the elements most open to criticism, the following may be quoted from the *Enchiridion*, 108: "When sin had placed a wide gulf between God and the human race, it was expedient that a Mediator, who alone of the human race was born, lived, and died without sin, should reconcile us to God, and procure even for our bodies a resurrection to eternal life, in order that the pride of man might be exposed and cured through the humility of God; that man might be shown how far he had departed from God, when God became incarnate to bring him back; that an example might be set to disobedient man in the life of obedience of the God-man; that the fountain of grace might be opened by the Only-begotten taking upon Himself the form of a servant, a form which had no antecedent merit; that an earnest of that resurrection of the body which is promised to the redeemed might be given in the resurrection of the Redeemer; that the devil might be subdued by the same nature which it was his boast to have deceived; . . . and, in fine, with a view to all the advantages which the thoughtful can perceive and describe, or perceive without being able to describe, as flowing

from the transcendent mystery of the person of the Mediator." [1]

The other Latins require only the briefest notice. Lactantius chiefly dwelt upon the example and teaching of Christ (*Inst. div.*, iv. 13, 25, 26). Seeberg says that, with Gregory the Great, the emphasis was also on the example and teaching; [2] but he held the deception theory of Origen and Gregory Nyssen in its most revolting form. He described the death of Christ as an expiatory sacrifice, a true placation, but did not think it to be absolutely necessary. It required to be supplemented by penance, which was a factor of equal value in atoning for sin. He seems to have been the first to apply the idea of merit to the work of Christ; [3] but the expiation and the merit do not belong to the same category. According to Harnack, he worked out no "theory of Christ's merit — after the analogy of the merits which we can gain. That was reserved for the Middle Ages: but he has examined Christ's work from the point of view of masses for the dead and the intercession of

[1] "In *Enchir.*, 108, Augustin has summed up all he had to say on the import of Christ's work; but it will be found that, although the *reconciliatio cum deo* — only, indeed, as restoration to God — is not wanting, what is called 'objective redemption' is left pretty much in the background" (Harnack, V. 205).

[2] *Text-Book Hist. Doct.*, II. 20.

[3] Seeberg, *loc. cit.* He used such expressions as: "suis meritis" (*Moral.*, xxiv. 2, 4; 3, 5; 17, 30; P. L., LXXVI. col. 280); "qui pro aliis indulgentiam mereretur" (*Ibid.*, col. 289).

saints" (V. 265; III. 312). From Gregory to Anselm there was a dearth of original thinking upon the subject. The only distinguished theologian of the Greek Church, John of Damascus, furnished nothing significant. Alcuin is said to have simply repeated Augustin. Erigena was pantheistic, and left no permanent trace upon the history of the doctrine.

Rivière quotes an obscure author of the eleventh century, Radulphus Ardeus, who was apparently engaged with the question of Anselm's treatise; and it is just conceivable that the latter genius may have obtained from him the hint which fused the elements already at hand for the construction of his theory. In a homily on I Peter ii, Radulphus asks the question: "Who suffered, and for whom, and *how much*, and in what, and in what manner, and *with what utility?*" He also uses the word "satisfaction" of Christ's work, though not specifically of His death.[1] We have thus single instances of this use in Ambrose and this author; but the first to realise its theological possibilities was Anselm.

As has been already pointed out, the intellectual atmosphere of the Latins predisposed them to a terminology, which was to become very familiar in later times and to be more rigidly and literally interpreted. The idea of placation or real appeasement, the adop-

[1] "Ut de praevaricatione satisfieret . . . ad satisfactionem illius superbiae"; quoted in Rivière, p. 289.

tion of the pagan conception of sacrifice, the emphasis on guilt, the stricter use of the notion of punishment, the gradual shading off of the figure of vital union into the act of one person in the place of another, — all these were departures from the higher Greek point of view. Allied with the unethical belief that God's favour could be won by acts of piety, they furnished details for the later theory of satisfaction as wrought out by Thomas Aquinas and the Reformers. Nevertheless, they were not the actual sources of Anselm's theory or of the Reformers' modification of it, and cannot be cited as parts of an historical constructive development of the doctrine of redemption. This development henceforward proceeded on other lines, through the effort to explain the causes of the work of redemption, and the effects on the law of God and his relation to us of the life and sufferings and death of Christ.

The teaching of the Fathers has been presented at some length, because it is of the highest importance to the understanding of Anselm's treatise, and its place in the history of the doctrine of the Atonement. Only by means of such a statement may we realise whether his theory is a natural corollary of previous thought upon the subject, whether it is vitally rooted in the faith of the first millennium of Christian history, or is an entirely original conception of the mode of

our redemption. If the latter be true, one may think with Ritschl that "the theologians of the Middle Ages . . . lifted the problem . . . to a *higher sphere* — that in which sin is viewed in its legal and moral aspects" (p. 5); or its disconnection with the past, its absence from the writings of those who laid the foundations of essential Christian theology, may be looked upon as a fatal flaw in its claim to a high place in our regard. In either case, there is one notable confession of such disconnection. Albrecht Ritschl, in his "Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation," being the translation of the first volume of the larger work, and comprising about 605 pages, devotes about *three* pages to the Fathers. All the rest, excepting nineteen pages treating of Anselm and Abelard, is given to the Reformers and their successors. As the Reformation theories were really derived from Anselm, by a different application of his idea of satisfaction, this is an admission whose full significance will be appreciated by a comparison of the preceding pages with the ensuing discussion.

In confirmation of what has been said of the patristic teaching and its relation to Anselm, the following may be quoted from Professor Harnack: "Yet neither by Gregory the Great, nor by any theologian of the Carlovingian period was this view [of satisfaction] applied to the work of Christ. Fre-

quent reference, it is true, was already made to the '*copiousness of the value* of the mystery of the passion'; . . . but a theory had not been framed, because there was no reflection at all on the nature, the specific worth, and the effect of the redemption contained in the suffering and death of Christ. The Fathers, Augustin included, had handed down nothing certain on this. The only view taken by the Greeks was that the reign of death was broken by the cross and resurrection of Christ, or that mankind were thereby bought off, or cunningly wrested, from the devil. All that they said of the *sacrifice* in the suffering was quite vague. Only Athanasius spoke with noteworthy clearness of the penal suffering which Christ took from us and laid upon Himself. But, from the days of Paul, all of them testified *that Christ died for us*, and delivered us from the power of the devil. That was felt and proclaimed as the great act of redemption. Ambrose and Augustin had then emphasised the position that Christ is Mediator as *man*, and had given many instructions about particular points; but the question why that Man, who was at the same time God, was obliged to *suffer* and *die*, was dealt with by pointing to His *example*, or by reciting Biblical texts about ransom, sacrifice, and such like, without the necessity of the death here coming clearly to view. But Augustin certainly had laid the foundation by a new and vigorous apprehen-

sion of the significance of Christ's work, by emphasising so strongly the gravity of sin, and by representing the relation between God and man under the scheme of sin and grace. At this point Anselm came in. The importance of his *doctrine of satisfaction*, as developed in Book II. of his *Cur Deus Homo*, composed as a dialogue, lies in this, that he made use of all the factors of the Augustinian theology, so far as they came into consideration here, but that at the same time he was the first of all to frame a *theory*, both of the necessity of the appearing of the God-man, and of the necessity of His death" (VI. 55, 56).

# III

# THE ANSELMIC THEORY

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### 1. Patristic and Mediæval Antecedents

In the long interval between Gregory the Great and Anselm, there were many influences converging towards the formation of the latter's special theory. He was the inevitable product of his antecedents. He was undoubtedly original in the application of certain familiar ideas to the work of Christ; but such application was the natural step to be taken in the development of theological thought, and he was able to discern the opportunity that was sure to be seized. His theory "arose from the circumstances of his age and expressed its thought," as truly as the ransom theory which it displaced.

#### a. *Antecedents affecting the* Substance *of the Theory*

##### (1) *A Racial Characteristic*

We often hear of the effect of Christianity upon the nations converted to its faith; but we do not think often enough of the effect on Christianity of

national characteristics. It is decidedly a different thing in important respects, accordingly as it is represented by the Greek or Latin Fathers, by a mediæval Italian or a Teutonic Protestant. The difference is not merely one of time or stages of progress, but of racial qualities. The Roman genius for *law* and government entailed a *legal* theology in the Latin Churches. It was not the principles of the law, but its spirit, that influenced the Western conceptions of truth; so that the common inherited trait of the Latin race determined the forensic point of view that distinguished the Anselmic theory.[1]

Sir Henry Maine has referred to this characteristic of Western Christendom. "Theology became permeated with forensic ideas and couched in forensic language. . . . The Western Church threw itself into a new order of disputes, the same which from those days to this have never lost their interest for any family of mankind at any time included in the Latin communion. The nature of sin and its transmission by inheritance — the debt owed by man and its vicarious satisfaction — the necessity and sufficiency of the atonement — above all, the apparent antagonism between Free Will and the Divine Providence, — these were the points which the West began to debate.

[1] It is difficult to say what additional direct effect may have come from the study of the Roman law by the clergy, at this period (see *Encyc. Brit.*, XX. 715).

. . . Almost everybody who has knowledge enough of Roman law to appreciate the Roman penal system; the Roman theory of obligations established by contract and debit; the Roman view of debts, and of the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them; the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by universal succession — may be trusted to say whence arose the frame of mind to which the problems of Western theology proved so congenial, whence came the phraseology in which these problems were stated, and whence the description of reasoning employed in their solution." [1]

### (2) *Ecclesiastical Ideas and Discipline*

I have already said that the Soteriology of the North African Fathers had little bearing upon Anselm's speculations. But some of their ideas and practices constituted the real basis of his thought. From the time of Tertullian, the Church had been familiar with the conception of *Satisfaction;* a term borrowed by him from the Roman civil law, as also the word *culpa.*[2] This was intimately associated with the belief that good works established a *merit* in the sight of God, that they had an objective value

[1] Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 356. See also Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, pp. 71–78, 98–100, 123, 480.

[2] Neander, *Church History*, I. 306, Bohn ed.

to Him.[1] Gradually, the merit of *supererogation* was ascribed to the works of the saints, so that the redundant piety of the Church furnished a treasury of satisfactions, to be drawn upon in behalf of those who could not provide sufficiently for themselves. Thus, very early a penitential system arose, which was "governed throughout by the idea that the magnitude of transgressions and that of the works rendered to God, the penitential offerings, were to have a strictly legal relation, and, similarly, that what a man's merits entitled him to from God had a fixed and regulated value." [2] As *satisfactio* and *placatio* were closely related, the practical point in the system was "that God took strict account of the *quantity* of the atonement, and that, where there was no guilt to be blotted out," the means of expiation "were represented as *merits*." [3]

The difference between the doctrinal theologian and the practical churchman is shown in Cyprian's application and development of Tertullian's ideas. In Cyprian's hands the thoughts became organised customs. As sins after baptism could not be simply forgiven, but required satisfactions or acts of penitence, such acts were assigned for performance, and there we have the system of *penance* complete. It

[1] Cyprian, *De op. et eleemos.*, 5, and often.
[2] Harnack, III. 311.
[3] *Ibid.*

was strengthened by the belief in *purgatory*, which, after its earliest suggestion by Clement and Origen, had been indorsed by Cyprian and Cyril of Jerusalem, and carried out to its full statement by Augustin and Gregory.[1] For more than 600 years prior to Anselm, then, the ecclesiastical discipline had made the idea of satisfaction radical in the relation of man to God. In the eleventh century, the belief in satisfaction as a prerequisite to pardon was universal. Anselm simply applied it to the work of Christ, and it is a marvel that it seems never to have been done before, except by the obscure and uninfluential author before alluded to.[2]

The theory, however, required a further increment before it became the ground-work of Anselm's essential doctrine. The "satisfaction" became an "indulgence," when permitted by the lenity of the bishop. Augustin (*Con. Jul.*, i. 3), notwithstanding his writings against the Manichæans, shows that he still retained some Manichæan ideas by adopting their view of indulgences. He quotes an earlier obscure author, who says, "Baptism is the principal indulgence known to the Church." [3] As sin was conceived of as a debt, and the penance was regarded

[1] Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas*, I. 253; II. 416.

[2] Dr. Harnack intimates that the penance regulations were nowhere so well observed as in the German kingdoms, because so well suited to the German spirit (V. 324).

[3] *Encyc. Brit.*, XII. 846.

as a compensation, the quantitative element made "redemptions" or commutations possible. If certain acts were the legal *equivalents* of certain sins, one kind of penance could be bartered or substituted for another kind. As the equivalence was arbitrary, the Church soon came to appropriate grace on easier conditions. The next step was the commutation of a penitential act by the payment of *money;* after that the descent into the enormities which provoked the Reformation was easy and unavoidable. The reforming canons of Clovesho (A. D. 747), and other synods in the following century, reveal to us how long the abuse existed.[1] These low moral views, "which one would gladly attribute to barbarous nations, had become the property of the Church before the incursion of the Germans; and Anselm's principle, 'Every sin must be followed either by satisfaction or punishment,' can be already shown in Sulpitius Severus." [2]

Anselm, however, first worked the theory out from these materials. Sooner or later, some one must have applied these details to the work of Christ, because the successive links made such a view of redemption inevitable, as soon as thought was again directed to

[1] The Council of Clermont, three years before the composition of the *Cur Deus Homo*, decreed that participation in the crusades would be a commutation for all other penances.

[2] Harnack, III. 311.

questions of Soteriology.[1] But, historically, he was the one to "make the principles of the practice of penance the fundamental scheme of religion in general." [2] To this source may be traced the following features of his theory: the conception of sin as debt, the alternative of punishment or satisfaction, the necessity of satisfaction, specific equivalents, merit and the superabundance of merit, commutation with its pecuniary analogies, vicarious satisfaction and the transference of merit.

### (3) *German Criminal Law*

Certain Teutonic customs were similar to the ecclesiastical practices just referred to, and dovetailed into them, so that both were constituted a part of the law. "The question has been debated whether Anselm's theory was framed on the conceptions of Roman or of German law." [3] But, as Professors Fisher and Harnack acknowledge, both contribute to the formulation of the principles of the theory. Ideas which were "anterior to the influence of

[1] If Cyprian anticipated Anselm, as Dr. Harnack says, it is remarkable that no one else appears to have recognised the significance of his statement, either among the later Fathers or among the modern historians of dogma.

[2] Harnack, VI. 56.

[3] Fisher, p. 221; Cremer, *Studien u. Krit.*, 1880, pp. 1–24; Harnack, VI. 55, 57, note; Ritschl, *op. cit.* p. 32.

Teutonic codes and customs," cannot be said to have arisen in the Romano-German period.[1] At the same time, the German criminal code held some of the very concepts that characterised the Roman ecclesiastical and civil law. The chief of these was the *Wergeld*, or blood money, by which the murderer made pecuniary compensation for his crime. The custom is found among many primitive peoples, and even to-day in undeveloped races.[2] It corresponds to the Goël of the Old Testament; who is not the "*avenger* of blood,"[3] but the *redeemer*, restorer, balancer, of blood. Blood was life. The killing of a man meant that the family or tribe was depleted of life, whose loss must be made good by an equivalent.[4] This was generally blood, but sometimes "an agreed payment for its value." It was a compensation for loss, a matter of equity. The original meaning had of course been obscured among the Teutons, but the practice continued, and the name was sometimes given to fines for lesser offences than manslaughter. It had two details in common with the earlier custom, the evasion of a criminal sentence by the payment of

[1] Fisher, p. 221; Harnack, III. 311; VI. 55.

[2] *Vide* Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, Index.

[3] As in the A. V., the R. V., and even Gesenius, owing to a prepossession that the right was one of *inflicting punishment* for blood spilt.

[4] It was, therefore, a higher idea than mere retaliation (*vs.* Sabatier, p. 109).

money, and the permission to kinsmen to pay the debt.[1] The inability to pay the Wergeld sometimes reduced a man to slavery, either "surrendering himself to the plaintiff, or to some *third party* who paid the sum for him by agreement with the aggrieved party." [2]

This, of course, cannot be accepted as the origin of Anselm's theory.[3] The legal composition was simply analogous to the penitential system of a definite tax or penance for all conceivable sins. It gave a new impetus and a more vicious form to the previous legal conception of sin and treatment of crime, the tabulating of offences and enforcement of pecuniary compensation.[4] It allied itself also with them in allowing substitutive satisfactions. The simple fact is that the German State granted to the Church a participation in the execution of the penal law, and the two sets of principles were fused very easily because they were so congenial. Dr. Harnack illustrates this as follows: "German law held the principle: either outlawry or penance. This cor-

[1] The obligation of kindred to take up the enmities and friendships of a relative is noticed by Tacitus as peculiar to the Germans of his day.

[2] Kemble, *The Anglo-Saxons*, I. 197.

[3] As in C. J. Wood, *Survivals in Christianity*, p. 175.

[4] It will thus be seen that the Wergeld and the penitential practices (combined with the doctrine of purgatory) furnished two strong bases for Indulgences among the Germanic peoples (Kurtz, *Church History*, sect. 106. 2).

responds to the Church principle: either excommunication or the performance of satisfactory acts of penance.[1] According to German law, vengeance did not require to be executed on the evil-doer himself. . . . The Church looked on Christians as forming a 'clan' with the saints in heaven, and the performance of penance could to a certain extent, or entirely, be passed on to the latter. . . . German law held that the payment of the fine could be divided. According to the practice of the Church, the saints interceded, . . . taking from the sinner a part of the penance imposed upon him. Afterwards, the Church positively adopted the German institution, and let earthly friends, comrades, members of the family, and bondmen share in the performance of penance in order to lighten the task" (V. 330).

From this source Anselm may be said to have derived his ideas of man's hopeless servitude until the intervention of "a third party," the commutation for sins as debts, a further inclination to the use of pecuniary analogies, and the vicarious payment of a kinsman.[2]

[1] The alternative of which Anselm makes so much, punishment or satisfaction, was a Germanic legal maxim, and also inhered in the penitential system (R. Seeberg, *Text-Book of the History of Doctrines*, II. 69).

[2] Although referred to only at the end of the treatise, it is insisted that the Redeemer must be of the same race as man, since an angel would not be akin by nature (*Cur Deus Homo*, ii. 21).

### (4) *Feudalism*

The German law also included principles, quite different from the Wergeld, which had their share in formulating the premises of Anselm's theory. These are derived from feudalism, with its "over-lord" to whom service is due, its emphasis upon the privileges and obligations of kinship, and its conception of "honour," still further developed by the institution of chivalry. The idea of compensation for injured honour was feudal, though the mode may have been derived from the Wergeld. Canon Kingsley notes this fact of pecuniary reparation: "So of personal honour. 'Schilte' or insult, for instance to call a man *arga, i. e.*, a lazy loon, is a serious offence. If the defendant will confess that he said it in a passion, and will take oath that he never knew the plaintiff to be arga, he must still pay 12 shillings." [1] Compensation for dishonour may also be found in ancient Roman law.[2]

The personal circumstances, amid which Anselm reflected upon his theory and composed the treatise,

Also, He makes inheritors of what is due to Him, "*parentes suos et fratres* (St. Matt. xii. 50), quos aspicit tot et tantis *debitis obligatos*" (ii. 19, 12).

[1] *Roman and Teuton*, p. 252. See also Kemble, *Anglo-Saxons*, I. 288. It is worth noting that he is here writing of Lombard laws, and Anselm's father was a Lombard.

[2] Mackeldey, *Roman Law*, sect. 488, 489.

may have given special point and vividness to his conception.[1] Dean Church says that he thought out and began to compose the work "in the midst of the strife and troubles of his last year in England."[2] The questions involved in his quarrel with King William Rufus were not only ecclesiastical but feudal. He refused to receive the pallium from the king's hands, and also to pay the accustomed homage to the sovereign. The succeeding monarch granted the papal investiture, and the Pope permitted the homage to the king. As a thorough ultramontane, he was keenly alive to the *honour* of Rome and Canterbury, which was simply the ecclesiastical correlative of the feudal notion then prevalent.[3]

Some important features of his thought are to be ascribed to feudalism; such as his conception of God's relation to man, of the loss of God's honour, of Christ's obedience as a service (see the illustration of a *day* appointed for a *service*, ii. 16 a, 17), of the mutual relations of the subjects of God

[1] The first book was written in 1094, and the second in 1098 (Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, I. 386). It was finished during his temporary exile from England, at Capua (see *Praefat.* to *Cur Deus Homo*), or at the village of Schiavia (Martin Rule, *The Life and Times of St. Anselm*, II. 290), or at the monastery of Telese near Benevento, according to various authorities.

[2] *St. Anselm*, p. 231.

[3] The quarrel referred to resulted in the appeal to Rome, which was the beginning of a mischievous and eventually scandalous system.

the Lord, and of the substitution of Christ's service for ours.[1]

### b. *Antecedents affecting the* Form *of the Theory*

These are the influence of Aristotle, and the rationalistic method that distinguished Scholasticism. Hegel points out that the German world was the continuation of the Roman, so that Aristotelianism, as preserved in Boetius, "became the fixed basis of speculative thought in the West for many centuries."[2] The Fathers had disparaged Aristotle, particularly the Orientals;[3] but his logic prescribed the forms and laws of men's thinking, after the influence of the Greeks had waned. It was his long preëminence that in reality created the distinction between the Fathers and the Schoolmen or Doctors. Independent,

[1] Dr. Stevens calls Anselm's theory "commercial," "because it so constantly uses the terms of quantity, payment, and equivalence." This would justify Canon Moberly's term, "mathematical"; but Stevens himself uses a much more apt description than either: "It appears to me, however, to be, far more fundamentally, a feudal theory — an interpretation based on the ideas of mediæval chivalry" (*op. cit., cf.* pp. 136, 241).

[2] J. Sibree's translation of *Philosophy of History*, p. 356. Aristotle's works on demonstrative reasoning, the Analytics, the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations or Fallacies, were probably known to Anselm; but his general philosophy was not accessible until half a century after the time of Abelard.

[3] Dr. Farrar refers to "no less than twenty from Justin to Cyril" (*History of Interpretation*, p. 263).

fresh thought gave way to deductive proofs of what was accepted, to shaping and systematising the materials already provided, to constructing a philosophy of belief. Precision of statement was a necessity to the Aristotelian. What had been figurative or rhetorical in the Fathers became logical and definite. The meaning of the words employed came to be wrought out more clearly, so that questions on which the Scriptures were silent were elaborately discussed and determined. The application of the mere processes of logic to Divine truth was, in some respects, a great evil. The very scientific precision marred the interpretation of Divine realities, which were Scripturally expressed in terms that were never intended by the writers to conform to logical modes or intellectual formulations, isolated from life. But this is just what characterises Anselm's treatment of his query; it is formal, exact, reducible to a series of syllogisms, and thus in complete contrast to the varied, metaphorical, unsystematic method of the New Testament.

Aristotle was the precursor of Scholasticism, by making theology a part of philosophy.[1] It has been defined as an attempt "so to fuse faith and reason as to save the one from being blind, and the other

[1] Farrar, *op. cit.*, p. 466. John of Damascus has been called the progenitor of Scholasticism, because he followed Aristotle in this, and applied to theology a philosophic method (*Ibid.*).

from being autocratic";[1] also, "to rationalise Christianity (in the technical sense of the term), to evince its absolute reasonableness";[2] again, "to reproduce ancient philosophy under the control of ecclesiastical doctrine."[3] With all this desire for rationality, in a period of intense intellectual activity, there was an immense amount of subtle and often absurd speculation. Says Erasmus of its later development: "There are innumerable quibblings . . . concerning instances and notions, and relations and formalitations, and quiddities and eccëities, which no one can follow out with eyes, except a lynx, which is said to be able in the thickest darkness to see things which exist nowhere."[4]

A multitude of such speculations may be found in Anselm; such as, whether God can lie (i. 12); why angels could not be redeemed by a God-man (ii. 21); how Christ was born without original sin (ii. 16); how, if the Father became incarnate, there would be two grandsons in the Trinity (ii. 9); that redemption was a compensation to supply the deficiency in the number of elect angels, occasioned by the fall of the devils (i. 16).[5] He has been called, "the Father

[1] Farrar, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
[2] Shedd, *op. cit.*, I. 75.
[3] Farrar, *ubi supra*, p. 265.
[4] Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, I. 400.
[5] This last is taken from Augustin (*De Civ.*, xxii. 1). Compare i. 16 and i. 19: "it is certain"; with i. 18, 11: "Wherefore hu-

of Scholasticism";[1] but this is interpreted in the qualified sense that he gave form to a philosophical spirit which had been at work from the time of Isidore, and "had almost come to an expression in Berengar and Lanfranc; and put it in the way of becoming an element of historical progress." The scholastic era began in the ninth century, and hence its methods were antecedent to Anselm. But he began an especially productive period which lasted for two centuries, the first of which marked an epoch in the history of the doctrine of the Atonement, whose discussion was started anew by his notable treatise.

His argument has just those features which we should expect from the influences here indicated. It is deductive, not inductive — which indeed would have been impossible in his time. Its premises take for granted much that needs consideration, if not proof. It assumes Christian dogma, and tries to show that it must be true by presenting it in purely rational form.[2] It starts with the idea of the *reasonableness* of Christianity, which is to be made clear, but faith must precede knowledge. "Rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda christianae fidei *credamus*, *prius-*

man nature was made for its own account, and not only to restore the number of individuals of another nature."

[1] Hasse in Hagenbach, I. 392; Oxenham, p. 180.

[2] *Fides quaerens intellectum.*

*quam* ea praesumamus ratione discutere" (i. 2).[1] He was a childlike believer, and contended against the scepticism engendered by previous modes of thought. But his reasoning is strictly *à priori*, "quasi nihil sciatur de Christo" (*Praefatio*); he never *proves* his positions from the Scriptures, which explains his omission of so many elements of the doctrine which find place in the New Testament. This will be seen to have an important bearing upon our acceptance of the details of the theory. It also serves to mark his contrast to the Fathers, who were Scriptural, even when rationalistic.[2]

Dr. Shedd regards it as an advantage that the Christological question from this time turned upon theories of the Atonement; and speaks of Anselm's view as "decidedly in advance of the best Soteriology of the patristic age, and agreeing substantially with that of the Reformation," just because it is definite and metaphysical (II. 274). It is most needful to remember that "out of the controversy over these theories Protestantism, as a theology, arose, and by these theories Protestantism is ever being split into sects."[3] The *Cur Deus Homo* was the prelude to

[1] See also *Proslog.*, i: "Neque enim quaero intelligere, ut credam; sed *credo, ut intelligam.* Nam et hoc credo, quia nisi credidero, non intelligam."

[2] It is sometimes said that the syllogistic and dialectical method began with Tertullian.

[3] *The Outlook*, Dec. 5, 1896.

the most important theological discussion since the death of Augustin, and we must now proceed to a careful statement of the theory and its excellences and defects.

## 2. "Cur Deus Homo?" [1]

Our author is really concerned with the problem, how to escape the punishment of sin. He says that the men of his time, "non solum literati, sed etiam illiterati," were inquiring whether God could have forgiven sin by a simple act of will. The work is an answer to this inquiry. It is divided into two books; the first of which replies to objections, and aims to prove that man could not have been saved without Christ; the second shows that man could have been saved only by a God-man, and how this redemption was brought about. It is cast in the form of a dialogue, which makes it agreeable reading, but exhibits the interlocutor, the acquiescent Boso, as too easily satisfied with the reasons given by his teacher.[2]

[1] The translation used is by Edward S. Prout, published by the Religious Tract Society.

[2] Rivière well calls Boso "un interlocuteur de convention," "un ami complaisant" (*op. cit.*, p. 292).

The theory of Anselm is criticised in the Histories of Dogma, and in works on the Atonement, of which the following are accessible: R. W. Dale, *The Atonement*, pp. 279 *sq.*; John Young, *The Life and Light of Men*, pp. 450 *sq.*; J. S. Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, pp. 451 *sq.*; D. W. Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, pp. 55 *sq.*; R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and*

### a. *Preliminary to the Argument*

The question which unbelievers "cast in our teeth, and many believers ponder in their hearts," is, "for what reason or necessity God was made man, and by His death, as we believe, restored life to the world?" (i. 1, 3). He first answers objections to the Incarnation and sufferings of Christ, by showing the fitness of restoring disobedient man by "a man's obedience," and of His birth of a woman since "sin had its beginning from a woman" (i. 3 and 4). He then gives a reason why none other than God could have liberated man; which is not very strong.[1] Boso then presents a dilemma (i. 6, 3): either God is not almighty, or else He is unwilling to save us or not wise enough. This Anselm answers in a sentence, and most evasively and unsatisfactorily: "The will of God ought to be a sufficient reason for us when He does anything, though we may not see why He so wills it, for the will of God is never unreasonable" (i. 8). Boso then suggests a difficulty from the current theology of the devil's claim upon man, and answers

*Personality*, pp. 367 *sq.*; A. Sabatier, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, pp. 68 *sq.*; Abbé J. Rivière, *Le Dogme de la Rédemption*, pp. 291 *sq.*; G. B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, pp. 136 *sq.*, and Index.

[1] "Cum ipse, qui non nisi Dei servus et aequalis angelis bonis per omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius, qui Deus non esset, et cuius angeli servi non essent" (i. 5).

it himself. "But there is the following statement also which we are wont to make, that God was bound to take action against the devil by a judicial process in order to liberate man, before He did so by a putting forth of power; . . . otherwise He would have done an act of unjust violence to him [the devil], since *he was justly in possession of man.* . . . I do not see the force of this. . . . Since neither the devil nor man belongs to any one but God, and neither exists apart from the power of God, what reason was there for God to deal with His own, concerning His own, in His own, unless to punish His own servant who had persuaded his fellow-servant to desert their common Lord and secede to him, and as a traitor had received a fugitive, a thief had received a fellow-thief in possession of the stolen property of his Lord?" (i. 7, 1 and 2; also, ii. 19, 18).

Boso then adduces popular objections (i. 8); the unfitness that the Most High should stoop to such humiliation, that the All-powerful should do anything with so great labour; and the injustice of allowing an innocent man to suffer as Christ did. Anselm replies that there was no humiliation of God in the Incarnation, but an exaltation of human nature (i. 8, 9).[1] Moreover, Christ's suffering was entirely voluntary: "God the Father did not treat that Man at all in the way you seem to understand, nor did He

[1] But compare Phil. ii. 8.

deliver to death the innocent for the guilty. For He did not compel Him to die or permit Him to be killed against His will, but Christ Himself, of His own free will, endured death that He might save men" (i. 8, 14). A distinction must be made between the requirement of obedience and what resulted from His obeying (i. 9, 1): He suffered because He obeyed, but He was not commanded to suffer (i. 9, 5). "God did not therefore compel Christ, in Whom was no sin, to die; but Christ Himself voluntarily endured death, not to show His obedience [per obedientiam] in abandoning life, but on account of His obedience in holding fast His righteousness, in which He so bravely persevered that on that account He incurred death" (i. 9, 10).[1] Still Boso is not satisfied, and wishes to know why God could not spare the guilty

[1] Here Anselm distinguishes the whole life of obedience as issuing in death, from the death itself which, not being commanded, was not part of the necessary obedience. The exigencies of his theory require him to lay stress on Christ's voluntary endurance of what was not demanded of Him as a sinless Man, in order to provide the work of supererogation which should repay to God the honour of which He had been defrauded. But this involves him in a contradiction, for he has already said that life was restored by a man's *obedience* (i. 3); and it compels him to evade the Scripture passages which assert that Christ was "obedient unto death," and that He did the will and commandment of His Father (Phil. ii. 8; Heb. v. 8; Rom. viii. 32; St. Jno. vi. 38; xviii. 11; St. Matt. xxvi. 39). These subtle efforts (i. 8 and 9), however, are rightly called, by Harnack, "clumsy sophisms." — Note some strange examples of mediæval exegesis: on Heb. v. 8 (i. 9, 12); St. Luke ii. 52 (i. 9, 19); and St. Matt. xxvi. 42 (i. 9, 24).

without the death of Christ (i. 10, 23). Anselm then comes to the detailed explanation of the work of Christ. I shall not follow him in his digressions, or from chapter to chapter, but shall present succinctly in his own words what constitutes the essence of his philosophy of the Atonement.

### b. *The Argument*

Logically, his first proposition is that all the actions of men are *due* to the promotion of God's *honour*, and that *sin* has *defrauded God* of this honour. "The entire will of a rational creature ought to be subject to the will of God. . . . This is the debt which angel and man owe to God; no one who pays this, sins, and every one who does not pay it does sin. . . . This is the sole and entire honour which we owe to God, and which God exacts of us. . . . He who does not render to God this honour, which is His due, takes away from God what is His own, and dishonours God, and this is to sin" (i. 11, 4–6).[1]

Secondly, sin, which thus deprives God of the honour which is His due, is a *debt*. "Sin therefore is nothing else than not rendering to God what is His due. . . . This is the debt which angel and man owe

[1] "God is viewed as a distant and mighty suzerain, having an absolute claim on the obedience of His subjects, Whose honour injured or diminished requires an awful reparation" (Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 202).

to God. . . . As long as he does not pay what he has stolen, he remains in fault" (i. 11, 3–7). As the lost honour must be restored, the sinner cannot be simply exonerated of his debt by the mercy or mere will of God. For such remission is a pretermission of punishment, which, if satisfaction otherwise be not made, is to let sin go without being brought into orderly relations with the righteous nature of God (inordinatum dimittitur; i. 12, 2). Also, if sin be unpunished, there is no *objective* distinction between the good man and the sinner: "God will treat in the same way him who sins and him who does not; which is a thing not befitting God" (i. 12, 5).[1]

There are only two methods by which God's honour may be restored. It cannot be done by our returning to obedience, because we owe present and future obedience to God in any circumstances, and therefore it cannot condone the past. "When you render anything, which you owe to God even if you have not sinned, you ought not to reckon this as a debt which you owe on account of sin. . . . In obedience, what do you give to God that you do not owe Him, to Whose command you owe all that you are and have and can become?" (i. 20, 6 and 12). The honour may be vindicated by *punishment*, which exhibits God's supremacy. "God subdues him, though unwilling, by tormenting him, and thus shows

[1] Thus punishment is grounded in justice.

that He is the Lord — a truth this same man refuses of his own will to confess. And on this point we must reflect that as man, by sinning, steals what is God's, so God, by punishing, takes away what is man's. . . . For although God does not transfer what He takes away to the use of His own advantage, as a man converts to his own use money he has taken from another, yet what He takes away serves the purpose of His own honour by the very fact that He does take it away. For by doing so he proves that the sinner and all that are his are subject to Himself" (i. 14. 3–6).

Or, on the other hand, the honour may be vindicated by making *satisfaction*, by giving back to God more than has been taken away from Him.[1] "It is not sufficient only to restore what has been taken away, but in return for the injury inflicted he ought to restore more than he took away. For just as when one injures the health of another, it is not sufficient to restore his health, unless he give some recompense for the injury inflicted in causing him suffering; so when one violates the honour of any one, it is not sufficient to restore his honour, if he restore not something which may be pleasing to him whom he has dishonoured, according to the extent of the injury caused by his dishonour. This, too, should be

[1] "Necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio *aut* poena sequatur" (i. 15, 11).

noticed, that when any one repays what he unjustly took away, he ought to give something which could not be required of him if he had not stolen the property of another. In like manner, every one who sins ought to pay back to God the honour he has taken away; and this is the *satisfaction* which every sinner ought to make to God" (i. 11, 7–10; also i. 14, 3). But God in His lovingkindness does not demand punishment, and will therefore accept satisfaction.[1]

He demonstrates the necessity of satisfaction in another way, and so leads up to the answer to the question on his title-page. — The debt of man *must* be paid: "Nothing is less tolerable in the order of things than that the creature should take away from the Creator the honour due to Him, and not repay what he takes away" (i. 13, 1). "Regard it therefore as most certain that without satisfaction, i. e., without a *willing payment* of what is due, God cannot let sin pass unpunished; . . . for man would not in this way be restored to such a position as he had before he sinned" (i. 19, 14). But "satisfaction must be made *according to the measure of sin*" (i. 20, 1). Sin

[1] Note the unsatisfactory answer to Boso's difficulty, which is acute also in modern times, as to our forgiving another freely, while God demands satisfaction (i. 12, 10–12). See also the Roman Catholic acceptance of this idea of satisfaction, as expressed by the Bishop of Amycla: "To make satisfaction to another . . . is to perform a retributive act more pleasing in the sight of the Person offended than the act to be atoned for was displeasing" (*The Atonement: A Clerical Symposium*, p. 234).

is such a serious offence that it is impossible for man to make compensation for it. This is illustrated by a single look taken in opposition to the will of God, which is declared to be so weighty that the whole universe should rather perish than that we commit such a wrong (i. 21, 3–8). Boso assents to the gravity of sin: "I must confess that in order to preserve the whole creation, I ought not to do anything against the will of God" (i. 21, 9). And Anselm concludes: "You do not, therefore, make satisfaction, if you do not return something greater than that for the sake of which you were under obligation not to commit the sin" (i. 21, 14). He enforces this conclusion by returning to the thought of the insult or gross dishonour to God through man's voluntary yielding to the devil (i. 22). Man "took away from God whatever He had purposed to effect out of human nature" (i. 23, 3). This he cannot restore: "man, therefore, neither can nor ought to receive from God what God purposed to give him, if he does not restore to God all that he took away, so that as through him God lost, through him also God may recover [what He lost]" (i. 23, 6).[1] "But man, the sinner, can by no means do this, because a sinner cannot justify a sinner" (i. 23, 7).[2]

[1] Baur finds here "the nerve of Anselm's doctrine" (Hagenbach, II. 46).

[2] We may remark the attempt to give a rational explanation of Augustin's amphiboly, that sin against an infinite God is infinite, and deserves infinite punishment. This exaggerated way of

As the debt must be paid and man cannot pay it, the otherwise valid excuse of man's inability will not hold, because he has voluntarily incurred this inability, and so is responsible for it (i. 24). The first book then concludes with the assertion that either man cannot be saved at all, or he may be saved by some other means than that recognised by Christians, or he must be saved by Christ (i. 25, 5 and 6). Rejecting the first two alternatives, he proceeds in the second book to show how we are saved by Christ.[1] The argument is briefly this: man must render satisfaction, and he cannot do it; but only *man* ought to, and only *God* can; hence, God became man in Jesus Christ. "This cannot be done except by a complete satisfaction for sin, which no sinner can make" (ii. 4, 3). "There is no one therefore who can make this satisfaction except God Himself. . . . But no one ought to make it except man; otherwise man does not make satisfaction. . . . If, therefore, as is evident, it is needful that that heavenly state be perfected from among men, and this cannot be unless the above-mentioned satisfaction be made, which no one *can* make except God, and no one *ought* to make except man; it is necessary that a God-man make it" (ii. 6, 4 and 5). Christ is God-man, not by conversion

reckoning the heinousness of sin was adopted by Cardinal Newman (Farrar, *Witness of History to Christ*, p. 168).

[1] See Boso's summary in ii. 17, 36–40.

of the Divine nature into the human, nor by the blending of the two natures into a *tertium quid*, but by the co-existence of the two natures in one person (ii. 7). He must be of the race of Adam, in order to make satisfaction for it (ii. 8). Being sinless, He did not need to die (ii. 10). "But there is nothing more severe and arduous that a man can suffer for the honour of God of his own accord, and not as a matter of debt, than death. And a man can in no way more entirely give himself up to God, than when he delivers himself up to death for His honour" (ii. 11, 21). Christ's death was therefore voluntary, and herein consisted its supreme value: His merits are infinite, hence superabundant and available for man's rescue. It is then shown "how His death outweighs the number and greatness of all sins" (ii. 14, 1). The merit of His death is derived from the uniqueness of His personality; "because a sin which is committed against His person surpasses beyond comparison all those which can be conceived of apart from His person" (ii. 14, 7). "The life of this Man was so exalted and so precious, that it may suffice to pay what is due for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely more" (ii. 17, 40).[1]

[1] Infinite merits are substituted for infinite demerit, and so a just compensation is made to God's honour. It was the supererogatory character of the obedience that gave it legal value, "its capacity to procure forgiveness for the ill-deserving" (Fisher, p. 221).

"It remains, therefore, now to show how that [life] is paid to God for the sins of men" (ii. 17, 40). "No man beside Him ever gave to God, by dying, what he would not at some time have necessarily lost, or paid what he did not owe. But this Man freely offered to the Father what it would never have been necessary for Him to lose, and paid for sinners what He did not owe for Himself" (ii. 18, 5). Thus Christ pays the debt, and receiving a forgiveness which He did not need, bestows it on man. So great a gift must have its reward; but "he who recompenses any one, either gives him what he has not, or forgives what might be required of him. But before the Son did this great work, all things that the Father had were His; nor did He ever owe anything that could be forgiven Him. . . . If so great and well-deserved a reward is paid neither to Him nor to another, the Son will seem to have accomplished so great a work in vain. . . . It is needful, therefore, that the payment be made to some one else, since it cannot be to Him" (ii. 19, 5–8). In this way, the mercy of God is harmonised with His justice.[1] The mercy seemed to be "clean gone" (perire), but by the contrivance here outlined mankind is redeemed; and "what is more just than that He to whom a price

[1] The idea of justice is continually mingled with the argument concerning God's honour, and, as will be shown, renders it nugatory.

is paid more valuable than all the debt, if it is given with the proper disposition, should forgive the whole debt?" (ii. 20, 3).[1]

### c. *Some Valuable Features of the Theory*

Its chief merit is that it dealt the death-blow to the ancient immoral notion that man was the devil's lawful prey, and that the slaveholder's claims must be met before the ransom is complete (ii. 19, 18).[2] This theory of our redemption, which held such long sway over the minds of Christian thinkers, is undoubtedly rejected as wholly untenable by every school of thought in the modern Church. There was a certain truth in the idea that we were rescued from the power of the devil; but the patristic statement is maimed by the admission that we were *purchased* from him, when as a matter of fact we were redeemed by Christ's victory over him. As the subversion of the elder theory is left to Boso, instead of being prominently stated by Anselm, it may be that he did not fully realise the important service he was rendering. He may not have been sufficiently alive to the con-

[1] I have omitted in this statement of Anselm's argument everything but the necessary elements of his theory.

[2] In this respect, Anselm's theory is nobler than that of the Fathers. Baur regards this as Anselm's original contribution to the development of the doctrine of the Atonement (*Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 187).

ception of redemption "by a mighty hand and a stretched-out arm," like those succeeding him who did not follow him in rejecting the ransom paid to the devil; and accordingly he made his argument against it subordinate and put it into the mouth of Boso. However this may be, he clearly repudiated the right of the devil, and declared: "quidquid ab illo exigebatur, hoc *Deo debebat non diabolo*" (ii. 19, 18). In giving up this mythical transaction with the devil, he was combating a long dominant *dualism;* but he unfortunately fell into another "dualism within the divine nature itself between justice and love," which Professor Allen regards as "a great step forward." [1] So persistent, however, was the influence of the patristic conception, that in the next century Bernard accused Abelard of heresy for contesting it; it is repeated in Peter Lombard and Innocent III., and is found in a sermon by the English Bishop Hooper.

Another practical value of the theory is that, as the doctrine of the later Fathers had delivered men from the fear of the devil, this "delivered the mediæval world from the unnatural dread of God which the Church was engendering." [2] The ecclesiastical mediation removed God from any intimate relation with mankind; His paternal love became more and

[1] *Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 202.
[2] Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 366.

more vague and intangible, and men's thoughts of Him were paganised into a fear of a distant Ruler whose rigorous justice exacted severe punishments. This was an unchristian misconception, and in the superstitious age in which Anselm wrote, it was important that the tendency of his teaching was to make the thought of God more alluring. It is true that he so presented the complete satisfaction of God's claims against us that it might be construed as our redemption out of the hands of the Father. But the Latin idea of the necessity of appeasing the Divine wrath is wholly absent; the demand for satisfaction was responded to and fulfilled by God Himself; God became man in order that He might be one with man, and thus was brought so near that man was freed from the dread of Him.

Again, Anselm has been highly estimated as the champion of the *objective* efficacy of the Atonement. The satisfaction which he describes removes an obstacle to the work of grace in the forgiveness of man, and is exclusively directed towards God. It must be admitted that there is to-day a general impatience of any explanation of the *modus* of the Atonement. There are strong objections to most of those propounded since his day, and his own has such grave defects as to be entirely inadmissible. There is particularly a repugnance to any pretended acquaintance with things deliberately left undis-

closed, such as the change wrought by the death of Christ in the relation of God towards us. This is what is usually meant by "objective"; and, even if it were true, it is conspicuously avoided in the New Testament, and it is wholly unverifiable. Nevertheless, there is a strong impression, to which the purely subjective theories have never done justice, that the work of Christ was influential with God as well as with men — even if it be left wholly unexplained; and Anselm must be credited with making it permanent from his time, even though we must reject every detail of his speculation and must regard its exclusively objective character as an essential defect.

The entire reasoning of St. Paul upon the subject of redemption involves the conception of a sacrifice *unto God*, which was too much obscured by the patristic conceit of a payment to the devil. The thought is barely suggested and not fully expressed; but it surely gives to the sacrifice a Godward aspect. The Apostle certainly thought of Christ as both God and man, and considered that He not only represented God to man, but that, as Head of the race, He also represented man to God. If he conceived of Christ as offering to God the sacrifice of mankind which was mystically one with Him, he must have thought of the work of Christ as primarily looking towards God. It is true that he merely indicates this aspect

of atonement, while it has been the fashion since Anselm to work it out with apparent familiarity with all its details. This, however, should not lead us to ignore such hints of the objective idea in this form as are plainly to be found in the New Testament.

Moreover, the use of such a word as λύτρον or ἀντίλυτρον suggests another point of view which contains an important truth. The word conveys no intimation that the cross was the cause or ground of forgiveness; this idea has been the source of the hazardous speculation upon what has not been revealed. But it is the simple fact that the cross has been the means of the *proclamation* of forgiveness.[1] The Scriptural sense of λύτρον is that of a figurative description of effect, and not method: our deliverance from sin may be actually traced to the sacrifice of Christ, *as though* a literal ransom had been paid by Him; this has been objectively and historically the means and cause of our knowledge of the reconciling love of God. The revelation of that love and righteousness was His work, a work which was outside of ourselves and independent of us and which we could not have performed; it is the historic source of our life in Him, and is something more than a subjective "moral influence." Hence the Atonement is more than an at-one-ment, at least in the

[1] *Cf.* W. L. Walker, *The Cross and the Kingdom*, p. 199.

sense that an effective work was performed by the historic Christ distinct from its consummation in our personal reconciliation. We come to be at one with God, not merely because we are to-day impressed by the exhibition of God's love in Christ, but because what Christ was and did centuries ago mediated for us the love and life of God and accomplished for us what we could not do for ourselves. The term "objective atonement" has traditionally meant "an appeasement of which God is the object." That description of Christ's work can no longer be accepted; all the best modern writers vigorously protest against the gross abuse of a Christian truth by this pagan survival. The meaning of the adjective has been softened and weakened, and so wholly changed, even by the most conservative theologians, that its use could be discontinued with great advantage to clearness of thought.[1] But the Church cannot afford wholly to lose the idea that the life and death of obedience were a sacrifice of which God was the object, and that the unique service which Christ rendered to mankind was historically and potentially efficient before it was appropriated by any of its beneficiaries.[2]

[1] *Vide* George B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, pp. 425, 432.

[2] Principal Simon stands almost alone in regarding Anselm's theory as "exclusively manward-looking." This seems a strange misconception; for the dynamic effect of Christ's work is merely

The moral necessity of this mode of Atonement enabled him to express another valuable thought, — that the Divine will is not absolute. The contrary idea had done vast harm to dogma and ecclesiasticism ever since Augustin had made it fundamental. If man could not be restored by a mere fiat, the theory of the abstract omnipotence of God disappears. Dr. Allen shows also that he incidentally helped to undermine the Papal authority by his position that even Almighty God cannot forgive sin by His will alone.[1] This opened the way to the conception that there are necessities laid upon love and righteousness which God cannot evade if He will. Athanasius said that God need not redeem man, but did so from motives of love. Anselm held that God was under necessity, because He would have been unjust to Himself if He did not redeem (i. cap. 16–18; ii. cap. 4 and 5). But to be just to Himself is to be faithful to His own nature of Love, and hence there are eternal necessities of character which not only limit His power and liberty

glanced at, and is really inconsistent with his whole point of view. Dr. Simon justifies his opinion that Anselm's "conception of the influence or action of the work of Christ is not properly objective," by laying stress upon Anselm's point that the direct object of redemption was to fill the gap made by the fall of the angels, so that the theory "really looks towards the *cosmos as a whole*, with special reference, of course, to man and angelic intelligences" (D. W. Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, pp. 54–58).

[1] *Christian Institutions*, p. 367.

(i. 12, 14), but which impel Him to those acts which constitute His glory and make Him supremely worthy of our worship.[1]

Still another valuable element in the theory is its emphasis upon Christ's work as being essentially obedience. It is true that the efficacious import of that work was found in His voluntary submission to death, but the stress lies upon His *obedience* unto death.[2] The satisfaction therefore was active, and the idea of *punishment* is entirely absent from the

[1] Dr. Stevens considers that Anselm has not made out the absolute necessity of a particular method of redemption, but only that it was fit or suitable, required by the Divine feeling of compromised dignity or honour (*Op. cit.*, p. 243). But the idea of a moral necessity is undoubtedly to be found in the above references.

[2] I have already indicated that Anselm is contradictory in his statements on this point. He makes the satisfaction to consist in Christ's gift of His life, which was not a commandment of God and therefore not an essential part of His duty. It was additional to His required obedience, and that constituted its merit or legal value. But he begins by calling Christ's work "a man's obedience" (i. 3); he expressly says that the death was "inflicted on Him because He persevered in obedience" (i. 9); and he admits that the cup which could not pass from Him was the death which God had willed as the means of saving the world, and God had sent Him to perform that will (i. 10). There could have been no ethical significance in the death if it had not been obedience. There could have been no merit or desert if it was not a moral act. In his contrast of necessity and free will, he simply juggles with the former word; for no one considers the moral necessity of obedience as incompatible with freedom. Hence, Dr. Fisher is quite right in describing Anselm's conception of satisfaction: "It was an act of obedience, but a supererogatory act of obedience" (p. 221).

scheme, and indeed quite alien to it.[1] It is of the highest importance to the understanding of the relation of Anselm's theory to the subsequent modification of it, that it should be emphasised as far removed from the penal satisfaction of later times. Instead of being penal, it was explicitly a substitute for the penal idea. The distinction, "satisfactio *aut* poena," is vital to the whole argument; and the very title of the book shows that Anselm did not wholly separate the death from the previous human life, as was the subsequent custom of many Protestant theologians.[2]

The legal and quantitative method of conceiving the satisfaction may be passed over as no longer concerning modern thought; but it is a profoundly ethical advantage to have it asserted that God can be satisfied with nothing less than an obedience as perfect as His Son's. Anselm was unable to give this statement its due moral significance; but, inasmuch as Satisfaction was the characteristic word of

[1] Baur is certainly right upon this point, and Hagenbach as certainly wrong (II. 46).

[2] Abbé Rivière, however, insists that the theory is one of penal satisfaction, because satisfaction being a painful work (*une œuvre pénible*) is itself a penalty (*une peine; op. cit.*, p. 310). But Anselm definitely avoids the idea of punishment, and makes the whole virtue of Christ's submission to death to consist in voluntary active obedience; and his theory cannot be called penal merely because some of its details are derived from the ecclesiastical system of penance.

this period, as Ransom was of the patristic, and Substitution of the Reformation, and the word is still vital in all discussions upon Soteriology, we may apply it in ways impossible to him and more congenial to a Scriptural understanding of the doctrine. Even as he put it, the grace of God is solely manifested in the saving work of Christ, and his argument leads to the modern thought of Christ Himself as our salvation and atonement. Notwithstanding its failure as a speculation, it was a real attempt to associate the Incarnation with the needs of the individual: this is the practical meaning of his doctrine, and it is still the dynamic element of personal religion.

It is wonderful that a theory which had for one of its chief antecedents the ideas of a penitential discipline should have contained a feature which led ultimately to the overthrow of that discipline; but this may be regarded as its final excellence. It is a notable fact that Anselm should have been concerned with the question, Why did God become Man? The very limitation of the inquiry turned men's thoughts away from the externalism and superstition of a mere ecclesiastical system to the significance of the person and work of Christ. The discussion has not one word to say of personal and legal satisfactions, of priestly interpositions, of the Church's control of the means of salvation. It fixes attention upon

the redemptive meaning of the Incarnation, upon the perfect offering of an obedient life, upon a death whose loving acquiescence and completeness of sacrificial surrender absolutely satisfied a Father's desire for an ideal Son, and it makes these the all-sufficient source and explanation of our reconciliation with God. That is to say, it acknowledges the greatness and sufficiency of Christ's work; forgiveness "springs from the Divine initiative, rests on Divinely appointed means," is the free gift of Divine grace, and is undeserved and wholly dissociated from human merit. Doubtless, the usual ecclesiastical means of applying the benefits of this work to the individual soul are taken for granted. Doubtless, Anselm would have been dismayed at any inferences from his theory which would have impaired the authority of the Church and disparaged the traditional mode of its exercise. Nevertheless, the emphasis was removed from the futile efforts of the sinner to placate the favour of God by his own merits and good works to the obedient death of One whose merits were infinite, who had superabundantly fulfilled the demands of the Divine righteousness, and who was willing to share His reward with those who followed Him. The precise form of the statement may have been of only temporary value, but it exalted the figure and achievement of the Redeemer to the supreme place which they occupy in the New

Testament. The remunerative discipline of the Church might continue for centuries longer, might even grow more degraded and offensive. But the fact of man's forgiveness had been treated quite apart from that discipline, and had been adequately accounted for in the person and work of Christ alone; and thus the way was prepared for the disregard of the pagan system introduced by Tertullian and Cyprian, and for a return to the Pauline understanding of the plenary efficiency of the Incarnate life and death.[1]

### d. *Defects of the Theory*

There are three main defects marking the theory as a whole, to be noted before proceeding to a criticism in detail. First, it is wholly outside of the teaching of the Scriptures. The total silence of the New Testament upon its essential elements furnishes a strong presupposition against it. The expressed intention of the author to conduct his discussion as though nothing had been revealed upon the subject might have had great apologetic value if his conclusions had coincided with the Apostolic conceptions of the work of Christ. But when he is ex-

[1] It is unfortunate that nearly every good feature in this treatise should be so connected with objectionable details that it must be isolated and reapplied before it is of use to doctrinal or practical theology.

clusively speculative and rationalistic and takes a point of view entirely unfamiliar to the inspired writers, his very originality is the most suspicious feature of his argument.[1] By his consistent disregard of Scripture he fails adequately to include the death of Christ with his whole life-work, and considers it as an adscititious merit rather than as the consummation of His redeeming effort. "This God-man need not have preached and founded a kingdom, no disciples need have been gathered: He only required to die."[2] Anselm entirely passes over the fundamental ideas of St. Paul, who treated of the work of Christ under the categories of redemption (*ἀπολύτρωσις, ἀντίλυτρον, ἐξαγοράζειν*), of sacrifice (*θυσία*), of propitiation (*ἱλαστήριον*), of reconciliation (*καταλλαγή*), of mediation (*μεσίτης*), of representation (*ὑπέρ*) and mystical union (*ἐν Χριστῷ, κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος*, etc). He brings us into an atmosphere quite uncongenial with any of these concepts. He is so purely speculative, so entirely aloof from Biblical ideas, that the enormous influence of his characteristic word has made nearly all subsequent thought on the Atonement extra-Scriptural, if not unscriptural.[3] This is so distinct a defect that

[1] Baur calls his theorising "abstract dialectic" (*Die Christ-Lehre*, p. 185). Minute definition has been, in Soteriology more than in other departments, the scourge of theological thought.

[2] Harnack, *op. cit.*, VI. 76.

[3] "I know of no important treatise on our subject which has so

Professor Harnack says that it is strange that anything so unworthy of the Apostolic tradition could have been produced without being condemned as heretical. "No theory so bad had ever before his day been given out as *ecclesiastical*. But perhaps no one can frame a better, who isolates the death of Christ from His life, and wishes to see in this death something else than the consummation of the 'service' which He rendered throughout His life." [1]

Secondly, the theory fails even as an abstract and rationalistic explanation of the Atonement. It is severely logical in method, and marked by a passion for metaphysical subtlety. It exhibits the same reverence for the intellectual process as such that was afterwards displayed by the Calvinist scholastics; it is not concerned with what precious things are trampled down in the march of the remorseless argument. Boso cries out at the demonstration that forgiveness of the sinner, forasmuch as he had not to pay, is contrary to justice; which permits nothing but punishment to be the due of sin. He says: "If God follows the method [rationem] of justice, God's mercy seems to be at an end." To which Anselm frigidly replies: "Rationem postulasti, rationem accipe" (i. 24, 20, 21, 23); and poor Boso hastens

few points of contact with Scripture" (Stevens, *Christ. Doct. of Salvation*, p. 243).

[1] *Op. cit.*, VI. 78.

to yield: "I, at any rate, do not see that any of your arguments can be invalidated."

Now, there is nothing in Christianity antagonistic to logic or philosophy; but if the philosophy be false or crude, if the premises of the logical process be themselves insecure — both of which are true of Anselm's argument — then the theory lacks scientific validity. Dr. Shedd remarks: "Anselm concedes, by implication, throughout his work, that if it cannot be made out that the vicarious satisfaction of Divine justice, by the theanthropic sufferings of Jesus Christ, is required by a necessary and immanent attribute of the Divine nature, then a scientific character cannot be vindicated for the doctrine; for nothing that is not metaphysically necessary is scientific." [1] But Anselm explicitly denies any metaphysical necessity; the most that he will admit is the moral necessity of not leaving the universe unordered (inordinatum). Then, he makes Christ's work depend on the Divine determination to save enough men to take the place of the fallen angels: an idea which he derived from Augustin (*Enchir.*, 62). This trivial notion is so completely without verification, his general postulates are so alien to Christian ideas of God's nature and relation to us, his syllogisms are so fallacious, that the pretentious structure is manifestly without foundation.

[1] *Hist. Doct.*, II. 275.

The third general defect is that it is external and institutional, as will be seen in the ensuing criticism.[1] It was the weak sense of individuality characteristic of the times that gave the penitential system its opportunity, and made it, together with the ruling ideas of the criminal law and of feudal customs, the natural mould of Anselm's thought. He could not have escaped his environment, perhaps; for he lived in a preëminently institutional age, was a prince of an institutional Church, which offered an institutional religion. But Christianity, while it necessarily developed institutions, is essentially personal; and the most vital element of our religion is ignored by Anselm, except in a mere incidental reference of a few lines.[2]

### (1) *The Idea of Honour*

Sin is conceived as a deprivation of the honour of God, and hence satisfaction is the vindication of His dignity as a sovereign.[3] As sin is "an affront

[1] Mr. Lidgett contrasts the real and spiritual atonement conceived by Athanasius with the "external, mechanical, and almost accidental" satisfaction of Anselm's theory, wherein salvation becomes "rather a gift of external status than of spiritual condition" (*Spir. Princ. of At.*, p. 455).

[2] Latin and early Teutonic Christianity was largely corporate rather than personal. The chief personal expression of religion among Catholics — as distinct from ecclesiastical practices — was through mysticism, of which Anselm in this treatise betrays hardly a trace.

[3] The whole conception of God as an "over-lord" is crudely anthropomorphic.

to His infinite majesty," " the Atonement is therefore an act of homage to God in which His supremacy is recognised." [1] This is derived from the institution of feudalism. The offence is not the wounding of the heart of personal love, but defrauding the suzerain of a vassal's service; and so the reparation is not the reconciliation of the rebellious subject to his duty, not even the conciliation of the Ruler by a Sponsor who ensures the obedience of the serf, but the soothing of a feeling of impaired official prestige and glory. Dr. Harnack speaks of it as "the mythological conception of God as a mighty private-man, who is incensed at the injury done to His honour, and does not forego His wrath until He has received an at least adequately great equivalent." [2]

(a) But there is here a logical inconsistency. First, as to the *premises* of satisfaction. By making the honour of God fundamental, he has not demonstrated that legal satisfaction is the *only* condition of forgiveness, as he himself is constrained to admit (ii. 17, 31). But then he has practically made it the only condition by introducing the claim of *justice*.[3]

[1] Dale, *The Atonement*, p. 284.

[2] Vol. VI. p. 76. Among other incongruities, notice that God cannot forgive for the sake of His honour, and then cannot receive again "hominem peccati sorde maculatum sine omni lavatione, i. e. absque omni satisfactione" (i. 19, 12); in the latter case satisfaction consists in moral cleansing.

[3] It is of the utmost importance to observe that Anselm inserts this alien idea, making his argument thenceforth that forgiveness

Compensation is *due* to the *honour* of God, but it is *required* by His *justice;* the justice is involved in the acceptance of Christ's death as a reparation.[1] That is, according to Anselm's own premises, it is not honour, but justice, which makes satisfaction the only proper condition of forgiveness. But the two ideas are incompatible; they denote entirely different relations between God and man. "The relation of men to God cannot be determined at once by the glory of God, in which God is the *superior* of the latter, . . . and, at the same time by the justice of God implying a *legal coördination* between man and God."[2] There is a difference between a sovereign whose majesty has been insulted — an offence to be atoned for only by punishment, not to be wiped out by any commutation — and a person whose honour has been injured, who claims satisfaction for the infringement of his rights, and who thus occupies before the law a coördinate relation

without satisfaction is contrary to justice, instead of being demanded by God's honour. "Sibi ipsi Deus *justus* non erit" (i. 13, 7). "Intende in districtam justitiam" (i. 23, 4). "Verum hujusmodi misericordia Dei nimis est contraria justitiae illius" (i. 24, 16). See also i. 12, title; i. 13, 2; ii. 20, title, and last sentence.

[1] "Satisfaction to God is necessary — generally, on account of His honour: particularly, on account of His justice" (Ritschl, p. 27). "But . . . the idea of satisfaction is not regulated directly by the honour of God, but by His justice" (*Ibid.*, p. 29).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 30. *Per contra*, see Josef Bach, *Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters*, I. 347, note 99.

with the offender. "Reparation to the injured honour of God" is not to be "compared to a civil action for damages." The logical conclusion from the premise of honour is that *no satisfaction* can be rendered. Admitting satisfaction on the score of justice, another might conceivably render it, but then honour ceases to be fundamental. Therefore, satisfaction may be consistent with the justice of God, but not with the claim of His honour.[1]

The theory is logically inconsistent, secondly, as to what constituted the value of Christ's death as satisfaction. The author says that Christ was *not bound* to die as man was, but He did it to make compensation to the honour of God; the whole merit of the death lay in its being voluntary and therefore surplus. The very gist of the theory is found in this point. The entire eighteenth chapter of Book ii is devoted to a subtle effort to prove that Jesus "*non debuit* facere, quia non ex *debito*."[2] But "the God-man is constantly bound, on Anselm's own assumptions, to the honour of God."[3] "He was *under obligation* to do what He thought to be better and more pleasing to God," is the statement of Boso himself which Anselm endorses and then seeks to explain away.[4]

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.*, VI. 72, 73.

[2] Observe the special emphasis in section 5 of that chapter, quoted above.

[3] Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[4] Lib. ii. 18, 8. See also i. 9, 4, 5, 24.

This is His personal duty as man; for Anselm distinctly makes the obedience as human as the death. But if the death was the requisite satisfaction for the injured honour, then, although He was exempt from death regarded as the punishment of sin, He *must* die to restore the honour. In which case the death was not voluntary, in Anselm's sense of suffering what He was under no obligation to undergo. Hence, according to the theory, it was not a gift over and above what was due, and it was not priceless in value; it lacked the quality of either surplus or superlative merit which would make it a satisfaction that could be carried to the account of sinners.[1] Being a human death, the dignity of the Divine person could not have made it infinite from any point of view.[2] On the other hand, if it was voluntary and yet not a part of His obligation, the death was not a personal obedience, but a mere *material* payment or compensation. Or, in a word, if the death of Christ was no part of His duty, it was not a personal satisfaction and had only the ethical significance of a bank-note; if it was personal, then He owed it to God and could not claim it as a merit or ground of satisfaction.[3]

[1] Oxenham, *Cath. Doct. of At.*, pp. 186–188.

[2] The distinction between the Divine and human *natures* as *subjects* betrayed him into other difficulties. See later on Nestorian defect.

[3] Ritschl, *ubi supra;* Harnack, VI. 72. It does not follow, as

(b) The theory, however, is destroyed by Anselm himself. The loss of God's honour is the basis of his whole reasoning; but he admits that God can suffer no objective loss of this kind. "*It is impossible for God to lose His own honour*" (i. 14, 2). "Nothing can be added to or taken from the honour of God absolutely [quantum ad illum pertinet]. For this honour, like Himself, is incorruptible, and in no way subject to change" (i. 15, 2). "It is plain, therefore, that no one can honour or dishonour God as He is in Himself; but any one seems to do it, so far as it is in his power, when he submits or withholds his will from the will of God" (i. 15, 12). The too complaisant Boso may reply: "I do not know that I can say anything against this"; but in fact the argument, notwithstanding all its acuteness, is utterly vitiated by this contradiction.[1]

Dr. Baur gives the most plausible statement of Anselm's distinction between the essential honour which is immanent and inviolable, and the exterior honour which consists in the order of the world and which we may either respect or violate.[2] This distinction undoubtedly is made; but it does not help our author's case, as he himself indicates by such

Ritschl asserts, that Anselm was not influenced by the analogy of the Wergeld, but only that he failed to apply it consistently.

[1] Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, II. 45; Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, VI. 72.

[2] *Christ. Lehre*, pp. 173 *sq.*

words as "seems," "as if" (i. 9 and 15). If the honour that was lost is the moral order of the universe, if the outrage upon that honour is our refusal of obedience to the moral order, then the necessary reparation cannot be an act of satisfaction which purports to supply a past deficiency, but a restoration of the order by the sinner's own obedience. What God exacts for our refusal to obey His laws and recognise His authority is a reversal of our attitude, combined with an inevitable endurance of spiritual penalty. But Anselm degrades the demand and longing for submission to the moral order into a sense of injured dignity, more suited to a petty potentate than the Ruler of the universe who is also the Father of men. By reducing the honour or glory of God from the noble idea that it is synonymous with His character to the shallow conception of a prestige which must be saved from insult, he externalises and conventionalises the Divine relation to us, and deprives God's personal claim of all moral significance. What he calls God's honour is very ill expressed by such a term, and requires no such elaborate satisfaction as he outlines; the injury done to it calls for simpler and yet profounder atonement. The distinction between intrinsic and external honour, then, simply helps to involve the argument in utter confusion and contradiction.[1]

[1] The judicial fictions of the Germanic law were not moral, and have been outgrown in the laws of modern nations. The

### (2) *The Idea of Satisfaction*

This refers to the human obligation as the idea of honour does to the Divine claim. It may therefore be ascribed to the same institutional origin. But, considered by itself, as the payment of a debt, it allies itself with those other externalising institutions, the penal requirement of the Wergeld and the ecclesiastical practice of commutation.

(a) The conception of sin as debt.

The use of this figure was justified both by the Scriptures and the Fathers, though probably derived from neither. As Anselm was familiar with the parable of the Unmerciful Servant, it is strange that he should have so completely missed both its surface statement and its deeper meaning. His thought of sin as debt necessitates a payment by the debtor or his substitute; the Scriptural idea is associated not with payment, but with forgiveness (St. Matt. vi. 12; xviii. 27; St. Luke vii. 42). The patristic treatment of debt is equally far removed from Anselm's, especially as it is seen in Athanasius. That was not the compensation for a loss, but the fulfilment of a law which demanded death as the penalty of sin. The analogy was not commercial,

atmosphere of thought has so changed that these notions can no longer live in it.

but ethical; whereas Anselm made no distinction between pecuniary and moral debts. However, the one represents a *thing* demanded and given, the other a *personal* failure whose liability cannot be transferred. But the obligation to restore God's honour is entirely impersonal and unmoral, because it may be evaded by the debtor and passed over to One who is not Himself bound to fulfil it. Moreover, sin is to be measured not by its effects upon God, but by its motive and intention, and its relation to righteousness; there all its ethical quality lies. Consequently, it is idle to establish a quantitative relation between the sum of human sin and Christ's merits, and to make a single sin equivalent to an *infinite* debt.[1] The conception therefore is neither Scriptural nor patristic, and is seen to be hopelessly unsatisfactory as soon as we consider the payment of the debt.

He has no understanding of a real salvation because he has no real understanding of sin. It is represented as something momentous in its effects upon both God and man, but its true ethical character is never discerned. It is not to him an "offence against inherent right and truth," against the reasonable principles of righteousness or the loving heart of

[1] He strives to make this seem reasonable (i. 21), but it is a useless attempt to maintain the validity of Augustin's amphiboly.

a Father; it is not disunity of spirit or perversion of will or depravation of nature. It is an affront to a great dignitary, a *laesa majestas*, an outward act of refusal to pay what is due. As Dr. Stevens says: "According to this theory, sin is high treason, not moral corruption; it is not a character; it remains outside the human conscience; it is, indeed, a great fault, but it is hardly a moral fault; it is sternly condemned, but not by holiness in God or conscience in man. . . . It would be difficult to name any prominent treatise on atonement whose conception of sin is so essentially unethical and superficial." [1]

As this notion of sin is so unreal and irrelevant to man's need of an actual salvation, the analogy of it as debt is necessarily misleading. A personal quality cannot be treated as similar to a pecuniary or legal liability. It cannot be measured, or compared in quantity, or offset by an equivalent. It is not an obligation that may be shifted to another or assumed by him. So far as the past is concerned, it does not represent anything that may be paid; it may be forgiven, it may be altered, but it does not admit of compensation. But Anselm's theory has no reference to the personal or the qualitative idea; and such language as the following is fundamental: "secundum *mensuram* peccati oportet satisfactionem esse"

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

(i. 20, 1); "patet quia secundum *quantitatem* exigit Deus satisfactionem" (i. 21, 13).[1]

(b) Christ's death as a satisfaction.

Until evidence is forthcoming that Cyprian described Christ's work as a satisfaction, we may consider that Anselm was the first to use the term as part of a theory. The fact that the Church had to wait a thousand years for such a philosophy of the

[1] Baur, *Christ. Lehre*, p. 188. "His question is conceived arithmetically, and raised really in terms of arithmetic. What wonder if the conclusion reached is also arithmetical? 'Non est aliud peccare quam Deo non reddere debitum.' Here is a definition which — though true no doubt as far as it goes — is fatal. It makes sin in its essence quantitative, and, as quantitative, external to the self of the sinner, and measurable, as if it had a self, in itself. The problem caused by sin is exhibited as if it were a faulty equation, which by fresh balancing of quantities is to be equated aright. But, in fact, sin is not in what I *do* so really as in what I *am*. What I am may be evidenced, nay, may be actualized, through what I do. Yet the sin lies not in the deed, as deed; but in the 'I', as doer of the deed. The 'I' is not distinguishable from the sin. The sin is within the 'I.' It is in what 'I' am. It follows that it is an impossibility, in any full sense of the words, 'dimittere peccatum,' so long as, in real fact, 'peccatum' remains. But if sin is within the 'I,' it *does* remain until the 'I' be changed. It is an essential alteration of the very constitution of the 'I,' not a transaction or equation external to the 'I,' in which the true forgiveness of sins finds its meaning. There could hardly be a better illustration than the *Cur Deus Homo*, of the inherent failure of any exposition of atonement, which is not, at every turn, in terms of personality; which does not find, in all the terms concerned, in sin, in punishment, in penitence, in forgiveness, in atonement, meanings which, if conceived of apart from personality, and not as aspects, or states, or possibilities of *personality*, would rapidly become no meanings at all" (Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 370 *sq.*).

Atonement suggests the strongest doubt of its truth, apart from any question of the interpretation itself. But the theory is open to fatal objections, both on speculative grounds and on account of its disagreement with the New Testatment.

The obedience of Christ unto death was not a *satisfaction* of God's demands upon men. Anselm proposes only two modes of satisfying God's honour, punishment and vicarious payment, but neither of them can satisfy God. The honour of God is what the Bible calls His glory. But His glory is not an external dignity that may be imperilled and outraged; it is inseparably associated with His character. Anselm, of course, specifically distinguishes satisfaction from punishment; but he particularly admits that God's honour may be vindicated by punishment (i. 14, 3–6), and because this would "serve the purpose of His honour" it must be thought of as a possible (though rejected) satisfaction of His requirements.

Now, punishment for sin comes inevitably, but its visitation is no satisfaction to the Divine righteousness, except as that righteousness is involved in the operation of the law of sin and penalty. In interpreting the work of Christ by means of the analogies of mediæval sovereignty, Anselm was misled by the defects and temporary value of that system, to which indeed he could not be alive. A feudal monarch

might not be able to rise above a sensitiveness to his personal honour, and might be satisfied with indifferent amends for slights upon it. But God is not a monarch, much less a mediæval monarch. He cannot be satisfied with the punishment of the sinner or any one else. He would not be glorified, that is, His honour would not be restored, by the perdition of all mankind: a lost soul is not a satisfaction but an eternal loss to God. The grandeur of the Biblical description of a Father is that it shows that nothing can satisfy the righteous love, which is the synonym for His character, but the fulfilment of His desire for His children's obedience.[1]

This is the strange and radical misunderstanding of the theory — that something else will satisfy a Father than the one thing upon which He has set His heart, that punishment is a conceivable alternative for the restoration of God's honour. He can be satisfied only by our redemption, by a filial return not a legal payment, by a positive righteousness not a passive endurance of penalty, by an actual response to His demand of goodness not by a material and juristic requital of pain or a formal equation. In the modern retention of the word, this is the ethical

[1] Anselm makes God act in His own interests rather than ours; an objection raised by Boso, and not answered by Anselm (ii. 4, 5). Hence he fails to manifest the Divine love in dwelling upon the personal resentment, the enforcement of personal claim, and the content with an inadequate satisfaction.

sense we put upon it: "God is not satisfied except by really saving us." [1] "How could the Father be satisfied with the death of Christ, unless He saw in the sacrifice mirrored His own love? — for God can be satisfied only with that which is as perfect as Himself. Agony does n't satisfy God; agony only satisfied Moloch. Nothing satisfies God but the voluntary sacrifice of love." [2]

But Anselm says that God accepts another satisfaction in lieu of punishment; and even that cannot satisfy Him. The question of another's obedience substituted for what He demands of each individual may be deferred for the present. Even if it could be accepted, it could not satisfy the longings of the Divine nature, which underlie any expression of His law. The obedience which man failed to render is conceived according to the feudal notion of the *service* of a *vassal;* and Christ's rendering of this service is — if not a mercantile transaction, as it has sometimes been called — a thoroughly unspiritual and external conception of what would satisfy the righteousness of God. If only such a service is required, it is easy to understand why Anselm did not appreciate the ethical difficulties of his system, and why the Divine honour was so easily restored. But it quite overlooks the *inner* relation between sin and

[1] Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
[2] F. W. Robertson, *Sermons*, second series, p. 301.

a true satisfaction. Dr. Dale says: "The Atonement is . . . an act of homage having such transcendent value that it outweighs the sins of mankind, and creates an adequate reason for remitting them" (p. 284). This corresponds to Anselm's view that "escape from the punishment of sin is the highest deliverance which the redemption in Christ accomplished." [1] But it is a very poor rendering of the Scriptural thought of freedom from sin and union with Christ, to make forgiveness mean only acquittal or the suspension of penalty. Anselm's conception of sin, however, had been too much externalised by the system of penances for him to have a true understanding of the punishment of sin. The outward act only could be estimated for the purposes of discipline, and naturally the adventitious penalty was thought of rather than the essential. It is a very light valuation of the consequence of sin which makes it to consist in physical death; but that seems to be Anselm's idea of its severest result. From this point of view it is merely judicial, disconnected, arbitrary, not natural and organic. The modern analogies are biological rather than legal, and the penalties of sin are perceived to be not extrinsic, but inherent and inevitable. The sinful act punishes itself with the capacity and likelihood of further sinning, and it continues so to do as long as

[1] Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 366.

its source remains in the soul. The sinful *state* is itself the dreadful penalty, and that is entirely ignored: no external satisfaction can affect this. "The damage suffered is internal to the man," and hence the relief needed is a new internal right relation with God. The sinful will is the cause, and the sinful habit or character is the effect; and the thing required to obviate this penal effect is something to operate upon its cause. No amends, even by the Son of God Himself, can of itself remove the punishment of the state of sin, the deterioration of the spiritual life. Even if we could admit that Christ's work were best regarded as a shield from the law's justice, "a cut-off of the natural consequences of wrongdoing," it would still not be a satisfaction in the sense of Anselm; because it would not touch the most serious and awful of those consequences. They can be done away only by a literal *reparation*, not by an indemnification. If satisfaction is in lieu of punishment, and is accepted as the equivalent of punishment, which thenceforth may not be visited upon the man for whom Christ died, then Christ's payment of the debt is not a satisfaction because the worst part of the punishment is not provided for.[1]

Besides, the satisfaction which is said to have

[1] See, for full discussion, J. M. Whiton, *Divine Satisfaction*, and John Young, *Life and Light of Men*.

averted the punishment was an *opus supererogationis*, which is the fatal flaw in the notion of Indulgences and the treasury of merit. The idea that a man could do all that was required of him, and *more*, reveals a crude apprehension of what will satisfy the heart of the Father of men. This theory of satisfaction corresponds to nothing whatever in our experience or in our conscience. Instead of contenting conscience, it excites its scruples and critical judgment. Instead of being confirmed by experience, we do as a matter of fact endure many penalties of sin for which full satisfaction is said to have been made. But Anselm teaches satisfaction instead of punishment, and hence penalties can no longer be justly visited upon us; nevertheless, they are visited, and therefore there has been no such satisfaction.

Again, if the death of Christ were accepted as a genuine satisfaction, it would nullify the Divine forgiveness. Anselm foresaw this serious difficulty, which is suggested by Boso and is not answered, and remains unanswered to this day in connection with any form of the theory. "But how is it that we say to God, 'Forgive us our debts,' and every nation prays to the God in Whom it believes, that He would forgive their sins? *For if we pay what we owe, why do we pray Him to forgive? For is God unjust, to demand again what has been paid? But if we do not pay, why do we pray in vain that He would do what*

*He cannot because it is unseemly?*" (i. 19, 15 and 16). Anselm evades the point: "It is not needful now to answer as to this. For when you learn why Christ died, perhaps you will see for yourself what you are asking." All that he offers is the following: "He who does not pay says in vain, 'Forgive,' but he who pays asks for pardon; for the very fact that he asks is part of the payment.[1] For God owes no man anything, but every creature is in debt to Him; and so it is not proper for a man to deal with God as an equal with an equal."[2] To this Boso as usual replies, "Sufficit nunc mihi"; but the explanation does not suffice.

The satisfaction of Christ was the discharge of man's debt; consequent upon that payment there can be no forgiveness, for there is nothing to forgive. When every debt incurred in the past or possible in the future has been abundantly paid many times over, it is unjust to consider man a debtor; the more than sufficient satisfaction makes it an act of justice to declare man free of debt. But precisely because it is thus an act of justice, it is not then an act of mercy. There can be no compassion or generosity

[1] He is talking of *our* prayers, though he may identify Christ who pays with us who pray. In any case, our supplication is made part of the payment, and so Christ has not completely satisfied for us.

[2] The justice of forgiving a paid debt is further asserted in ii. 20.

in foregoing a claim which has been paid to the uttermost farthing. Either the debt has been fully paid, and there can be no forgiveness; or enough debt remains to be forgiven, and then there has been no satisfaction: the two thoughts are wholly incompatible. The force of this contention is admitted by many advocates of passive satisfaction,[1] and is boldly asserted by Dr. Charles Hodge: "It is a simple matter of commutative justice, a *quid pro quo*, so much for so much. There can be no condescension, mercy or grace on the part of a creditor receiving the payment of a debt."[2] Archbishop Thomson in *Aids to Faith* reminds objectors that they have simply revived an idea of Socinus. But Llewelyn Davies wisely answered: "Such a taunt is adequately met by the manly reply of Grotius: 'Neque me pudeat consentire Socino, si quando is in veram veteremque sententiam incidit.'"[3]

Dr. Harnack well calls it a "terrible idea" that it is impossible for God freely to remit our debts to Him. Anselm is opposed to the entire previous

[1] *E. g.*, C. Jerram, *A Treatise on the Doctrine of Atonement*, p. 43; Paton J. Gloag in *The Atonement: A Clerical Symposium*, p. 257.

[2] *Syst. Theol.*, II. 470. Dr. Briggs says: "Forgiveness of Sin and Pardon of Sin are not found in the indexes of the doctrinal systems of Dr. Shedd, Dr. Charles Hodge, and Dr. A. A. Hodge" (*How Shall We Revise?* p. 13).

[3] *Tracts for Priests and People*, xiii. 35.

history of the doctrine in holding to it. The Scriptural teaching and the creedal confession of the "forgiveness of sins" are lost in a philosophy which is not even consistent with itself. It makes impossible the imitation of God, whose precepts enjoin forgiveness, but whose justice exacts satisfaction. It not only deprives the manifestation of God's love of its grace, but it leaves no room for the motive of love in our redemption. It represents Him as inexorable, not as merciful. If His honour requires indemnification, He sent His Son into the world for *His own sake*, not for ours (see ii. 5); it was an inherent obligation of His own nature to itself.[1] And this obligation was not to His nature of love, but to His attribute of justice. If infinite justice demands its due, what sphere of activity has infinite love? There must be a necessity for our redemption in the eternal nature of His love; to centre theology in His justice is paganism, not Christianity. And yet a distinguished theologian says: "Justice is the most central attribute of the Divine nature. God is in no sense bound to show mercy, but He is inevitably bound to punish sin." But if there be any meaning in His name of Father, He is at least as much bound to be pitiful as to be just. So that this theory of satisfaction annuls the most essential truth of the Gospel. "It paints God as acting altogether unlike

[1] Oxenham, pp. 187 *sq.*

God, in order that He might be enabled to act like God." [1]

### (3) *The Forensic Form of the Theory*

"The Latin divine succeeded to the Roman advocate," and naturally theology was expressed in the familiar terms of Roman jurisprudence.[2] The juristic conception of satisfaction belonged also to a time when a child's relation to his father was severely legal, and was made more natural to Anselm by the fact that the Norman was "a born lawyer." [3] Thus his doctrine, as all succeeding forms of it, was "shot through with colours drawn from the corruption of Roman society, from the Roman sense of authority and the Roman forms of justice." [4] "The law became an abstraction to be set beside the throne of God Himself, and to which His other attributes must conform." [5] In this respect also the theory is institutional.

God is not thought of as a Father, but as a Judge

[1] John Hyde, *Tract.* The parables of our Lord picture a free forgiveness — the two Debtors, the Prodigal, the Unmerciful Servant.

[2] Stanley, *Eastern Church*, pp. 111, 112: "The subtleties of the Roman law as applied to the relations of God and man . . . are almost unknown in the East." See also J. B. Heard, *Old and New Theology*, cap. ix.

[3] *Encyc. Brit.*, XVII. 548.

[4] T. T. Munger, *The Freedom of Faith*, p. 21.

[5] J. B. Heard, *Alexandrian and Carthaginian Theology*, p. 54.

or a Teutonic Over-lord.[1] The government of this sovereign was "not one of redeeming love, but of imperial, inexorable justice."[2] "The absoluteness of sovereign love was too much conceived of as the love of an absolute sovereignty."[3] This was not the Scriptural idea of a God near to us and dwelling within us, but the deistic idea of One remote and transcendent. We are introduced into the atmosphere of a court-room, and our redemption is a purely forensic transaction or device. There is no apprehension of St. Paul's strong conception of a righteousness that must righten, that is not in conflict with love, but its effective and redemptive agent. The ruling influence is *retributive justice*.[4] But is the "retributive the sole element" in God's relation to the sinner, as Dr. Shedd affirms?[5] He says again: "All true scientific development of the doctrine of the Atonement, it is very evident, must take its departure from the idea of Divine justice."[6] He shows what this means: "There is no attribute more just and necessary than that *punitive* righteousness innate to Deity which maintains the honour of God."[7]

[1] The two notions blend in the mind of Anselm.

[2] Lyman Abbott, *Evolution of Christianity*, p. 86.

[3] *Progressive Orthodoxy*, p. 159.

[4] On the distinction between righteousness and justice, see Bushnell, *Vicarious Sacrifice*, I. 247 *sq.*, 382 *sq.*

[5] Introd. to *Aids to Reflection*, p. 52.

[6] *Hist. Doct.*, II. 216.

[7] *Ibid.*, II. 278.

This is truly Anselmic: "Verum hujusmodi misericordia Dei nimis est contraria justitiae illius, quae *non nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum*" (i. 24, 16). It may be that *justitia* demands only punishment; but that is a poor equivalent of δικαιοσύνη. which in the nature of things brings punishment, but demands, not that distinctively, but its own likeness. This hard mechanical legality is completely unethical and unspiritual, because morally impersonal. It contains no revelation of the heart of God, and has no relation to the personal life of conscience and obedience: it is technical and subtle like a lawyer's brief, external to the needs and moral activities of the human soul.[1]

It is unfortunate, but quite true, as Archdeacon Wilson says, that the less spiritual the forensic statement is, the stronger hold it takes on the popular imagination, and that it lends itself "most easily to preaching, by degrading a spiritual mystery to the level of the understanding." [2] However logical and convincing it may sound, it is contrary to the inmost spirit of Christianity. The idea of merit belongs to

[1] "Das Verhältnis Gottes zur Menschheit ist *lediglich juristisch* gedacht. Nicht um ein Verhältnis, wie es zwischen Vater und Kind besteht, handelt es sich. Daher ist weder das Wesen der Sünde noch der neuen Lebens in der Vergebung der Sünden voll verstanden worden" (Thomasius, *Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters*, bearbeitet von R. Seeberg, 1889, p. 123).

[2] *The Gospel of the Atonement*, p. 80.

every theory of satisfaction; but it is unevangelical and legal, and characteristic of the very form of thought against which St. Paul waged such unceasing warfare.[1] The Atonement is "not a problem in forensic technicalities, but in spiritual dynamics."[2] The end proposed is not that of saving men from justice or from penalty, but from sin; and this ethical end cannot be accomplished by legal processes. To be sure, the legal may be regarded as a low stage of the ethical; but when this great reality is expressed in terms of a legal transaction, it invariably lacks intimate moral contact, and loses the appeal of great motives. Instead of being the inevitable outcome of the nature of God Himself, the work of Christ becomes a mere device or expedient. There is no necessary relation of the Son of God to man, as Athanasius taught, — no solidarity between Him and mankind; He is a mere incidental auxiliary, literally a *deus ex machinâ;* and the reward which He assigns to sinners is something exterior to Himself, and not therefore as in the Scriptures something of His very life and self.[3] All that such a transaction can do is to establish for us a legal *status* with God; it can never initiate a moral salvation, for it is almost destitute of moral implications. But the rela-

[1] Luthardt, *History of Christian Ethics*, p. 311.
[2] Borden P. Bowne, *The Atonement*, p. 117.
[3] Lidgett, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

tionship between man and God is exclusively moral, and to make it purely legal is to miss the essential point in the need for a work of redemption.[1]

With characteristic inconsistency, however, after carefully building up his forensic theory, Anselm forsakes the legal for the ethical. He says: "To whom could He assign the fruit and recompense of His death more suitably than to those . . . to whom by His death He gave an *example* of dying on behalf of justice? Since they will be *imitators* of Him in vain, if they are not sharers of His merit" (ii. 19, 11. See also ii. 11, 26; ii. 18, 3–6). He had omitted to say how man was to receive the benefits of Christ's satisfaction, because he took it for granted that it was through the Church. This had taken the place of the individual conscience, and he was governed by the institutional idea, and had no logical room for faith and personal relations. But in making the imitation the means of participation in the merit of Christ, he has unconsciously gone back to those ethical ideas which are so foreign to his theory. For satisfaction may be valid without our being aware that Christ made it; but he realized that moral personality requires moral renewal.[2] But then, if satisfaction has been all-sufficient, how will men make use of the example of Christ? Will it arouse

[1] See Thomasius, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[2] *Cf.* his illustration of the pearl, i. 19, 8–12.

them to zeal? Will it not rather make sin easier to the conscience, because "Jesus paid it all, all the debt we owe"?[1] Satisfaction has reference to God, and following Christ's example belongs to men; which involves a further defect. We must then consider this as an admission by Anselm that his theory is incomplete, and that a full satisfaction has not been made. The fact is, the theory "does not guarantee to the *individual* that he *really* becomes saved; *it aims rather at only showing for all the possibility of their being saved.*"[2] He refers to those who "believe in Him" (i. 20, 16). He says: "In what way we are to *gain access to a share in so great a favour*, and how we are to live in it, Holy Scripture everywhere teaches us" (ii. 19, 14). He acknowledges that "God the Father says to the sinner condemned to eternal torments, and having no power to redeem himself from them, '*Accept* My only-begotten Son, and *give* Him for thyself,'" and "the Son Himself says, '*Take* Me and *redeem* thyself'"(ii. 20). But a full satisfaction puts the sinner where he was before he committed sin, and accomplishes more than a *possibility* of salvation; it is complete exoneration from penalty, which is what Anselm understands by salvation. To demand conditions of access to the

[1] Church history proves that Antinomianism is a natural sequence of the theory of satisfaction; but the believer in it is happily often illogical.

[2] Harnack, VI. 68.

privilege won by Christ is to admit that the satisfaction is inadequate.

### (4) *The Latent Dualism in the Theory*

Anselm had rejected the dualism of the patristic interpretation of ransom, but his own theory is dualistic in two ways. The first is the result of his misconception of God's relation to us as Love and Righteousness as something legal. He created a disunity in the Divine nature by picturing a *conflict of Divine attributes*. He made such a complete distinction between justice and mercy as to render antagonism possible, and then arrayed the one against the other by portraying the one as demanding what the other does not. This is a practical revival of the Gnosticism of Marcion.[1] Mercy was represented as helpless until justice was satisfied; their reconciliation was the proof of their previous opposition (ii. 20).[2] These qualities were treated "as independ-

[1] Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 56; Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 290. Marcion regarded justice as so antithetic to love and mercy that he deemed the being who forgives and saves as not the same as Him who punishes. Anselm, and all who follow him in this antithesis, fall into a similar personal dualism.

[2] Neander incorrectly says that Pope Innocent III. was the first to refer to such a reconciliation of the attributes (*Hist. Christ. Dogmas*, II. 583). "Anselm was the first to formulate the doctrine that the forgiveness of unpunished sin would be incompatible with the Divine justice" (Tymms, *The Christian Idea of Atonement*, p. 34). "Anselm was the first to oppose, within the Godhead, the at-

ent entities, each having a fixed and definite existence and meaning of its own; and as, when taken thus abstractly, they seem to involve conflicting results — Righteousness being a principle which demands the infliction of deserved penalties, Mercy a principle which seeks their remission — a crude attempt is made to solve the contradiction by *hypostatising* both attributes, and inducing the one personified quality to accept fictitious concessions or compensations in order that the other may have its way. Obviously, however, here as elsewhere, the unity which is attained is got not by any real conciliation of differences, but by explaining away one side or aspect of a complex truth, in order to hold by another with which it seems to come into collision." [1]

tributes of justice and mercy. . . . The gravest consequence of the old judicial and legal point of view was that it introduced an irreducible dualism into the Christian conception of God. . . . In fact, men have imagined an internal conflict between His justice and His mercy, so that He was not able to exercise the one without offending the other. Christ, instead of being the Saviour of men, became an intra-divine mediator whose essential office it was to reconcile the hostile attributes within the Godhead, and to ensure peace and unity within God Himself. This was termed high metaphysics; it was pure mythology" (A. Sabatier, *The Atonement*, pp. 69, 118 *sq.*). Rivière quotes Gilbert Foliot, Bishop of London (*ob.* 1134), as an exponent of the Anselmic doctrine: "Misericordia et justitia *sibi contra venire coeperunt*. . . . Ad poenas hominem veritas exigebat, de cujus reparatione misericordia melius aliquid disponebat" (*Op. cit.*, p. 354). He calls this "un conflit naïvement imaginé."

[1] John Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 213. Strauss quite properly likens this theorem to that of the parallelogram of forces

But such a division of the Divine personality into fatherly and rectoral attributes, the one requiring that the sinner amend his ways and the other that he render satisfaction for his disobedience, really destroys the very idea of personality, since it makes the Divine Being "nothing more than the sum of these various attributes." In speaking of the justice and mercy of God, however, we merely connote a *person* of such dispositions; and we are driven to absurdity by thinking of the attributes themselves as personal, as if they were anything but different phases of the one character. The attributes of God are equal, because they are infinite. If they could be conceived as conflicting — justice seeking punishment, and love planning rescue — they would simply neutralise each other, and the sinner could neither be saved nor destroyed. In order to disturb the equilibrium and make either effective against the other, another attribute must be imagined which, by the very terms of the theory, is neither just nor loving. What is this but to break the unity of the Divine Being into a series of independent forces? If this be rejected as preposterous, the Person by all His attributes must be regarded as demanding the same thing, and there can be no collision or need

in mechanics: "divine mercy inclining towards forgiveness and justice calling for inexorable punishment are two equal forces, and the resulting force lies in the diagonal of *vicarious* satisfaction" (Sabatier, *op. cit.*, p. 70).

of reconciliation among them. We must insist on the absolute and unalterable unity of God, which will not admit of such oppositions within itself. The work of Christ was not the at-one-ment of mercy and justice, but the at-one-ment of God and man. Such separation of attributes is mere rhetoric, and, if converted into fact, is essentially pagan and mythological.[1]

The second dualistic feature of the theory is the schism in the Godhead involved in the *divergence of the Persons*. The conception of a transaction between justice and mercy leads to that of a transaction between the Father and the Son. This is the feudal idea of the intervention of a "third party" between God and man. The two Divine Persons come to represent different attributes, and so exhibit different characteristics.[2] Anselm followed the Platonists in his argument for the existence of God, and they personified the attributes.[3] He made the Son correspond to the intelligence of God, and

[1] "The mediæval thought of God was profoundly dualistic, save as it gained a seeming unity by an exaltation of an unethical omnipotence" (*Progressive Orthodoxy*, p. 159). The same may be said of the whole Latin theology, which, as Sir Henry Maine said, is "saturated with Roman Law."

[2] "Wessel" — who was one of the "Reformers before the Reformation" — "declares that 'Christ is not only the Mediator between God and man, but is rather a Mediator for man between the God of justice and the God of mercy'" (Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 152). See also Dale, p. 288; Ritschl, p. 113.

[3] *Encyc. Brit.*, XXI. 422.

the Spirit with the love of God.[1] Most of the scholastics agreed that "the attributes were not really or objectively in God, but merely human representations reflected, as it were, on the idea of God." And yet they represented, together with Anselm, "the Persons of the Trinity as corresponding to distinctions among the very attributes which they in another reference denied to be distinct." [2] Inevitably, in the scheme of satisfaction, the Father would be held to be the rigorous creditor and the Son the generous benefactor. There would be no escape from "the suspicion of moral opposition between Him who exacts and Him who pays the debt." [3] The Son satisfies the justice of the Father, but nothing is intimated as to His own sense of justice which had an equal claim. If He satisfied Himself as well as the Father, then we have the unreal conception of God bargaining with Himself. Moreover, how could He satisfy for His own loss of honour by His own obedience, when it was man who caused the loss? But it is the Father's right to satisfaction that is dwelt upon, and if God must be reconciled to man, then our Lord becomes almost a substitute for God, instead of His Word and express Image. In that case

[1] Hagenbach, I. 460.

[2] *Encyc. Brit.*, XXIII. 241.

[3] Bigg, *op. cit.*, p. 290. "Has God the Father a different mind from God the Son? Is the one hard justice, the other loving mercy?" (Wilson, *The Gospel of the Atonement*, p. 82).

we are *rescued from the Father*, which is a far more mischievous thought than our rescue from the devil by a ransom.[1] The Persons are so separated that we are drawn to the love of Christ, but not to the love of God. Christ's mercy and pity are beyond question; but God's character seems severe, relentless, and inspires awe, dread, and even aversion.[2] But all this is subversive of the Divine Unity, and there can be no divergence, compromise, afterthought or contrivance within that unity. "I and the Father are one," said Christ; and every representation that imperils or overshadows this fact must be false. The theory well deserves the sarcasm of Harnack, who includes among its worst features "the quite Gnostic antagonism between justice and goodness, the Father being the just One, and the Son the good; the frightful idea (as compared with which the views of the Fathers and the Gnostics are far to be preferred) that *mankind are delivered* from the wrathful God; the illusory performance [*Schattenspiel*] between Father and Son, while the Son is one with the Father; the illusory performance of the Son with Himself, *for according to Anselm the Son offers Himself to Himself*" (ii. 18).[3]

[1] "Better to Satan, however, than to the Father — the most horrible doctrine of all" (Wilson, *Gospel of At.*, p. 70).

[2] Many have confessed this, who have known only the satisfaction theory.

[3] *Hist. Dogma*, VI. 76, 77. *Vide* Aug., *De Trin.*, xiii. 11. The mythological character of the transaction is evident. God

### (5) *The Nestorian Element in the Theory*

"From the time of Athanasius, and even earlier, the doctrine of the Two Natures was so understood as to imply that the *God-Logos is the Subject*, and He takes the human nature into the unity of His Divine Being." [1] This led to such expressions as Θεοτόκος, "the Word of God died," etc. But in Anselm the Divine and human are separated, so that it was the *Man Jesus* who died and became our Mediator, and the Godhead is referred to only as determining the worth of the human Person in His actions. The Man obeyed, and the God claimed the merit. He says indeed that the Logos and the Man are one Person: "Was it not equally clear, from what was said, that the Son of God and the *Man* taken by Him [notice, "hominem"] are one person, so that the same being may be both God and man?" (ii. 16 b, 16) "Whence it was necessary that God should take man into the unity of His person, so that he who in his own nature ought to pay and could not, might be in a Person who could"

satisfying Himself, or one Person offering a gift to Another and receiving in return a reward to be passed on to sinners — this is not only an account of experiences within the Divine Being of which we are told nothing and of which we can know nothing, but it is the baldest and crudest Tritheism, or Ditheism, as Archdeacon Wilson calls it with reference to the two Persons.

[1] Harwick, VI. 73.

(ii. 17, 38). The following also has an orthodox sound: "For this object the diversity of natures and unity of person in Christ were of value; that whatever needed to be done for the restoration of men, if the human nature could not do it, the Divine nature might, and if there were anything incongruous to the Divine nature, the human nature might manifest it. And yet it would not be sometimes one person and sometimes another, but the very same person, who existing perfectly in both natures, through the human might pay what it owed, and through the Divine [might pay] what was expedient" (ii. 17, 18).

But this is not the Athanasian teaching of the Divine as the Subject of all the theanthropic actions. The emphasis here is upon the natures, in such a manner as to leave the impression, "this He did as God, that He did as Man." He appears to juggle with the word "nature," as in i. 9, 4: "That man, therefore, owed this obedience to God the Father, and the human nature to the Divine [humanitas divinitati]"; and in ii. 17, 38, quoted above, where he seems to approach the Greek thought of man's incorporation with Christ: "So that he who in his own nature ought to pay and could not, might be in a Person who could." But he who ought to pay was man, not a man's human nature; and the human nature of Christ does not satisfy, but the Person of

Christ by means of that nature which could die. Where the Greeks laid stress on the God-Logos as "the Subject of the redeeming personality," Anselm really makes Christ as Man the subject.[1] He admits the Godhead, but does not make it more than the means of giving value to the acts of the Manhood: it is not the Subject, the Person who achieves salvation through Incarnation, obedience and death. This is a "quite Nestorian diremption of the Person," "such as had regularly occurred in the West from the time of Augustin." [2] In order to preserve the theanthropic unity, not only the Godhead of Christ must be asserted, but His "God-manhood" must be established.

### (6) *Satisfaction considered as Substitution*

Christ is represented as paying the debt for us, because we were unable to pay it: that is substitution.[3] Vicarious suffering was recognised in the Ante-Nicene church, but Anselm substitutes the infinite merits of Christ for the infinite demerits of mankind, by means of the price He paid to justice. This is a novelty in Christian theology.[4]

[1] Harnack, VI. 74.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] The Latin idea of substitution was always more *real* than the Greek (Harnack, III. 314).

[4] Neander says that we do not find the *satisfactio vicaria* in Anselm, but in Peter Lombard (*Ch. History*, IV. 505). It is true

The objections to a literal substitution are many and obvious. First, it is an impersonal, institutional idea, derived equally from the Church discipline, the Wergeld, and feudalism. The privileges of *kinship* are referred to by Anselm (ii. 19, 12). If the law be regarded as impersonal, and the debt of man as well, then any one may render satisfaction. But justice, or rather righteousness, is God's nature, and law is the expression of His character, of Himself. He demands man's obedience, and that is what man owes. Christ's obedience cannot be accepted in place of ours, because it is *ours* which is wanted. The obedience which we failed to render cannot be offered by any one else, so as to make up the deficiency; because obedience is personal, and nothing can be done with the deficiency but to pardon it or else let it work its due punishment. One who is mystically united with us, as our Head, our Sponsor, our Representative, may offer His perfect obedience as the pledge of our own, as the response of humanity to the requirements of God. But God can be *satisfied* with nothing less than righteousness, and not even with that from any other than the one who

that he does not teach the *satisfactio passiva*, but *activa*, which, however, was certainly in our stead. Neander admits this very distinction (*Hist. Dogmas*, II. 517). The word "vicaria" is by many referred entirely to the passive satisfaction. Thomasius says of the death: "as a gift to the honour of God, it is not strictly vicarious, but rather supplementary" (Hagenbach, II. 46).

lacks it and of whom He asks it. He may forgive our failures, but not even His Son can satisfy His desire that *we* should obey Him.

Again, the idea of substitution fails to distinguish between a material and a moral debt. The difference between a pecuniary and an ethical obligation is now generally recognised, because the Anselmic theory of a judicial process that would nowadays be called *civil* has given way to the analogy of criminal proceedings. But the fundamental point remains untouched, and the following admissions, chiefly by believers in satisfaction, may be applied to Anselm's satisfaction by substitution. Archbishop Magee says: "Neither guilt nor punishment can be conceived, but with reference to *consciousness* which cannot be *transferred*." [1] Anselm does not teach that Christ bore our punishment, though he uses the idea of guilt as indicating our exposure to penalty; it is in this connection that we may claim Magee's support. Turretin says: "In a pecuniary debt the payment of the thing owed *ipso facto* liberates the debtor from all obligations whatsoever, because here the point is not *who pays*, but *what is paid* . . . The case is different with respect to a penal debt, because in this case the obligation respects the person as well as the thing; the demand is upon the *person who pays* as well as the *thing paid* . . . Hence, pecuniary

[1] *Atonement and Sacrifice*, I. 268.

satisfaction differs from penal thus: In debt, the demand terminates upon the thing due. In crime, the legal demand for punishment is upon the person of the criminal." [1]

Albert Barnes also rejects the conception of a literal debt and payment, because our burden is "*guilt*, not a failure in a pecuniary obligation." [2] Dr. Charles Hodge asks: "If among men the bankrupt can become solvent by a rich man's assuming his responsibilities, why in the court of God may not the guilty become righteous by the Son of God's assuming their responsibilities?" [3] He has given the answer himself: because we cannot argue from pecuniary debts to moral obligations. He says: "In the case of crimes the matter is different. The demand is then upon the *offender*. He Himself is amenable to justice. Substitution in human courts is out of the question. The essential point in matters of crime is, not the nature of the penalty, but *who shall suffer*" (II. 470). And again: demerit "is inseparable from sin. It can belong to no one who is

[1] In J. M. Armour, *Atonement and Law*, pp. 130, 131. Armour struggles to evade this concession, by insisting that money does not pay debts, but money *from* the debtor, or the substitute who is treated as the debtor. But he wholly fails to overthrow the objection that moral obligation is so absolutely upon the person that another cannot undertake it.

[2] *The Atonement*, p. 230. He also admits the previous point that, if there was satisfaction, there could be no mercy.

[3] *Syst. Divin.*, III. 175.

not personally a sinner. . . . It cannot be transferred from one person to another" (II. 476). It is manifest that this is equally true of merit. And again: "As a matter of mere law, no satisfaction can find acceptance other than the literal suffering of the penalty by the criminal in person." [1] The principle is the same if the satisfaction is obedience.

Coleridge makes the same point, as an objection to substitution: "Morality commences with, and begins in, the *sacred distinction between thing and person*. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded; consequently the law of justice. If you attach any meaning to the term justice, as applied to God, it must be the same to which you refer when you affirm or deny it of any other personal agent — save only that, in its attribution to God, you speak of it as unmixed and perfect. . . . Should it be found irreconcilable with the justice which the light of reason, made law in the conscience, dictates to man, how much more must it be incongruous with the all-perfect justice of God." [2] As a sample of many similar statements in recent books, the following may be quoted from Archbishop W. C. Magee of York: "Persons are not things; personal feelings, states, conditions, cannot be made to change places

[1] In Armour, *ubi supra*, p. 153.
[2] *Aids to Reflection*, pp. 313, 314.

as if they were mere material substances." [1] Many of the objections to Substitution do not apply to the Anselmic statement; but the general thought of the foregoing quotations does apply, that Anselm has ignored the significance of a moral debt and treated it as simply material, as so external to the person as to permit of a transfer of the duty of obedience.

The idea of literal substitution is really a survival of folk-faith, where continually we see "the disposition of men to shift upon another the results of their sin." [2] But it cannot for a moment be considered as literal, because it is an utterly fictitious proceeding, and confusing to the moral sense.[3] It makes God violate the very justice which is said to demand satisfaction, because it makes Him satisfied with an obedience as ours which is not ours. This is a double offence against justice: it foregoes the claim of obedience upon the one who owes it, and it accepts a substitute from one who does not owe it.[4] Finally, it logically leads to Antinomianism, as was said above, by its being a substitute for our obedience

[1] *The Atonement*, p. 103. See also Moberly, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

[2] C. J. Wood, *Survivals in Christianity*, p. 146.

[3] "It is suicidal in theology to refuse the appeal to a moral criterion" (Jowett, in *London Library*, p. 493).

[4] This objection is greatly strengthened when directed against the Reformation theory of substitutionary punishment, which is not found in Anselm.

in the future as well as in the past, since the satisfaction must cover all possible needs.[1]

### (7) *The Purpose of the Incarnation*

The work is a defective statement of the meaning and object of the Incarnation, especially as contrasted with the rich conceptions of Athanasius and the Greeks. It led the way to the extreme and one-sided presentation of Christianity as merely a scheme of salvation, so that "the religion of the Incarnation was narrowed into the religion of the Atonement." [2] The answer to the question in its title, "*Cur Deus Homo?*" represents the wide interval between Anselm and the Fathers. They taught that God became man to unite us to Himself; he held that it was to make satisfaction to His own outraged dignity. They rejoiced in the Incarnate Word as the assurance of the removal of sin and the restoration of man — Christ became human that man might become divine; he dwelt upon the Incarnation of the Word simply as the means of His offering to God the gift of His death, by which the debt of mankind might be fully paid and the race exonerated from

[1] If Christ is conceived as one with us, as by the Greek Fathers, this would not apply; but then, that is not substitution but mystical identity.

[2] *Lux Mundi*, p. 183.

the claims of justice.[1] They make the Incarnation the keynote of the Gospel system; he is followed by the Reformers in making central the death of Christ. That is, unlike the Fathers, he *explains* the Incarnation by the atoning death; thus finding the significance of the Person in His work, not seeing the work grow out of the essential characteristics of the Person.[2] Where they start with the idea of God, he begins with the idea of *sin:* he builds his theory of the necessity of satisfaction upon the condition of servitude and alienation into which the race had fallen, instead of "the pure and free consciousness of Him who is the type of the normal man, who abode in undisturbed communion with the Father, and aims through the power of His living presence to bring all men into the same relation."[3] The appearance of Christ on earth became dependent on the existence of sin (i. 16–18), instead of the natural revealing of the universal mediation of the Logos, irrespective of human sin.[4]

[1] He makes the death of Christ the only possible means of man's rescue. His admission that another method was conceivable for Omnipotence is one of reverence; his whole argument really posits the other idea.

[2] Heard, *Alex. and Carthag. Theology*, p. 235; Thomasius, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[3] Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 203.

[4] Harnack says that no Greek theologian bluntly asserted that Christ would have become incarnate if there had been no sin (III. 303); but it is frequently implied.

But this reduces the Incarnation to a mere means or condition of making the death possible, and giving it value. It makes redemption the end, to which the Incarnation was subordinate; when the Word's becoming flesh was the natural climax of the history of creation, and redemption itself was but a means to "the reconsecration of the universe to God." But the Scriptural emphasis upon Christ's death has reference to a fact, that it was actually and historically the source of our cleansing; it does not require the treatment of the Incarnation as an afterthought of God resulting from the threatened perdition of humanity. That was not occasioned, it was only modified, by the necessities of our sinful and lost state. The mediation of Christ was not confined to the Cross; it had been manifested in creation, in providence, in the theophanies, in the giving of the law.[1] It was extended to His coming into the world, not as "a pitiful expedient devised to remedy an unexpected disaster in the plan of salvation," but, as St. Paul put it, as part of the eternal purpose of God and destiny of man.[2] Anselm makes it exceptional, incidental, having another and more important object than itself, instead of the normal, essential, inevitable outgoing of the nature of God, the revelation of His character and eternal humanity.

[1] P. G. Medd, *The One Mediator, passim.*
[2] *Vide* W. Kirkus, *ubi supra.*

It was an institutional device, and hence could not occupy the prominent place assigned to it throughout the patristic period. But the Fathers were undoubtedly Scriptural in regarding the Incarnation as the larger and more significant term, inclusive of the Atonement, primarily and intrinsically important, the characteristic mystery and disclosure of the "good news" of God.[1]

### (8) *The purely Objective Character of the Theory*

It has already been noted, as one of the valuable features of Anselm's work, that he reminded us of the objective implications of the sacrifice of Christ. But it must be considered as a defect, that he represents it as exclusively objective and retrospective, a mere "transaction external to the selves to be atoned for." [2] The Fathers, like the Scriptures, were chiefly occupied with the effect of Christ's redemption upon *us;* our author is engaged solely with its effect upon *God.* This has already been referred to under preceding sections, but it is worthy of separate mention. It was the natural result of the

[1] The contingency of the Incarnation upon sin is more often inferential with the Latin Fathers than with the Greeks. The latter, beginning with Clement, but excepting Athanasius, suggest what was plainly stated by John Scotus Erigena and Duns Scotus, that God would have become man if there had been no Fall. *Vide* Medd, *ubi supra,* pp. 106–108, 500.

[2] Moberly, *op. cit.,* p. 319.

externalised conception of religion, with which the mediæval Churchman was acquainted.

It is recognised that Anselm's purpose was to give a rational explanation of the Atonement; but it is wholly novel and unscriptural to confine the Atonement to the relations between God and Christ, and to ignore the reconciliation between God and man without which the Atonement is incomplete. The subjective element is barely hinted at, in such passages as i. 20, 16 ("credunt"), ii. 16 a, 19; ii. 19, 11 ("exemplum," "imitatores"). It is so much in the background that he may be said to disregard it altogether in his theory. He would have felt the less need to dwell upon it because the Church had all the requisite machinery to apply the rewards of Christ's satisfaction. But he had indeed no room for faith as the condition of receiving these benefits, or for the realization of personal relations, connoted by such a word as *καταλλαγή*. Our debt was only an insult to God's majesty, which might be atoned for officially; if it had been appreciated as a personal deficiency as well, the theory must have provided specifically for its removal. This indifference to the subjective side of the work of Christ certainly makes the presentation imperfect. It is so characterised by Ueberweg, who speaks of "the transcendence of the act of Atonement, in his view of it, in that, although accomplished through the humanity of

Jesus, it is represented as exterior to the consciousness and intention of the men to be redeemed, so that stress is laid rather on the judicial requirement that guilt should be removed, than on the ethical requirement of a purified will." [1]

But this introduces us to the real difficulty of an exclusively objective theory. The conflict between God's love for us and His regard for His own honour, the resolution of forces by means of the obedience of a Divine Person, — all this is transcendent and unknowable. To philosophise about it is to talk most of what we can know least. It is entirely independent of revelation, and is mere matter of speculation. It is being wise above what is written to pretend to familiarity with the intimate relations within the Deity, with the precise obstacles in the Divine mind to the fulfilment of His purpose, with the exact facts regarding the "councils of the Trinity," and all those well-known accompaniments of the exclusive objectivity of redemption. It is not only impertinent, but futile; for it is utterly imaginary and baseless from the Biblical point of view, and it is fatally clear-cut and defined in treating of the mystery of personality, human and divine. It is not only the neologian, but the truly reverent thinker of to-day, who coincides with Dr. Munger in desiring the statement of "an atonement that saves men by

[1] *History of Philosophy*, I. 386.

a traceable process, and not one that is contrived to explain problems that may safely be left with God." [1] Any attempt to go beyond this plunges us into the perplexities several times enumerated, the risks of Antinomianism, and the dreadful misconception that the Son delivered us out of the hands of the Father.

### (9) *A Pernicious Effect of the Theory*

It has been shown that the penitential system was an antecedent of Anselm's thought. His application to the work of Christ of the principles underlying the practice of discipline deepened their significance for the men of his time. The notion of supererogatory and transferable merit and the custom of indulgences received a strong enforcement from the idea that these things were exemplified in the Divine accomplishment of our salvation. Although the theory logically seems to lead to Universalism (see Boso in ii. 19), yet Anselm appears arbitrarily to confine the benefits of satisfaction to those who imitate Christ.[2] Being arbitrary, the grace of pardon might be easily appropriated by the Church on easier conditions, and this was universally customary. The very principle of commutation becoming

[1] *The Freedom of Faith*, p. 33.
[2] Ueberweg, *op. cit.*, I. 386.

the interpreting element of the Cross itself, there was nothing needed to give dogmatic vindication to the vicious system of indulgences. The Schoolmen first reduced the *praxis* to a theory;[1] but the growing content with the thought of the work of Christ as precisely analogous to an ecclesiastical satisfaction made the statement of the theory extremely simple and easy. The "pretended sacrament" was converted into a "revenue" by the Pope,[2] and became such a crying abomination as to give effective impulse to the reforming effort of Martin Luther.

### 3. Anselm's Contemporaries and Successors

Anselm did not succeed in convincing the Schoolmen of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[3] They betray his influence by bringing into the foreground more prominently than had been the custom the effect upon God of the work of redemption, and the meritorious quality of that work. They are usually very general and indefinite as to the way in which Christ enables us to escape the penalties of sin; the best of them teaching, with Augustin, that God chose the method most likely to elicit His children's

[1] Kurtz, *Church History*, Sect. 107; *Encyc. Brit.*, XII. 847.
[2] Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, vi. cap. vi.
[3] Hagenbach, II. 46, 47; Harnack, VI. 78; Thomasius, pp. 125–144; Joseph Schwane, *Dogmengeschichte der mittleren Zeit*, pp. 304–327.

love. But they give no support to his positive theory for nearly two hundred years; and his idea of the necessity on God's part of the death of Christ is repudiated even by those who are claimed as his disciples, by Hugh of St. Victor, by Bonaventura, and by Aquinas.[1] However, his influence was felt by those who did not accept his system, and survived even the rejection of everything but its one feature of Satisfaction at the Reformation.[2]

### a. *His Adherents*

Several may, on the whole, be classed as his adherents who agree with his positions only at single points, with important reservations and distinct lines of cleavage. Hugh of St. Victor employs the significant word "satisfaction." He admits that God requires to be propitiated, and that Christ paid man's debt and expiated his sin by His death and perfect obedience; but he parts with Anselm in the recognition of Satan's claim, in the denial of the necessity of the Incarnation, and in the expression of a quasi-penal element in Christ's sufferings.[3]

[1] Oxenham, pp. 197, 202, 205.

[2] Seeberg denies that Anselm's fundamental ideas were generally accepted. On the contrary, he finds Abelard's much more general in the later Middle Age (*Op. cit.*, II. 200).

[3] P. L., CLXXVI. col. 307–312; Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 226; Oxenham, *op. cit.*, p. 194; Rivière, *op. cit.*, pp. 339–342. Richard of St. Victor accepted the necessity of the death of Christ for a

He is best remembered by the oft-quoted saying: "Non quia reconciliavit amavit, sed quia amavit reconciliavit."

Alexander of Hales also adopts the word "satisfaction"; but he uses none of Anselm's analogies of the right of the suzerain and the loss of his honour. He does not explain precisely what he means by the word, except by insisting that, unless satisfaction is made, there is disorder in the universe. His statement of the necessity of the Incarnation is truly Anselmic — a necessity not inevitable, but immutable. "Homo enim non poterat reddere, sed debebat; Deus poterat, sed non debebat: oportuit ergo quod solveret homo-Deus, homo qui debebat, Deus qui posset." [1] He is said to have introduced the idea of *equivalence;* but although he made much use of the idea, it was already familiar.[2] He also developed the theory of a "treasury of merit," and helped to furnish the doctrinal basis for Indulgences.[3]

Bonaventura regarded satisfaction as the most fitting mode of restoring human nature, being most consistent with the Divine justice and mercy. But he firmly believed (*firmitur credo*) that the race could have been *delivered* by other methods, while neither

full satisfaction, "but this does not exclude other methods of satisfaction, or free forgiveness" (Oxenham, p. 195).

[1] Rivière, p. 359.

[2] *Cf.* Lias, *The Atonement*, p. 50.

[3] Fisher, *Hist. Christ. Doct.*, p. 250; Rivière, pp. 357–360.

affirming nor denying that it could have been otherwise *redeemed*. A mere creature could not make satisfaction for the race, either for the injury done to God or for the loss sustained by Him. He admits that man may make semi-satisfactions (*semi-plenam*) for himself, but Christ's work is necessary to complete these by His merits. A mere man could not make plenary satisfaction for himself, because original sin "involves depravation not only of will but of nature." Christ alone could atone for that, and His Passion acts most fully in the sacrament of baptism. The method of satisfaction is the noblest that can be conceived; and yet God might have saved us "by way of mercy and not of justice, and still nothing would have been left disordered" (Anselm's own word, "inordinatum") — here deserting Anselm at the most essential point.[1]

The system of Thomas Aquinas is practically the completed Catholic theology of the Middle Ages, especially after its endorsement in most particulars by the Council of Trent. The official recognition of Pope Leo XIII. (1879) may be said to have constituted it the authoritative theology of the modern Roman Church. It contains the nearest approach to an acceptance of the Anselmic theory by any of the Scholastics, and may be said to have fixed the satisfaction theory in theological thought. It will be

[1] Oxenham, pp. 198–203; Rivière, pp. 360–364.

seen, however, to diverge from Anselm in important respects under the influence of the great Pope at the beginning of the thirteenth century. It began with nearly the same premises, but Aquinas has to admit that "the acts of the creature as such cannot be infinite," even when considered as offences against God. Yet there is a "sort of infinitude" because they are committed against Him, and so their demerit may be regarded as infinite.[1] He also makes the death an act of obedience, the highest act of homage that could have been paid to God; but he does not confine the obedience to the death, extending it to embrace the whole life of service and suffering. It was thus an objective satisfaction, because its essential element was that it offered Him "what He loved more than He hated the offence." [2] It was not only a sufficient, but a superabundant satisfaction, on account of the dignity of the life laid down and the greatness of the love displayed.[3]

Yet God could have pardoned sin without any satisfaction.[4] There was no necessity beyond His own self-determination; but it was the most suitable

[1] "Quamdam infinitatem habet": *Summa Theol.*, pars iii. quaest. i. art. 2. This is of course denied by Duns Scotus (Ritschl, *Crit. Hist. of At.*, p. 60).

[2] *Ibid.*, quaest. xlviii. art. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] This is so remote from Anselm that it is evident that those who are called his adherents are conveniently so styled only because they differed less wholly from him than his opponents.

mode (*sicut equus necessarius est ad iter*), because it best revealed His love, it afforded an example of obedience, and it was calculated to awaken reciprocal affection in us.[1] He denies that any change was wrought in the disposition of God, and he insists that we have to supplement the satisfaction of Christ for sins after baptism. He did not, therefore, teach a complete objective satisfaction.[2]

But Aquinas went beyond Anselm in his emphasis upon the Passion. Sabatier says that the satisfaction is founded by him, not as with Anselm on Germanic law (compensation for an offence by an offering equivalent to the wrong committed), but on Roman law (satisfaction by the legal penalty merited and duly borne).[3] Christ endured every kind of suffering common to man, the greatest ever borne by man, in

[1] *Summa Theol.*, pars iii. quaest. xlviii. art. 2. The necessity was, therefore, only relative; the sacrifice of Christ was not a *conditio sine quâ non* upon which God could bestow forgiveness, but only an expedient or *modus per quod melius et convenientius pervenitur ad fidem* (Ritschl, *ubi supra*, p. 48).

[2] *Ibid.*, quaest. xlix. art. 1–6. The want of harmony in his several points of view is thus referred to by Harnack: "When we review the exposition given by Thomas, we cannot escape the impression created by confusion (multa, non multum). The wavering between the hypothetical and the necessary modes of view, between objective and subjective redemption, further between a *satisfactio superabundans* and the assertion that for the sins after baptism we have to supplement the work of Christ, prevents any distinct impression arising. It was only a natural course of development when Duns Scotus went on to reduce everything entirely to the relative" (VI. p. 196).

[3] A. Sabatier, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 *sq.*

a spirit of obedience to God.[1] Here we see the influence of Pope Innocent's distinction between active and passive satisfaction;[2] but we are still a long way from the Reformation theory. The merit of the atoning work was transferred, not by imputation, but by mystical union with the Redeemer. It has been said that his idea of substitution is clearly set forth in the following language: "The head and the member are, as it were, one mystical person, and therefore the satisfaction of Christ pertains to all the faithful, as to His own members. For in so far as two men through love become one being, the one can offer satisfaction for the other."[3] This is either a contradiction, since Christ's substitution for us and identification with us are opposites; or more probably, it is a clumsy attempt to harmonise the great patristic thought with a current mode of speech (unus *pro* alio). In either case the penal side of his theory is very different from that which came later, when the sufferings of Christ were regarded as literally substituted for our just dues.[4]

[1] *Summa*, pars iii. quaest. xlvi. art. 1–3, 5–8.
[2] Neander, *Hist. Christ. Dogm.*, II. 583.
[3] *Summa*, quaest. xlviii. art. 2.
[4] Fisher, *Hist. Christ. Doct.*, pp. 245 *sq.*; Hagenbach, II. 50; Harnack, 190–196; Oxenham, pp. 204–207; Lias, pp. 131 *sq.*; Rivière, pp. 364–368; Lidgett, *Spir. Princ. of At.*, pp. 455–458.

### b. *His Opponents*

Among these must be numbered such great names as Abelard, Bernard, Peter Lombard, and Duns Scotus; of whom the first three may be almost said to have ignored Anselm. Abelard indeed rejected the ransom from the devil, but he also rejected the doctrine of satisfaction. He does not touch upon the juridical view, or ask how God's honour and justice may be satisfied. He is the antithesis of Anselm, being ethical where the latter is legal, and Scriptural where the other is speculative. Thus he supplies some elements of truth totally lacking in Anselm, and needful to our understanding of Atonement. He begins with the love and the righteousness of God, and inquires only how Christ accomplished our reconciliation through the manifestation of that love and righteousness. The ground of the reconciliation is not justice, but love; this is an enormous advance upon Anselm, whose scheme necessarily left out the love of God as the fundamental and interpretative element in atonement. The necessity for it exists, not for the sake of God's honour, but of man's knowledge of God's love. There was no obstacle to the forgiveness of sin, but the self-will and alienation of the sinner himself. The merit of Christ was not a sum of definite actions, but His indwelling

fulness of love towards God; and this merit was accredited to man, not as the performance of an external work, but as the incitement of an inward disposition.[1] God could have forgiven us by His will alone, but He could best manifest His love in the Passion.[2] We are justified by the blood of Christ, because the Cross is the best persuasive to renewed obedience.[3] The free grace of God, by kindling affection in man, blots out his guilt and sin. "Our redemption consists in that love which is awakened in us by the sufferings of Christ, and which sets us free from the slavery of sin and acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God, by means of which we fulfil His commandments no longer with fear but with love."[4]

Abelard distinguishes between forgiveness and justification, both having their basis in the work of Christ, but the one objective in the sense of not re-

[1] S. M. Deutsch, *Peter Abälard*, p. 378: "Christus durch alles, was er gethan und gelitten, sich kein höheres Verdienst erworben habe, als er es schon durch die Liebe, die in ihm war, besessen habe. (*Note.* — Sic quoque de Christo sane asserimus, quod, *quando ad passionem ductus est et in ligno affixus est, non plus meruit quam ab ipsa conceptione.* Neque enim tunc melior effectus quam ab ipsa pueritia exstitisset, cum ex tunc Deum ex toto corde diligeret. — *Sententt.*, cap. 34, p. 107)." See also Harnack, VI. 79.

[2] Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, IV. 501.

[3] Oxenham, p. 190.

[4] Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 370. See also J. Bach, *op. cit.*, II. 68–85.

quiring man's coöperation, the other demanding co-operation in the individual.[1] The distinctive point is that the Atonement depends on personal participation with Christ, and the theory has therefore been called subjective. It has, however, the advantage that it deals exclusively with the knowable; although it is inadequate in laying so little stress upon the work of Christ as a sacrifice unto God, and, as Bernard effectively shows, in practically eliminating infants from the benefits of that work, since they are incapable of the love inspired by it. Nevertheless, it recovers for us that aspect of reconciliation, as complete only when accomplished within ourselves, which is overlooked by Anselm because he is occupied exclusively with the other and objective side. It is sometimes called "the moral view," and was generally accepted by the fourteenth century Mystics, and has been popular with many in our own time. Ritschl says that "in the Middle Ages themselves, through the influence of Peter the Lombard, the preference is given to Abelard over An-

[1] "Die Vergebung der Sünde ist die Aufhebung des göttlichen Strafurteiles, welches dem Menschen das Himmelreich verschliesst, die Rechtfertigung dagegen ist das wirkliche Gerechtwerden des Menschen, das den Glauben zur Voraussetzung hat, und durch die Liebe sich vollzieht, sie ist ein in dem Menschen erfolgender Vorgang, wobei die Frage, wie sich die Gnade Gottes und das eigne Wirken des Menschen dabei verhält, zunächst noch ausser Betracht bleibt" (Deutsch, p. 373; see also pp. 374, 375).

selm." [1] Even if he be one-sided and deficient, his ethical insight is a valuable reaction from the purely transactional view. It is wonderful that so thorough a rationalist should have elevated the problem to such a high plane, and should have presented so many practical and fruitful points of view unattained by his elder contemporary.

Abelard uses many of the traditional expressions. For example, he says: "peccatum commissimus, cujus ille poenam sustinuit." [2] In the *Epitome* (*cap.* xxiii) he says: "this He does by offering the man whom He has taken to Himself to the Father; that is, by giving the man as a price for man." [3] "And yet," says Canon Moberly, "it may be doubted whether they really quite cohere with his proper thought. He seems in them to be doing a somewhat conventional (and indeed in some cases even undue) homage to conventional modes of expression. Plainly his real heart is rather in such statements as that our real justification is the Divine Love within us. . . . The emphasis of his thought is not really so much upon Calvary as a picture exhibited before our eyes, as it is upon Calvary as a constraining and transforming influence upon our characters. It is

[1] *Crit. Hist.*, p. 24. Rivière doubts if this is true after the end of the twelfth century (p. 357).

[2] *In Rom.*, II. c. iv; P. L., CLXXVIII. col. 859.

[3] It should be remembered that the Epitome of Abelard's lost work on theology was drawn up by one of his disciples. See P. L., CLXXVIII. col. 1695 *sq.*

not so much really upon the love of God manifested to us, as upon the love of God generated within us. The difference is important. And, so far, he is wholly in the right direction. But if the question be pressed, *how* is it generated? Abelard's exposition seems to have no deeper answer to give than that the exhibition of the Cross constrains it. He dwells on the Cross very finely, as an incentive to love; but hardly conceives of it more profoundly than as an incentive. He has lost the emphasis upon the thought of humanity as a corporate unity, summed up and represented in Christ, so that what Christ did and suffered, Christians themselves also suffered and did in Christ, — which was so strong and clear in the earliest Christian theologians; and, on the other hand, he has totally failed to interpret the production of Divine love within us, not as a mere emotion of ours, elicited in us as our response to an external incentive, but as being the doctrine of the Holy Ghost; — that presence of Christ as constitutive Spirit within, which is the extension of the Incarnation and Atonement, the very essential of the true Church of Christ, the real secret of the personal being of Christians, and therefore the characteristic doctrine of the Christian faith, as it is the characteristic experience of the Christian life." [1]

[1] *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 381 *sq.* Robert Pulleyn is reckoned among the followers of Abelard. He denied the necessity

Although Bernard was Abelard's constant antagonist, he agrees with him in rejecting Anselm's positive theory of satisfaction. He retains the patristic idea of ransom, fully admitting the right of Satan over mankind. By regarding our bondage as the proper retribution of sin, Satan becomes "the executioner of the Divine justice." Satisfaction, therefore, is made to him, not to God as with Anselm; and in making it Christ is the Head of the body, representing its members.[1] The death was voluntary, but not penal: "it was not the death in itself, but the will of Him who died of His own accord, that was acceptable to God."[2] The occasion for the death was "non justitia, sed misericordia"; which is another vital difference from Anselm.[3] The reason for the method of redemption is referred

of an objective satisfaction, because we might have been redeemed in some other way; and he held the sufferings of Christ to be exemplary, and only so requisite to redemption. "Ut quantitate pretii quantitatem nobis sui innotesceret amoris et nostri peccati"; this method was chosen in order to make us sensible of the greatness of His love and of our sin (P. L., CLXXXVI. col. 82; Neander, *Hist. Dogm.*, II. 521).

[1] "Satisfecit ergo caput pro membris, Christus pro visceribus suis" (*De Error. Abael.*, 6. 15; P. L., CLXXXII. col. 1065). Again, it is to be noted that this patristic idea of solidarity is not only an advance on Anselm's juridical view, but is antithetic to it, since the latter made Christ's work the intervention of a "third party" between God and man.

[2] "Non mors, sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis" (*De Err. Ab.*, 8.

[3] P. L., CLXXXII. col. 934.

to the "inscrutable council of God," [1] but it is not absolutely imperative, however suitable, since other means of deliverance were possible.[2]

Peter Lombard exhibits in his *Four Books of Sentences* the strong influence of his teacher Abelard. He does not follow him in rejecting the devil's claims upon us; but he places the need of reconciliation on the side of man, not of God, and the mode of Atonement is subjective: "the death of Christ justifies us by exciting His love in our hearts." [3] Neander says that he teaches vicarious satisfaction, which "we do not find in Anselm." [4] But we do find the *satisfactio activa vicaria* in Anselm; and Ritschl says that the Lombard "exhibits the death of Christ under all possible categories, except that of a satisfaction to God." [5] He employed the idea of *merit*, which be-

[1] "Mihi scire licet quod ita; *cur ita, non licet*" (P. L., CLXXXII. col. 1069).

[2] Neander, *Hist. Dogm.*, II. 520; Oxenham, p. 193; Rivière, pp. 333–339; J. Bach, *op. cit.*, II. 108–111.

[3] P. L., CXCII. col. 795. On the other hand, Abbé Rivière says: "Pierre Lombard fonde le merit du Christ sur une signification *objective* et métaphysique de sa mort, et pour l'expliquer, il introduit la *vieille* idée de sacrifice" (p. 348). He bases this solely on the use of the word "meruit"; and, while this may be an inconsistency, he is compelled to admit that, in showing *how* we are delivered from sin, the Lombard employs the ideas of Abelard. Rivière goes on to call the figure of sacrifice "*impropre et vieillie*": most characteristic for the legalist and ecclesiastic to call the Scriptural term improper and obsolete!

[4] *Ch. Hist.*, IV. 505.

[5] P. 41. "The Anselmic theory is not mentioned at all" (Harnack, VI. 81).

came predominant after Anselm's use of it, even with those who did not apply it to a satisfaction. He also speaks of Christ as bearing the punishment of our sins: "per ipsius poenam, quam in cruce tulit"; "poena Christi, qui pro nobis solvit." [1] But this is not worked out, and probably means no more than, as with Athanasius, that He died and so shared our penalty, and, as with Gregory Nyssen, that He thereby won for us release from the power of Satan.[2] He rejects with Augustin the necessity of Christ's death, which is viewed "as a proof of love, which awakens counter-love." [3] He is careful to repeat the now familiar thought, that God might have found other ways to save us, and that no change was effected in the mind of God by the work of Christ. "We were reconciled to God, when He already loved us. For He did not begin to love us from the time we were reconciled to Him by His Son's blood, but before the world and before we existed." [4] As his theory did not admit the objective efficacy of the Atonement, it cannot justly be regarded as "a distinct step in advance of Anselm" in the direction of the Reformation dogmas, unless his use of "poena" involves much more than as stated above.[5]

[1] P. L., CXCII. col. 797.
[2] Harnack, VI. 81.
[3] P. L., CXCII. col. 798 *sq.*
[4] Oxenham, p. 197.
[5] Fisher, p. 227; Hagenbach, II. 49; J. Bach, II. 213–215.

Duns Scotus cannot be said to have ignored the Anselmic theory, but he contradicts it in every essential point except in the single fact that he uses the word, satisfaction; which is not actual and adequate as with Anselm, but merely accepted as such by God's absolute will.[1] His philosophy was radically different from that of Anselm and Aquinas, and the antagonism between the Dominicans and the Franciscans may have determined his views upon Soteriology as well as upon Realism. He disputes the assertion that redemption is the motive of the Incarnation, and says that Christ would have come if man had not sinned, in order to be the Second Adam and Head of the mystical Body, and that He would have offered the perfect sacrifice of His *life*.[2] He held that Christ suffered only in His human nature, and hence His merit was finite. "The worth of any merit depends upon the value at which it is set by the acceptance of God. It has merit because it is accepted, and just that amount of merit which God is pleased to attach to it. And thus, while intrinsically the merit of Christ cannot be other than finite, it may receive a kind of infinity, because God's ac-

[1] His use of the idea shows the influence of Anselm, but the Scotist view of Atonement is contrasted with the Anselmic as representing henceforth the two general opposing theories (Fisher, pp. 247 *sq.*; Rivière, pp. 368–372; Neander, *Hist. Dogm.*, II. 521.

[2] This idea is suggested in Hilary, but Scotus was probably the first to make the formal statement.

ceptation of it takes it for an infinite value." [1] Having no inherent claim to be accepted by God, it is however accepted as a sovereign act of grace, the obedience of Christ being arbitrarily regarded as a sufficient compensation for evil. But this destroys the principal argument of Anselm's treatise, the satisfaction being nominal, not real.[2] He calls this process "acceptilatio," adopting a familiar term of the civil law, meaning the acceptance of something merely imaginary in satisfaction of a verbal contract.[3] This compensation, however, was not necessary except "as consequent on the Divine predestination." As there was no infinite debt and no infinite merit, there was no infinite satisfaction, and no need of any.[4]

He makes the moral law itself the expression of God's arbitrary will;[5] which of course is open to

[1] Summary in Lidgett, *Spir. Princ. of At.*, p. 458. "All satisfaction and all merit obtain their worth from the arbitrary estimation of the receiver. Hence, the value of Christ's death was as high as God chose to rate it" (Harnack, VI. 196). "The value of meritorious acts is measured by God's acceptance, not His acceptance by their value" (Oxenham, p. 207). See Sabatier, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

[2] Hagenbach, II. 51.

[3] The same word is used to-day in Scottish legal practice. The *acceptilation* theory has been accepted practically by Grotius, and explicitly by Professor Crawford, Dr. Charles Hodge, and Dr. A. A. Hodge; see D. W. Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, pp. 20–23, 413–415.

[4] Fisher, p. 247; Neander, *Hist. Dogm.*, II. 584; Harnack, VI. 196–198.

[5] Dale, *Atonement*, p. 286.

the objection that in that case all existing moral distinctions are purely contingent. But it enables him to deny the necessity of any particular mode of satisfaction, because any mode whatever might have been arbitrarily demanded.[1] Dr. Dale thinks this degrades the scholastic theory, and we should cordially agree with him; but it makes evident how completely Scotus denies the fundamental principles of Anselm.[2] On the other hand, Ritschl regards his doctrine as a truer expression of the Catholic attitude in the Middle Ages than that of Aquinas (p. 60). And Oxenham says that the Scotist theory was the prevailing one in the Roman church in 1881 (p. 213), and commends it because it saved the Church from the Lutheran and Calvinistic extensions of the Anselmic satisfaction.

This brief survey will suffice to show how slight was the influence of Anselm's specific theory upon his contemporaries and successors. It has never indeed obtained any general recognition. Nevertheless, its vital thought was reapplied by many of the Scholastics, it was fully accepted by the Reformers,

[1] Scotus says that a good angel or a man begotten without sin might have served to redeem humanity, if God had been pleased to adopt that method. See Sabatier, p. 151.

[2] Like Anselm, he regards the work of Christ as procuring only the possibility of redemption, the reality of which is to be attained by the man himself through the customary ecclesiastical channels.

and has ruled the theology of the Atonement to our own day. The Roman position during the sixteenth century is fairly represented by Lainez, the General of the Jesuits. At the Council of Trent, in arguing for the sacrifice of Christ in the Last Supper instead of on the cross, he contended that our salvation is not to be ascribed solely to the death of Christ, though that was the final and crowning act, but to the life and death of Christ as a whole, and as embracing no one salutary and satisfactory act, but countless acts of obedience to the will of the Father. However, the Council finally declared that "Christ . . . on account of the great love wherewith He loved us, merited justification for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross, and made satisfaction for us to God the Father."

### 4. Anselm's Relation to Reformation Theology

#### a. *Basis of Protestant Soteriology*

Although the theory secured so little adherence, yet, when modified in certain significant details, it became substantially the basis of Protestant Soteriology. Certain Anselmic ideas became imbedded in all the thinking about the Atonement — of merit, of the provision for escape from the judicial consequences of sin, of a legal transaction between the attributes or the Persons of the Trinity, of the

payment of a debt or the rescue from a criminal sentence by a Substitute, of a legal Atonement strongly distinguished from an accompanying subjective reconciliation. These ideas were naturally inherited by the Reformers, and have governed the figures and conceptions of theologians since Luther and Calvin. Especially did the thought of Satisfaction become dominant, either as sufficient or superabundant, as accepted by mercy or possessing inherent claims to acceptance; the former through the influence of Scotus, and the latter through that of Aquinas. Indeed, the word practically banished the Scriptural and patristic figure of sacrifice;[1] although for ethical purposes Luther deprived its use of any validity. He said: "Therefore let this word, satisfaction, henceforth be nothing and dead in our churches and our theology, be committed to the judges and to the schools of the jurists, where it belongs and whence the papists derived it."[2] Notwithstanding his distaste for the word, the power of tradition is shown by his retention of it in speaking of the work of Christ, and by his elaboration of its characteristic idea of substitution.

The Reformers adopted Anselm's radical principle that the forgiveness of unpunished sin would be un-

[1] Archbishop Thomson says with approval: "It has gone far to replace the word sacrifice" (*Aids to Faith*, p. 350).

[2] Quoted in Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II. p. 268, from *Kirchenpostille*, I. 621. See the original in Sabatier, p. 152.

just, and that contrivance must be resorted to in order to enable God to be both just and forgiving. But they departed from his essentially non-moral theory by grounding the work of Christ "in the ethical nature of God." "They picture the atonement, not as a reparation for a private wrong, but as a satisfaction to inviolable holiness and a protection to the universal interests of the moral order. The whole subject was brought into the field of ethics." [1] They improved upon Anselm by illogically insisting on the subjective condition of faith. It was an improvement because no external work of atonement can be efficient if severed from the spiritual experience of the redeemed: and it was illogical because, if faith is required as a condition of receiving the benefits of Christ's work, the satisfaction has not been sufficient and complete. By this happy inconsistency they did much to restore the ethical aspects of religion and theology: and it is all the more remarkable that they should have held so rigorously to the ideas of law in defining the Atonement. They rejected the Latin conception of merit as applied to man, but retained it with reference to the satisfaction of Christ, and treated it as legally and externally as Gregory or Anselm or Aquinas.[2] They

[1] Stevens, *Christ. Doct. of At.*, p. 244: "it does not follow that the ethics which was applied to it was sound and tenable."

[2] Seeberg, *Text-Book Hist. of Doct.*, II. 20, note. The confusion of Calvin on this point and his final adoption of free and

used the Scholastic logic and the language of Scholastic theology, because these had been current for centuries; but they developed a theory of their own which is quite as foreign to Anselm as to the Fathers of the Church. Its novelty and variance from earlier thought are indicated by Dr. Shedd, when he says that "it was reserved to the Protestant Church . . . to bring the doctrines of Soteriology to a correspondent degree of expansion" with Theology and Anthropology.[1]

The connecting link by which Anselm led to the Reformation doctrine, was the teaching of Pope Innocent III (*circa* 1200 A. D.). He is said by Neander to have been "the first who represented the satisfaction of Christ as a reconciliation between the divine attributes of mercy and justice."[2] But we have already found such a reconciliation in Anselm (ii. 20). What was original with Innocent was the description of Christ's satisfaction as *punishment:* "Modum invenit, per quem utrique satisfaceret tam misericordiae quam justitiae; judicavit igitur, ut *assumeret in se poenam* pro omnibus et donaret per se gloriam universis." His argument is: "God's justice required an adequate punishment for all; His mercy could not permit this; hence the adjust-

sovereign grace may be found in his *Institutes*, II. c. 17. See also Sabatier, p. 81.

[1] *Syst. Theol.*, II. 204.

[2] *Hist. Dogmas*, II. 583; *Ch. Hist.*, IV. 506.

ment that God took upon Himself the punishment for all, and bestowed the gift of salvation upon all through Himself." Neander is right in saying that "this was the first assertion of the *satisfactio vicaria passiva* among the Schoolmen."

### b. *Antithesis of Protestant Soteriology*

The Reformers greatly developed the passive satisfaction of Innocent by adding speculative details, such as literal appeasement of wrath, the equivalent or identical endurance of our penalty; so that their agreement with Anselm is verbal, not real. As Dr. Dale remarks, the Reformation idea of the Atonement is "the precise antithesis of the conception in the *Cur Deus Homo*. . . . The theological distance between the theories cannot be measured." [1] The contrast is marked in four particulars.

(1) First, the Anselmic satisfaction was active, and the Reformation doctrine was chiefly, and tended to be exclusively, *passive*. Jonathan Edwards the younger, who carried it to an extreme, said: "I venture to say further that, not only did not the Atonement of Christ consist essentially in His active obedience, but that His active obedience was no part of His Atonement, properly so called, nor essential to it." [2] Anselm made much of the

[1] *The Atonement*, p. 290.
[2] *Works*, II. 41.

fact of Christ's death; but he treated it, not as a passive endurance, but as a moral act additional to the obedience of the whole life. He did not, indeed, attribute any redemptive power to the life of the Lord, whose obedience was owed to God, and was of merely "private significance." It was the supererogatory obedience to the will of God for our salvation which availed, the obedience which resulted in death, but which was not *commanded* and which consequently He did not owe, and which could therefore restore the lost honour of God. He referred to the suffering, but it was particularly the suffering of death, and that considered as the effect of obedience rather than as suffering in itself. The Reformers, however, emphasised the literal sense of the word Passion, and enlarged upon the details of the sufferings which the Redeemer underwent on our behalf; and it was in these that they found the efficacy of His satisfaction. This constitutes a fundamental difference between the two theories, and creates a striking contrast between what Hagenbach not too strongly calls "the chaste and noble, tragical style, too, in which the subject is discussed" by Anselm, and "the weak and whining, even sensuous, 'theology of blood' of later ages." [1]

The separation of the life from the death of Christ, the distinction between the significance and

[1] *Hist. Doct.*, II. 46.

effects of the active and passive obedience, is not tenable. It is evident that St. Paul had in mind no such artificial discrimination, when he said that "through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous" (Rom. v. 19). The spirit of the death was the consummation of the spirit of the life, and it is psychologically impossible to set off one moment of its manifestation from all that preceded and prepared for it, and assign to it alone a redemptive value. Moreover, as a historic fact, the active and passive elements entered into our Lord's entire obedience. From the circumcision to the cross, there was suffering involved in His participation in our humanity. In His active fulfilment of His Father's will and in His ministry of teaching and service, He suffered from His sensitiveness to men's physical ills and mental dulness and spiritual hostility and degradation. On the other hand, there was an active spirit of self-surrender throughout the endurance, and, above all, in the supreme moments of it. "Indeed," says Mr. Lidgett, "so entirely predominant is this activity, that the words passive endurance seem wholly out of place. Of His life our Lord said, 'No one taketh it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself.' From the moment when 'He set His face to go up to Jerusalem' to the moment when He cried, 'It is finished,' our Lord's attitude was that of one who was consummating a great act of

self-oblation." [1] If attention is led away from the spirit of Him in whom the Father was well pleased to the mere physical and mental sufferings, the exaggerated importance attached to the latter deprives them of all ethical significance; for suffering, as such, has no moral value. It leads also, by the withdrawal of the ethical or active element, to the penal aspect of the Atonement, by which "the measure of the sufficiency of the satisfaction was the intensity of the suffering." [2]

(2) Secondly, the Reformers taught that our Lord's sufferings were *penal*, and Anselm expressly distinguishes between punishment and satisfaction: "necesse est, ut omne peccatum satisfactio *aut* poena sequatur" (i. 15, 11; also, i. 13, 7). As a *commutation*, satisfaction was instead of punishment; but they transformed it into satisfaction *by* punishment. He has been criticised as unethical in several of his positions; but, as between the passive satisfaction of punishment and the active satisfaction of obedience, there can be no question as to which was more ethical. He says nothing of the endurance of the Divine curse, or the burden of the wrath of God; on the contrary, penal satisfaction is the rejected alternative, he denies that Christ

[1] *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, p. 146. See pp. 141–151, which have suggested part of the above criticism.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

could have been miserable (i. 11–14; ii. 12). But they followed Innocent in making the sufferings penal, and enlarging upon them with rhetorical detail, making them superlative in accordance with the deserts of sin. Their descriptions of His pre-eminent anguish read strangely enough by the side of the reverent reticence of the Evangelists.

The language of Luther is very extreme, although it is rhetorical and inconsistent, and probably was not intended to be interpreted with the scientific accuracy of definite dogma. Mr. Lidgett says of it: "When he speaks of the Atonement the same characteristics are present which are so marked elsewhere: namely, a perfervid intensity, sometimes breaking through the restraints of both reverence and prudence; a curious mixture of extreme literalism with profound mysticism; and, above all, the over-mastering sense of perfect deliverance, in Christ, from the condemnation of sin." [1] Still, his acceptance of the penal character of the satisfaction is unmistakable. He said: "It was the anger of God itself that Christ bore — the eternal anger which our sins had deserved. . . . The inner sufferings of Jesus, His anguish — an anguish in comparison with which all human anguish and fear are but a slight matter — was the feeling of the Divine anger." [2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 463.

[2] Quoted in Simon, *Redemption of Man*, p. 31.

He thus described Christ's substitutive endurance of the curse of God: "Our most merciful Father, seeing us to be oppressed and overwhelmed by the curse of the law, . . . laid upon Him the sins of all men, saying, 'Be Thou Peter, that denier; Paul, that persecutor, blasphemer, and cruel oppressor; David, that adulterer; that sinner which did eat the apple in Paradise; that thief which hanged upon the cross; and, briefly, be Thou the person which hath committed the sins of all men. See therefore that Thou pay and satisfy for them.' Here now cometh the law and saith, I find Him a sinner, and that such a one as hath taken upon Him the sins of all men, and I see no sins else but in Him, therefore let Him die upon the cross; and so he setteth upon Him, and killeth Him." [1] And again: "If thou wilt deny Him to be a sinner and accursed, deny also that He was crucified and was dead. . . . It is not absurd to say that He was *accursed, and of all sinners the greatest.*" [2]

Melanchthon and the Reformed divines departed from the Catholic statements of all the preceding history of this doctrine. The *Saxon Confession* says: "Such is the severity of His justice, that there can be no reconciliation unless the penalty is paid. Such is the greatness of the anger of God, that the eternal Father cannot be placated, save by the beseeching

[1] *Galatians*, p. 205 folio edition of 1760.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

and death of His Son." [1] The *Würtemberg Confession* says: "The Son of God alone is the *placator of the anger of God.*" The *Heidelberg Catechism* (Quæst. 37) declares that Christ "bore in body and soul the anger of God against the sins of the whole race." [2] The *Belgic Confession* (Art. XXI.) also speaks of Him "in body as in soul, feeling the terrible punishment which our sins had merited." [3]

Calvin is supposed by some to have been more cautious in his language; and he evidently tries to keep in harmony two entirely contradictory ideas. He makes the love of God to precede the reconciliation, the cause and not the consequence of placation; which, of course, makes placation utterly meaningless. He says: "We do not admit that God was ever hostile to Him, or angry with Him. For how could He be angry with His 'Beloved Son, in whom His soul delighted'? . . . But we affirm that He sustained the weight of the Divine severity, since, being smitten and afflicted by the hand of God, He experienced from God all the tokens of wrath and vengeance." Also, compare the following: "It was requisite that He should feel the severity of Divine vengeance [*ultionis*], in order to appease the wrath of God, and satisfy His justice." "Christ took upon

[1] Lias, p. 133; Simon, p. 32.
[2] Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, III. 319.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Himself and suffered the punishment which by the righteous judgment of God impended over all sinners, and by this expiation the Father has been satisfied and His wrath appeased." "The cross was accursed, not only in the opinion of men, but by the decree of the Divine law. Therefore, when Christ was lifted up upon it, He renders Himself obnoxious to the curse. . . . From the visible symbol of the curse, we more clearly apprehend that the burden, with which we were oppressed, was imposed upon Him." And what that burden was is thus defined: "For sinners, till they be delivered from guilt, are always subject to the wrath and malediction of God. . . . We are obnoxious to the wrath and vengeance of God, and to eternal death. . . . We all, therefore, have in us that which deserves God's hatred." [1] Such sentences and expressions are constantly to be found in him, and it is needless to show how foreign they all are to the theory of Anselm.

(3) Another contrast between the Reformers and Anselm logically follows from that just mentioned. From Christ's endurance of punishment ensued His endurance of the *self-same* punishment as was due to mankind: this was especially the contribution of Calvin. "He was made a substitute and surety for transgressors, and even treated as a criminal Himself, to sustain all the punishment which would have

[1] *Institutes*, lib. ii. cap. xvi. sect. 1–4, 6, 10, 11.

been inflicted on them." The idea of equivalence was carried so far as to represent Him as suffering the *mors aeterna*, the actual torments of hell. "Hence it was necessary for Him to contend with the powers of hell, and the horrors of eternal death. . . . Therefore it is no wonder, if He be said to have descended into hell (!), since He suffered that death which the wrath of God inflicts on transgressors. . . . He suffered in His soul the dreadful torments of a soul condemned and irretrievably lost." [1] This was inconsistent with the conception that He suffered only in His human nature, and was properly called by Bellarmine "a new and unheard-of heresy." [2] It is manifestly unscriptural and even pagan.

Calvin indeed combined the active and passive satisfactions. "Now, in answer to the inquiry, how Christ, by the abolition of our sins, has destroyed the enmity between God and us, and procured a righteousness to render Him favourable and propitious to us, it may be replied in general, that He accomplished it for us by the whole course of His obedience. . . . There is no exclusion of the rest of His obedience which He performed in His life. . . . His voluntary submission is the principal circumstance even in His death." [3] The difficulty of harmonising this position

[1] *Ubi supra*, sect. 10.
[2] Baur, *Christ. Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 348.
[3] *Ubi supra*, sect. 5.

with passive penal satisfaction has been already alluded to; and it can hardly be denied that, in systematising the Reformation doctrine, he added some abhorrent features, which however were implicit in the teaching of Luther. They only serve to show how unwise it is to theorise about the infinite; for either Christ could suffer only one eternal death and so could pay the debt of only one sinner, or else that eternal death is equal to all eternals, in which case the perdition of all mankind is exactly equal to the perdition of one. Such quantitative comparisons between guilt and satisfaction are called by Harnack "frivolous arithmetical sums." [1]

The idea of the literal punishment of the Son of God is to-day unthinkable. It is inconceivable that the Father's wrath could be visited upon the blameless and holy One. It is utterly confusing to the moral sense to imagine that the justice of God makes no distinction between the innocent and the guilty, and that the sufferings of Christ can in any proper sense be called penal. The necessity for a penal satisfaction is derived from the supposed conflict of the Divine attributes; but, as is always the case with this dualistic conception, the governing attribute is justice — not the love which is the fundamental description of God's character, and punitive justice at that — not the righteousness which is both loving and holy.

[1] *Op. cit.*, III. 306.

Thus Dr. Shedd makes justice "the unconditional necessity to punish." Accordingly, justice is imperative, while mercy is optional; or, as Dr. Strong puts it: "God *may be* merciful, but *must be* holy." [1] But the objection to making punitive justice the ruling principle of the Divine administration is radical. As Dr. Stevens remarks: If it "lies deeper than love in God, and is independent of it, and has its infinite energy of wrath excited against sin, how is it logically conceivable that an inferior, optional, and (in its relation to 'holiness') dependent and non-determining attribute (love) should succeed in checking this punitive energy? The theory lays no logical basis in the nature of God for a work of salvation. It sacrifices the very motive to salvation in its effort to show how God surmounted the difficulty of making it possible." [2]

(4) A further inference from the passive and penal details is the idea of *imputation*. Anselm knows no more than the Scriptures of the imputation of our sins to Christ, or of His righteousness to us.[3]

[1] Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 248. It is not difficult to understand why the Calvinists of our day desired revision of the Westminster standards, in order to introduce ideas essential to the Gospel.

[2] *Ubi supra*, p. 245.

[3] The New Testament speaks only of the imputing of our sins to us under the law, the non-imputing of our sins to us through forgiveness, and the imputation by grace of "the righteousness of the faith" which we have in Christ (Rom. v. 13, 20; iv. 8; 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. iv. 9–11).

He conceives of Christ as rewarded for His unique righteousness; the Reformers conceive of Him as enduring the penalties which we deserve, but which are transferred to Him by imputation.

Luther thus literally interprets Gal. iii. 13: "All the prophets saw this in the Spirit, that Christ would be of all men the greatest robber, murderer, adulterer, thief, sacrilegious person, blasphemer, etc., than whom none greater ever was in the world, because He who is a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world now is not an innocent person, and without sin, is not the Son of God born of the Virgin, but a sinner who has and bears the sin of Paul who was a blasphemer, a persecutor and violent, of Peter who denied Christ, of David who was an adulterer, a murderer, and made the Gentiles blaspheme the name of the Lord; to sum up, who has and bears all the sins of all men in His own body, not because He committed them, but because He took them, committed by us, upon His own body to make satisfaction for them with His own blood."[1] He further says: "If the sins of the whole world are on that one man Jesus Christ, then they are not on the world; but if they are not on Him, they are still on the world. So if Christ Himself was made guilty of all the sins which we all have committed, then we are absolved from all sins, yet not through ourselves,

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

our own works or merits, but through Him." The peril of this kind of statement is that it leaves no room for justifying faith, although justification by faith was to him *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae.* If all our sins are absolutely taken from us and their full punishment endured and complete satisfaction made, there is no need for further conditions, since we stand before God as though we had not sinned. The logical implication, also, is that, as Christ has taken upon Him all the sins of the future as well as of our past, we need no more concern ourselves about the former than the latter; and that is the practical Antinomianism which has been so often charged against Luther's doctrine, which has been not seldom exhibited by some who adopted it, but which, it must be confessed, has been usually avoided by the inconsistent influence of a devoted faith and love. Language as incautious as the following is certainly very dangerous: "Ab hoc non avellet nos peccatum, *etiamsi* millies millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus."[1]

Calvin seems in one passage to deny external imputation. "We do not contemplate Him at a distance out of ourselves, that His righteousness may be imputed to us; but because we have put Him on, and are ingrafted into His body, and because He has deigned to unite us to Himself, therefore we

[1] Hallam, *Literature of Europe*, I. 299.

glory in a participation of His righteousness." [1] But this is with reference to justification by faith; when he speaks of the Atonement, he uses such expressions as these: "Thus we shall behold Christ sustaining the character of a sinner and malefactor, while from the lustre of His innocence it will at the same time evidently appear, that He was loaded with the guilt of others, but had none of His own. . . . This is our absolution, that the guilt, which made us obnoxious to punishment, is transferred to the person of the Son of God. . . . Our guilt and punishment being as it were transferred to Him, they must cease to be imputed to us. . . . When He was about to expiate our sins, they were transferred to Him by imputation." [2]

It is evident that this element is necessary to complete the theory, for the passive satisfaction could not have been penal and equivalent if the sins of mankind were not imputed to the sinless One. It was, however, often revolting even to men who embraced the chief Reformation doctrines; for Osiander calls it "forensic and sophistical, contrary to Scripture, and verging on blasphemy." [3] Its defect is that it involves crude and literal substitution, which cannot be made rational or moral. Suffering by the inno-

[1] *Inst.*, III. xi. 10.
[2] *Ibid.*, xvi. 5, 6,
[3] Oxenham, p. 242.

cent for the guilty is a common fact of experience, and is one of the redemptive forces of human life; but it is never in their stead, in the sense that the due of one is borne by the other, or the same consequences, or an equivalent amount, or a similar quality, and it has nothing of the character of punishment.[1] "Vicarious punishment is pure injustice, and vicarious guilt pure nonsense."[2] Whatever our Lord endured, it was in no respect penal; moral responsibility cannot be transferred, and the infliction of so much suffering for so much sin by means of a mechanical substitution is irrational and inequitable. The Christian concept of God will not permit us to represent Him as "so just that He cannot forgive the guilty, but so unjust that He can punish the innocent."[3]

These four additions to the Anselmic idea of satisfaction were undoubtedly associated with a spiritual conception of the personal relation of Christ to the human soul, which greatly obviated their dogmatic defects. Nevertheless, they ushered in that era of Protestant scholasticism which developed so many statements of doctrine which have now become unpalatable and are rapidly passing into oblivion. The theologians of the two following centuries worked

[1] The modern distinction between substitutionary punishment and vicarious suffering is convenient, though somewhat inaccurate.

[2] H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, I. 217.

[3] Stevens, p. 250.

out the consequences of the Reformers' teaching on the Atonement to their pitiless logical issue; the orthodoxy of Protestantism was fixed in its final form by Francis Turretin, towards the close of the seventeenth century. The exaggerations of these speculations on the method of the Atonement, their disregard of Scriptural and primitive forms of thought, their dogmatic tyranny, contributed to the inevitable reaction which is reaching its full proportions in our own day.

### c. *The Modern Development and Reaction*

In tracing the history of this doctrine from the earliest Fathers down to the Reformation statement, it has become evident that the stream of thought has not grown more pure as it flowed through the centuries. From time to time we have observed ideas emerging and colouring the original Scriptural conceptions, which were alien, inharmonious, obscuring the crystal simplicity of Apostolic teaching. The notion of a fraudulent ransom was succeeded by an external, forensic, transcendental scheme of satisfaction; so that the categories under which men described the work of Christ became radically changed, and the whole current of thought shifted in direction. We have here almost reached the point of widest divergence from the Scriptures and the best patristic

insight; and we have now to notice the gradual precipitation of those elements which have given a strange hue to the views of the work of redemption. The remaining history of thought upon this subject, for the most part, is a record of successive changes of statement, brought about by acute criticism, the relinquishment of one and another detail fundamental to the Reformation dogma, the attempted readjustment of the theory by the retention of the familiar terminology and the alteration of its significance, until we find in the most recent books, even on the conservative side, an almost total departure from the Lutheran and Calvinistic teaching.

The theory of Anselm was so much modified by the unauthorised speculations of the Reformers that it may seem to have entirely disappeared. But its essential principle of satisfaction remained and dominated thought, and has been the basis ever since of what has been called Evangelical Theology. It may be noted that before the Reformation very different explanations of the Atonement were allowed to pass current, and that thereafter this one doctrine assumed peculiar importance, whose several hypotheses claimed the sole right to the title of orthodoxy, and permitted no opposition or even variation. It is indeed wonderful that this iron-bound dogmatism should have held sway for so many centuries,

despite the continuous evidences of reaction against its objectionable features.

The first great protest came from a confessedly unorthodox source. Lælius and Faustus Socinus were undoubtedly much handicapped by their heresy concerning the person of Christ. For a long time it seemed enough to answer an objection to the theory of satisfaction to call it Socinian; as though doubt of the full statement of forensic and penal substitution were heretical, because its most vigorous critics happened to be also unbelievers in the deity of our Lord. But even that fact does not destroy the validity of a protest against a form of doctrine which shocked the moral consciousness and outraged the reason. The imperfection of the Socinian view of Christ naturally made their constructive theory a failure. The death of Christ was to them merely an example similar to martyrdom, an assurance of the Divine forgiveness, and a preparation for the resurrection which was the real power in the redemption from sin. As a positive statement, this must be regarded as deficient, because it ignores what St. Paul and the Greek Fathers made so prominent, the relation between Christ and the whole of humanity, and the solidarity of humanity itself by which alone His sufferings in our behalf become intelligible. The final formulation of the truth regarding Christ's work will contain all the Scriptural elements, though

it may be questioned whether the time for that has even yet come; certainly it had not come at the period of the Sozzini, especially with the embarrassment of their faulty theology.

Their significance lay in their powerful negative criticism, in the substitution of plain sense for juristic fictions. The general point of view has been already indicated, because it has been largely absorbed in the modern attitude toward the idea of satisfaction. First of all, satisfaction, of which the New Testament says nothing, and the remission of sins, of which it is full, are mutually exclusive. If satisfaction has been made, there is no logical room for forgiveness, the release is a matter of strict justice; if remission is a gift of grace, there has been no satisfaction. Moral obligations may not even figuratively be compared to debts or sums of money; the difference between personal delinquencies and pecuniary debts is ethically as wide as possible. Nor may the punishment of sin be treated under the analogy of criminal proceedings; for the punishment of the innocent is unrighteous, and the suffering of others through being involved in the sin of the guilty is not penal suffering. If sin be a violation of private right, as Anselm asserts, then satisfaction is unnecessary, because the affront could be pardoned by the magnanimity of the One offended. If it be a violation of public law, and the essential note

of justice be the necessity to punish sin, as the Reformers and their successors asserted against Anselm, then satisfaction becomes impossible. Justice requires that the sinner should suffer the penalty of eternal death. The inner and spiritual punishment of sin cannot be transferred; merit and demerit are inseparable from the subject himself.

There was and could be no equivalence between Christ's sufferings and our deserts. For He suffered as man, and this suffering was consequently finite, and not equal to the penalty deserved by the whole race. If the value of the suffering is sought to be enhanced by the fact that He was God, so that what was lacking in the quantity is made up by the quality, still there was no actual equivalence. An individual endurance of penalty, even if regarded as constructively infinite, would be equal to only *one* eternal death, and therefore could compensate for only one sinner. Moreover, if any endurance becomes equivalent to infinity, merely because the sufferer was Divine, then the smallest amount of suffering would have been adequate, for it would have for the same reason an infinite worth to God. The only real equivalence for even one sin would be that Christ should have died the eternal death; but on the contrary He was raised and ascended into glory. Still further, if His Divine nature is supposed to invest His passion with its true value, then the satisfaction is artificial and

unreal, because that makes God compensate Himself, and this is contrary to the orthodox view that God is impassible. Finally, the idea of imputation is incompatible with that of satisfaction; for, if the latter is complete, it excludes anything further, and if it be imputed on the ground of faith, it is conditional not perfect.[1]

These objections must be considered as on the whole unanswerable, because they have distinctly modified the whole subsequent discussion, except in the scholastic development of the seventeenth century. They made the analogy of criminal procedure indefensible, because that demands the punishment of the offender, and the satisfaction theory requires a substitute. Hence the theorists were driven back to the figure of a civil debt, which permits of substitution, but destroys the conception of sin and of distributive justice. Those who have tried to make satisfaction seem rational and just have ever since been involved in hopeless vacillation and inconsistency, in the attempt to evade the crushing force of the Socinian criticism. It has so affected the thinking of the Christian world that nothing is more remarkable in modern theology than the open or tacit omission of all those conceptions against which it

[1] Ritschl, *op. cit.*, pp. 298–309; Baur, *op. cit.*, pp. 374–414; Harnack, VII. 156–159; Hagenbach, II. 355–360; Neander, *Hist. Christ. Dogm.*, II. 260; Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–161; Sabatier, pp. 83–88; Lidgett, pp. 474–476.

was directed. It has compelled "Christian thought to abandon once and for all the regions of mythology and of penal law, and to take its stand at last on the firm ground of moral realities." [1]

The *Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ* by Hugo Grotius was intended to be an answer to Faustus Socinus; but it has to be acknowledged that it betrays the powerful influence of his destructive criticism. It must therefore be considered as the beginning of the revolt within the ranks of the orthodox against the Calvinistic doctrine. Grotius substituted the relation of a ruler (rector) to his subject for that of debtor and creditor, and for that of judge and criminal. He perceived the inadequacy of the metaphor of debt and payment, and also the impropriety of an injured person acting as judge in his own cause or demanding punishment when he has a right only to compensation. The method of salvation was not by a fulfilment of the law, but by its relaxation. As Ruler or Governor, God might have forgiven sin as a matter of prerogative, but He must consider the effect upon the moral universe. "He most wisely chose that way by which He might at the same time manifest the greater number of His attributes, both clemency and severity, a hatred of sin, and care for preserving the law." The end of His government is the preservation of

[1] Sabatier, p. 84.

order and the prevention of transgression. That end was secured by the death of Christ as a penal example, "placing in clear light the character of God, the heinousness of sin, and the authority of the law." It was not a payment of a debt (*solutio*), but a satisfaction; for payment excludes remission, the display of rectoral justice (*justitia rectoris*) fulfilled the ends of government, and room was left for the exaction of faith and repentance as the conditions of pardon.

Such, in brief, is what is known as the *governmental* theory of the Atonement. Its author used much of the current terminology of the Reformation theory, such as "paying our debt," "receiving our punishment," "suffering the penalty of our sins"; but, in fact, he destroyed the real ground of that theory by depriving it of its characteristic features. He rejected the idea of equivalence, and he did not maintain a strict satisfaction, but a Divine acquittal. As Ritschl has said, he made Christ's death, not a "satisfaction for past sins," but a "penal example for the prevention of future sins." God accepts this substitution of Christ's affliction in lieu of real punishment, because it is needed to vindicate His rectitude and the dignity of His government, and not because it is a necessity of His punitive justice. But such acceptance is practically the same thing as the Scotist idea of "acceptilation"; and Dr. Baur says: "There is no theory to which the idea of acceptilation

could be applied with greater propriety than to that of Grotius." On every essential point, then, he deviates from the Reformers; in the technical sense of those words, he knows nothing of punishment, of substitution, or of satisfaction, and for his justification of the execution of one as an example for the rest his only appeal is to heathen ethics and illustrations.

The theory is unsatisfactory, because it makes God's sovereignty fundamental; whereas back of His will is the character of love and righteousness which conditions it, and it cannot depend upon His arbitrary will whether He punishes or forgives. It is not juristic indeed, but it is political, and a reflex of the politics of the time; it makes God's relation to us official instead of personal, despotic instead of paternal. It was developed under conceptions of law, different from those of Anselm or the Reformers, which we have outgrown as barbarous and immoral. His whole notion of the dignity of law is an abstraction, and the means by which God upholds His moral government are well described as "the primitive and imperfect expedients resorted to by human legislators in the rudest times." The theory is an attempt to provide a *via media*, but like most attempts at compromise it is unsuccessful. It is a distinct movement away from the Reformation type of thought; but, as Dr. Stevens says, it has the ad-

vantage of being "capable of adjustment, by modification, to the requirements of modern thought and of harmonisation with the Christian ideas of God and of His relations to the world." [1]

Notwithstanding the suspicion of heresy attaching to it, the governmental theory has had great weight down to our own day, although it has suffered considerable modifications in form, in the endeavour to "ethicise the conception of satisfaction." Naturally, the Arminians followed Grotius, and the prevalence of their theology commended the theory to many English Churchmen like Archbishop Tillotson and Bishop Patrick, and gave it a far-reaching influence on English Nonconformity. It was accepted by Jonathan Edwards, Sr., and the New England divines generally, and survives in some of the most notable works published in recent years. Its vogue is one evidence of the extent of the revulsion from any mode of stating the idea of penal satisfaction.[2]

[1] Dale, *The Atonement*, pp. 295–297; Baur, pp. 414–435; Fisher, p. 341; Hagenbach, II. 355, 361; Lidgett, pp. 111–114, 480; Stevens, pp. 161–171, 252–254, 417; Ritschl, pp. 309–319.

[2] Dr. Simon considers it one of the so-called "moral" views of the Atonement, which is a sufficient illustration of its distance from the Reformation dogma. He mentions Albert Barnes and Professor Wace among its modern advocates. Dr. Stevens devotes a chapter (pp. 198–220) to "Modern Ethical Satisfaction Theories," as exhibiting the perpetuity of some of the conceptions and principles of Grotius. He names Professor Edwards A. Park, Dr. J. McLeod Campbell, Dr. R. W. Dale. Dr. S. Harris, Dr. Lewis F. Stearns, Professor George Harris (Essay in *Progressive*

The Protestant scholastics of the seventeenth century, Gerhard, Mastricht, Quenstedt, and Turretin, carried the Calvinistic doctrine to its farthest extreme. They were stalwart in pushing the logical process to its utmost conclusions, shrinking from no statement, however startling, that seemed to be justified by their unfortunate premises.[1] They were unable, however, to curb the tendency to depart from the Reformation orthodoxy, and this divergence has continued until it has grown to the proportions of a revolution in our own age.

*Orthodoxy*), Rev. A. Lyttelton (Essay in *Lux Mundi*), Rev. J. S. Lidgett, Canon Moberly, Rev. W. L. Walker, Dr. J. T. Hutcheson, Principal Fairbairn, and Dr. Henry C. Sheldon.

[1] The Westminster *Confession of Faith*, by comparison, is very tame, although loyal to the general position of the Reformers. "The Lord Jesus, by His perfect obedience and sacrifice of Himself, . . . hath fully satisfied the justice of His Father" (ch. viii. sect. v.). We may also note the admirable reticence of the Anglican standards of a century earlier; except that Article II. contains a wholly unscriptural expression: "Who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to *reconcile His Father to us*, and to be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for actual sins of men." Article XXXI. has language similar to that of the Eucharistic Office, which says: "Who made there (by His one oblation of Himself once offered) a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world." The phraseology is a natural reflex of the theology of the time, but it does not commit us to a particular theory. While we might to-day employ a different word, and are entirely at liberty to think of the Father's satisfaction in an obedient Son, we are to look for the Church's authoritative formulas in the language of the Catechism: "who redeemed me and all mankind," and in the sober statement of fact in the Nicene Creed.

The New England theologians, from their sympathy with the Grotian theory, denied that Christ suffered the penalty of our sins. Dr. Dwight said: "Nor will it be believed that any created nature could in that short space of time suffer what would be equivalent to even a slight distress extended through eternity . . . When, therefore, we are told that it pleased Jehovah to bruise Him, it was *not as a punishment*." Dr. Edwards the younger said: "It is not true that Christ endured an equal quantity of misery to that which would have been endured by all His people, had they suffered the curse of the law . . . As the Eternal Logos was capable of neither enduring misery nor losing happiness, all the happiness lost by the substitution of Christ was barely that of the *man* Christ Jesus, during only thirty-three years; or rather, during the last three years of His life." And Dr. Emmons said: "His sufferings were no punishment, much less our punishment. His sufferings were by no means equal in degree or duration to the eternal sufferings we deserve, and which God has threatened to inflict upon us. So that He did in no sense bear the penalty of the law which we have broken, and justly deserve." [1]

These concessions must not be estimated as a

[1] Introduction to *Theological Essays*, edited by Geo. R. Noyes, D.D., pp. xxiv, xxv.

complete departure from the Calvinistic view of the Atonement; but they clearly indicate the beginning of the return to simpler and wiser theorising on the unrevealed. It is unmistakable that, during the whole of the century just past, many familiar conceptions were becoming quite impossible of belief. Dr. McLeod Campbell has illustrated this from modern English Calvinism. Thus, Dr. Payne rejected the imputation taught by Owen and Edwards: "Guilt and merit not being transferable — but only their consequences." Dr. Jenkyn admitted that "Christ's sufferings were not a punishment." Dr. Stroud approvingly quoted President Edwards, to the effect that to represent Christ as "suffering a positive infliction of Divine wrath" is chargeable with error, "not to say absurdity." [1] Among English Churchmen the same disregard of the old tenets is shown in the work which was so long regarded as the classic upon the subject, Magee's *Atonement and Sacrifice*. He said: "I have used the expression, 'vicarious *import*,' rather than *vicarious*, to avoid furnishing any colour to the idle charge, made against the doctrine of atonement, of supposing a real substitution in the room of the offender, and a literal translation of his guilt and punishment to the immolated victim; a thing utterly incomprehensible, as neither *guilt* nor *punishment* can be conceived,

[1] McLeod Campbell, *The Atonement*, pp. 66, 70, 72.

but with reference to *consciousness*, which cannot be transferred." [1]

However, the Reformation dogma, in its main features but with constantly diminishing emphasis, was frequently repeated in the first half of the last century, and has not been entirely dislodged in our own day, but is manifestly obsolescent. Hugh Martin, Charles Jerram, and J. M. Armour presented variant forms of the traditional view, although some important reservations are made. Edwards A. Park and Albert Barnes gave good representations of the modified Grotian doctrine. The controversial treatises of Drs. Smeaton, Crawford, and Candlish; the Bampton Lectures of Archbishop Thomson, and his essay in *Aids to Faith*; the essays in *The Atonement: A Clerical Symposium* by Mr. Mackennal, Dr. Olver, Dr. Rainy, Dr. Cave, Dr. Morris, and Dr. Gloag; the work of Dr. Dale: *The Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement* by Dr. Cave; *The Humiliation of Christ* by Dr. Bruce (which adheres to the penal element in the sufferings of Christ and the objective imputation of our sins to Him); the Kerr Lectures of Dr. D. W. Forrest; *The Christian View of God and the World* (Lecture viii) by Dr. Orr; the *Studies in Theology* and *The*

[1] I. 268, edition of 1822. Dr. Simon includes the view of Archbishop Magee among the theories that are "exclusively manward-looking" (*The Redemption of Man*, p. 58).

*Death of Christ* by Dr. James M. Denney; *The Christian Salvation* by Dr. J. S. Candlish; and Bishop Moule's *Outlines of Christian Doctrine* are some more recent illustrations of the partial survival of the older conceptions.[1]

One characteristic of the modern statement is the attempt to "put a piece of new cloth into an old garment" that is already much patched and ready

[1] The thoughtful work of Dr. R. W. Dale (*The Atonement*) has been so deservedly admired for its candour and scholarship, and has had so much wider reception than any of the others, that it may be considered a typical instance of the effects of the modern influence. He says in his Preface: "The premature attempt to construct a Theory of the Atonement on the basis of those descriptions of the Death of Christ which represent it as a Ransom for us, or as a Propitiation for the sins of the world, or on phrases in which Christ is described as dying for us, or dying for our sins, has been the mischievous cause of most of the erroneous Theories by which the glory of the FACT has been obscured." On which Professor Adeney remarks: "That great theologian was not content to rest in any half-way house himself, and proceeded to work out a most elaborate argument in the region of hypothesis" (*A Theological Symposium*, p. 143). He seems genuinely Grotian when he says: "It belonged to Him to assert, by His own act, that suffering is the just result of sin. He asserts it, not by inflicting suffering on the sinner, but by enduring suffering itself" (p. 392). Dr. Stevens thinks he only approximates the penal theory, although he employs the usual terms. He calls imputation "a legal fiction," and he labours to show that Christ's suffering was a substitute for punishment (pp. 391–394). Yet this whole passage is vitiated by a real recognition of the penal idea (see also p. 222), and he admits the validity of literal substitution, expiation, and propitiation (pp. 475 *sq.*, 103, 237, 242). See, for effective criticisms, Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, pp. 155–170; Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 393–396; Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 190, 198.

to fall to pieces. The language of the historic theories is retained, but it is evacuated of its original meaning. Dr. George B. Stevens says: "Almost all modern evangelical writers, whatever their particular shade of opinion, are disposed to qualify and tone down the definitions and formulas of the old theology, even where they employ some of its terms; they seldom glory in the claim, as earlier writers did, that theirs is the 'legal' and 'forensic' interpretation of the work of Christ, or assert that the determination to punish is the primary element in the Christian concept of God, which He must gratify in the sufferings of Christ before he can forgive." [1] Most of the authors referred to above recognise that the theory needs restatement in view of modern objections, and oftentimes closely approach the standpoint of its critics. This is especially seen in their reluctance to formulate a complete philosophy of the Atonement, their endeavour to revitalise the old words by a spiritual rather than a legal interpretation, and their rejection of those details which have made the accepted doctrine abhorrent.[2] But it must be remarked that these qualifications, which have almost totally altered the old form of penal substitution and attenu-

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 198, 199.

[2] A comparison of the *Clerical Symposium* (1883) with the *Theological Symposium* (1902) upon the same subject, will furnish a suggestive indication of the progress of twenty years.

ated it so that it is barely recognisable, have shorn it of its consistency and logical force. It is not too much to say, therefore, that, as an explanation of the method of our redemption, it is disappearing as antiquated and outworn. To quote again from Dr. Stevens's profoundly able discussion of the Christian doctrine of salvation: "In but very few books on the Atonement which are fairly recent has the old Protestant traditional theory been preserved without important qualifications. In Germany I do not know of a single prominent living theologian who has championed it in any well-known treatise.[1] . . . At any rate, for better or for worse, the theory is moribund. . . . No British theologian, so far as I know, has, within recent years, consistently elaborated or defended the theory of vicarious punishment." [2]

Many of the modern writers make no effort to harmonise the Reformation terminology with the changed conception of the work of Christ. They frankly acknowledge that the attempt is not only

[1] The Germans and French Protestants universally regard the death of Christ as "the historical means of a subjective atonement."

[2] Pp. 186, 187, 190. Even Dr. Denney repudiates such words as "legal," "judicial," "forensic" (*The Atonement and the Modern Mind*, p. 69), and avoids the use of the word "penal," although, both in this and his former treatise, *The Death of Christ*, he holds to the word "substitution," which he admits "lends itself very easily to misconstruction" (*ubi supra*, p. 130).

vain but unnecessary, because that mode of speech is radically at variance with the truth. The fear of heterodoxy withheld many thinkers from taking such a decided position, until their courage was reinforced by the stimulating reflections of Coleridge.[1] Since 1860 the movement in favour of a new construction of thought upon redemption has become very pronounced. The significant fact about it is that it has been largely characterised by an endeavour to bring out the essential truths which had been too long minimised or ignored. The new historic sense of the period necessitated the study of doctrine in its historical development; with the result that the original authority of many customary statements was challenged, there was more and more evident a refusal to philosophise about what in its nature is unrevealable or what at least has not been clearly disclosed to us, and there was a disposition to be silent about those elements of any theory which cannot be found in the Scriptures and the writings of the Greek Fathers. The extreme recoil from any form or modification of the Anselmic theory is witnessed by a host of writers, far too many to name, whose works are remarkable frequently for their rejection of all its details, but more often for *what they do not say*, and what they must have said if the

[1] The term "orthodoxy" should be confined to the few things pronounced upon by the Church universal.

omitted features were important. There is great difference among them as to what constitutes atonement, and even whether it be in some sense both objective and subjective or only the latter; but they practically agree in disavowing those statements which were until recently regarded as the essence of orthodoxy.

The tendency seems to be, on the whole, to lay stress on the *fact* that we are reconciled to God through the sacrifice of Christ, with no attempt to define precisely its method or to dogmatise about it or even to insist that any understanding of it is needful. The love of God is made primary and fundamental, inclusive of His righteousness, and a far more splendid and rectifying attribute than what has been called "a desire to be willing to forgive." [1] The judicial is completely superseded by the ethical, and the Incarnation resumes its ancient power of interpreting the work of Christ. Instead of employing the words suggestive of some particular method of atonement, we are reverting to Sacrifice, Redemption, and Reconciliation as being Scriptural and so best descriptive of the fact.[2]

[1] Jas. Morison, *Exposition of Romans Third*, p. 305.
[2] See Appendix for illustrations.

# IV

# ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE TREATISE

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The *Cur Deus Homo* has an importance for the history of doctrine which it does not possess as a positive theory. *Per se* it has little permanent worth. Ritschl thinks it has been much overestimated, and that its appreciation is "conventional and unhistorical" (p. 23). It has been shown how meagre were its results upon scholastic thought, and at the same time how vital has been its hold upon the theology of the past three centuries. Dean Church speaks of it as "the famous dialogue, in which, seeking the rational ground of the Incarnation, he lays down a profound and original theory of the Atonement, which, whether accepted or impugned, has moulded the character of all Christian doctrine about it since."[1] This indicates at once its historical import and its prime defect.

It is certainly remarkable, that a theory which so entirely lacked the power to commend itself to gen-

[1] *St. Anselm*, p. 232. Thomasius calls Anselm "the theological founder of the dogma of the Atonement" (*op. cit.*, p. 123).

eral acceptance should have contained so many ideas whose influence has persisted for eight centuries. Perhaps no other theological statement has been so universally rejected as a whole, but whose essential characteristics have so completely coloured subsequent thinking. To Anselm is due the displacement of the simple doctrine and fact that Christ "died for our sins" by a philosophy of the Atonement. Though the form of the theory has been strikingly changed, he has given popularity and continuance to an almost exclusively objective treatment of the Atonement, to the subordination of the Incarnation to a mere incidental means, to the thought of God as Sovereign rather than as Father, to the conception of the governmental administration of Divine law instead of the paternal, to the fiction that righteousness is more peremptory in its demands than love, to the preference of the legal word "justice" to "righteousness" as the nobler equivalent of the Scriptural term δικαιοσύνη. He has introduced the idea of satisfaction as the chief demand of the nature of God, of punishment as a possible alternative of satisfaction and equally fulfilling the requirements of justice — thus opening the way to the assertion of punishment as the true satisfaction of the claims of the law. He has authenticated the notion of a "battle of the attributes"; he has substituted a legal and commercial

use of the figure of debt for the Scriptural use of the same figure and for other figures more frequently employed in the New Testament; and he has promoted the ambiguous description of the *infinite* guilt of sin and of the merely forensic value of the infinite merits of Christ.

The student of popular theology will recognise all of these elements as occupying greater or less prominence in the familiar statement of the doctrine of Atonement; and their permanence is a strong testimony to the extent of Anselm's influence. But, as Dean Church said, the theory is "original" with him, and, in their application to the mode of our redemption, the details above noted are equally novel. It is suspicious and ill-omened that they had no expression for a thousand years. Their local antecedents, their exclusive development in the West, their determination of thought to such different categories from those assumed by the Fathers, render them interesting as a phase of historical theology, but quite without authority in the investigation of fundamental Christian truth. It cannot be denied that they have wrought grievous harm, as will have appeared in the preceding discussion. Surely it was not a false instinct that led the Fathers to think more of the indwelling of God in humanity than of the sufferings and death that resulted from the "human life of God." It was a simpler and truer conception

of the meaning of the Incarnation that made the presence of God in the form of man the natural and presumptive corollary of the creation of man in the image of God, instead of making it the adventitious sequel of human sin.

It was a distinct loss when the Atonement was made so central that theories of its *modus* were no longer tolerated, if certain speculative elements were absent. The "ransom" theory was not imposed upon the faith of the church, and its exponents were considered no more orthodox than its opponents. The satisfaction theory of Anselm was accepted in part by a very few, but its rejection did not affect the standing of a thinker as a defender of Catholic truth. The satisfaction theory of the Reformation, however, which owed its existence to Anselm, was made the test of orthodoxy, and continued to be so urged until a few years ago. Yet the mischief of requiring subscription to a rationalistic and metaphysical formula, in the place of the Scriptural doctrine from which it was heroically asserted to be a derivation, should have been manifest from the deliberate avoidance in the Scriptures of any explanation of the *process* of redemption. Anselm's adoption of a purely objective interpretation of Christ's work, his assumption of an ability to penetrate into the esoteric relations of the Trinity, made him primarily responsible for the intrusive prying into Divine mys-

teries, and for the confident familiarity with the unrevealed portions of truth that issued in the dogmatic tyranny so conspicuous in the Protestant churches. When we compare the compact and, in many respects, consistent theory of Anselm with the unsystematised and multiform and independent utterances of the Evangelists and Apostles, we wonder why the very coherence and symmetry of his logic were not regarded as a dubious excellence. The features in which the elder divines most delighted are precisely those which fail to commend themselves to modern thought. What Professor Fisher says of Scholastic Theology in general may be applied to the Anselmic and ensuing theories: "It is the great drawback to the value of these wonderful feats of intellectual acumen that it is abstractions and logical relations that are dealt with, so that Christianity appears to lose, so to speak, its flesh and blood, and to be resolved into a lifeless structure of metaphysics" (p. 215).

But it must be fairly acknowledged that we are indebted to Anselm for two great services in connection with this doctrine. The first has already been sufficiently treated; by overthrowing the theory of Origen, he brought our thought back to God from the devil, whose power and rights had been unduly exalted. The second is his indirect and entirely unintentional contribution to the modern

reality of personal religion. His theory is justly criticised as a speculation; but, in tracing the sources of certain spiritual impulses in and after the Reformation, we find them latent in him. Professor Nash, in his *Genesis of the Social Conscience*, has shown how monasticism enhanced the value of the common man. "The declaration that the world was worthless and so must be abandoned was the negative side of the conviction that the essential man in every man was infinitely worthy. . . . The monastery was the pledge of the independence of the spiritual view of things and of its ultimate masterfulness. Confronting the castle, it bespoke the reality of a world where the low-born stands level to the noble." " The monastery was the home and fortress of the conscience" (pp. 161, 162, 178). Professor Allen, in *Christian Institutions*, has contrasted monasticism with the Episcopate, to bring out the individualism of the one in opposition to the solidarity of the other. "The Catholic Church had aimed to solidify the Church and the world in unity, and it had begun to appear as if its purpose were already achieved, when the monks arose to dispute its ideal, to assert the importance of the individual man as greater than the institution, as greater than any temple that man could build, or wherein he might worship" (p. 156). This interpretation of the inner meaning of the monastic life, as an emphasis upon

the worth of the individual experience, validates his inference respecting the good work begun so unconsciously by Anselm.

The *Cur Deus Homo* was the work of a monk, who had been prior and abbot of Bec. He was thoroughly imbued with the monastic traditions, and his theory was such as could hardly have been devised by a representative of the secularised church. It implied the Church as an organisation, and no doubt intended to leave to the Church the control of the treasury of mercy. But it makes no reference to sacrament or penance or priesthood. These were not the means proposed for deliverance from the fear of a just God, but a satisfaction of divine justice so abundant that it promised peace to the souls tortured with the dread of the consequences of sin. It was a crude statement of the good-news of forgiveness, but it opened the way to a better understanding when better ideas of God should prevail. It contained also a fresh and powerful statement of the Incarnation of Christ, one with man and one with God, which assured mankind that the Divine attitude towards each one of the redeemed was goodness, not severity. Through these ideas and the accompanying elevation of the Atonement as the doctrine of prime significance, Anselm was the spiritual forerunner of Luther.[1] It was a strange irony of

[1] Allen, *Christ. Institutions*, p. 366.

fate that a theory whose antecedents lay partly in ecclesiastical practices which made the Church a necessary mediator between God and man should have by discernible stages issued in such a conception of the Christian life as gave immediate access to God in Christ.

Yet such was the actual result. When reconceived by the Reformers, the idea of satisfaction became a new proclamation of the Gospel of hope to every man. As they made it apprehensible only by personal faith, they were the logical successors of the monk who after all stood for the individual as contrasted with the hierarchy. Anselm was himself an Archbishop and a genuine ultramontane, and did not in the least suspect that he was aiding to change the very idea of the Church to which he was devoted. But after the superstitions were rejected, which did not offend his conscience and some of which had contributed to the framing of his thought, the *fact* of reconciliation became the dynamic element in the revived power of the personal religious life. Below all the objectionable theorisings there was felt the consciousness of the individual relation to God, and of peace with God through Jesus Christ and not through the mediation of a priesthood. The sense of personal pardon, the privilege of immediate access to God, the spiritual instead of the institutional idea, the hope of justification by faith apart

from the deeds of the law, — these made the Atonement vital in the creation of a new and free personality, from which ensued the religious and social benefits of the Reformation. It was the meaning of the fact of reconciliation to the world at large, the translation of the strange dogma which preserved the fact into personal experience — and only what was true in it could be so transferred — that enabled such an inspiring apprehension of the love of Christ and such a renewing appropriation of the cleansing blood. But this takes us back of the ecclesiastical development to the New Testament, where the teaching was, not of the method, but simply and prëeminently and continually of the fact whose acceptance transformed Jew and Gentile into new creatures in Christ Jesus.

It has been said that the Fathers laid stress upon the Incarnation and the Reformers upon the Atonement; but the two things need not remain in opposition. By the better understanding of the Atonement, as just described with reference to the service rendered by Anselm, we may go back to the teaching of the best of the Fathers, and greatly enrich their thought of the Incarnation, in its application to the needs of sinful man as the means of our at-one-ment. This does not mean that we are to be as exclusive in our references to the life of God in human flesh as the Reformers were to the death for human sin.

But we may return to the patristic thought of the primary importance of the Incarnation, as including the sacrificial death as a "dispensation" growing out of the necessities of man's redemption. This seems to be the trend of the more recent Soteriology; and it reveals the movement, referred to by Aubrey Moore in another connection, when he says: "Our modes of thought are becoming increasingly Greek" (*Lux Mundi*, p. 100).[1]

[1] It is sometimes asserted that we need to modify the Greek theology by the ideas developed in the Latin theology, especially with reference to the conception of sin. It is admitted that the Latins contributed much that was valuable to Christian thought; but they added very little in the department of Soteriology, and whatever was original with them was generally mischievous. Their theological concepts were too commonly cast in legal phraseology, in which they seem to have entirely misunderstood the difference between the *νόμος* of St. Paul's Epistles and the *lex* of Roman jurisprudence. The paternal idea of the relation between God and man was displaced by the juridical. The "divine kinsmanship" between Creator and creature was rejected in favour of a profound unlikeness and disjunction between them, that could be remedied only by a series of forensic transactions. Sin was not essentially spiritual, the substitution of self-will for the will of God, a missing of the end for which man was made; it was a "crimen," a "delictum interdictum." Penalty was no longer the natural and inevitable consequence of sin, the separation of the life from God, the deterioration of the spiritual nature; it was a judicial imposition from without, extrinsic and contingent. Forgiveness was not so much the remission of *sins* as a legal quittance from *penalty;* redemption was transformed from the deliverance of man at the cost of a loving sacrifice, by figures that reduced it to the payment of costs imposed by the judgment of a court; the ruling motive in the work of Christ was not so much a divine and righteous love as divine punitive justice. The legal morality of merit and good works, which St. Paul so vehemently

opposed, was the appropriate correlative of this forensic theology. (In many respects, Augustin was a noble exception to this representation; but I speak of the theology that was generally wrought out in the Western Church.)

It is true that no Greek ever uttered such intense and passionate confessions of sin as did some of the Latins, in which they went far beyond St. Paul in Romans vii. But that was because sin could not bulk so large to the consciousness of men who dwelt upon the Incarnation as the evidence of an affinity between divine and human nature, as it did to that of men who denied or at least underestimated this affinity. The Greeks were not insensitive to the "exceeding sinfulness of sin"; but they were splendidly alive to the truth that, "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." It is mainly a matter of emphasis. The Greeks placed it upon God in Christ and Christ in man; the Latins placed it upon human sin. There can be very little doubt as to which of these thoughts is the more spiritually fruitful.

# APPENDIX

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THOSE who are not familiar with the literature of this subject can have but little idea of the extent of the reaction from the Reformation dogma, referred to in the foregoing pages. It is exhibited not only by writers who wholly repudiate the details of that theory, but also by those who strive to retain its phraseology while giving up the features essential to its consistency. Some illustrations are accordingly submitted for those who may desire materials for further study. Many of the quotations and references are for the sole purpose of showing the reluctance of even the most conservative of modern thinkers to explain the precise method of the Atonement.

WILLIAM LAW (1728). — "The innocent Christ did not suffer to quiet an angry Deity, but as coöperating, assisting, and uniting with that love of God which desired our salvation. He did not suffer in our place or stead but only on our account, which is a quite different matter."

"Our guilt is transferred upon Him in no other sense than as He took upon Him the state and condition of our fallen nature . . . to heal, remove, and overcome all the evils which were brought upon us by the Fall."

"His merit or righteousness is imputed or derived into us in no other sense than as we receive from Him a birth, a nature, a power, to become the sons of God" (Quoted in *English Church in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 583).

Bishop Joseph Butler (1736). — "How and in what particular way, it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain; but I cannot find that the Scripture has explained it. . . . And if the Scripture has, as it surely has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain" (*Analogy of Religion*, Pt. ii. cap. v.).

John Wesley (1775). — "This grave danger was noticed by John Wesley, since he promised never again to use intentionally the term ' imputed righteousness,' when once he found 'the immense hurt which the frequent use of this unnecessary phrase had done '" (Melville Scott, *Crux Crucis*, p. 94).

Archbishop William Magee (1809). — "I know not, nor does it concern me to know, *in what manner* the sacrifice of Christ is connected with the forgiveness of sins: it is enough, that this is declared by God to be the medium, through which my salvation is effected. I pretend not to dive into the councils of the Almighty" (*The Scriptural Doctrines of Atonement and Sacrifice*, Discourse I. p. 20).

S. T. Coleridge (1825). — "Forgiveness of sin, the abolition of guilt, through the redemptive power of Christ's love, and of His perfect obedience during His voluntary assumption of humanity, is expressed, on account of the

resemblance of the consequences in both cases, by the payment of a debt for another, which debt the payer had not himself incurred. Now the impropriation of this metaphor (that is, the taking it literally) by transferring the sameness from the consequents to the antecedents, or inferring the identity of the causes from a resemblance in the effects — this is the point on which I am at issue: and the view or scheme of Redemption grounded on this confusion I believe to be altogether unscriptural. . . .

"The purpose of a metaphor is to illustrate a something less known by a partial identification of it with some other thing better understood, or at least more familiar. Now the article of Redemption may be considered in a two-fold relation — in relation to the antecedent, that is, the Redeemer's act, as the efficient cause and condition of redemption; and in relation to the consequent, that is, the effects in and for the redeemed. Now it is the latter relation, in which the subject is treated of, set forth, expanded, and enforced by St. Paul. The mysterious act, the operative cause, is transcendent. *Factum est:* and beyond the information contained in the enunciation of the fact, it can be characterised only by the consequences" (*Aids to Reflection*, pp. 30 *sq.* See also p. 235).

Thomas Erskine of Linlathen (1831). — "This view of the Atonement, which is generally known by the name of the doctrine of Christ's substitution, has, I know, been held by many living members of His body — and yet I believe that, with some truth in it, it contains much dangerous error. In the first place, I may observe, that it would not be considered justice in an earthly judge, were

he to accept the offered sufferings of an innocent person as a satisfaction for the lawful punishment of a guilty person. And as the work of Christ was wrought to declare and make manifest the righteousness of God, not only to powers and principalities in heavenly places, but to men, to the minds and consciences of men — it is not credible that that work should contain a manifestation really opposed to their minds and consciences. . . . Christ died for every man, as the head of every man — not by any fiction of law, not in a conventional way, but in reality as the head of the whole mass of the human nature, which, although composed of many members, is one thing, — one body, — in every part of which the head is truly present. . . . The substance of all these passages proves that the substitution of Christ did not consist in this, that He did or suffered something instead of men, so as to save them from doing or suffering it for themselves. . . . What Christ did for us, was done for us in a sense and with a view very different from that of saving us from doing it ourselves. He fulfilled the law, for instance, certainly not with a view of saving us from fulfilling it, but, on the contrary, with the very view of enabling us to fulfil it. . . . He made Himself a sin-offering, 'that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit'" (From *The Brazen Serpent* in *Letters* pp. 548–550. See also *Letters*, pp. 26, 215, 411).

Alexandre R. Vinet (1844). — "The transfer of guilt upon the innocent is absolutely contradicted by our ideas of morality. . . . It is not only by the sufferings of His life, but by His life as a whole. . . . The death of the

cross was not a punishment endured as such; it was a *self-sacrifice*" (A. Sabatier, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 101).

Newman Hall (1856). — "It does not represent Christ as having been punished. . . . It does not represent Christ as appeasing the wrath of God. . . . Most emphatically we renew our denunciation of so monstrous a notion as that the wrath of the Father is appeased by the death of the Son. This is heathenism in its most terrible form" (*Tracts for Priests and People*, Second Series, No. XIII. p. 5).

Francis Garden (1862). — "But many such men may fail of reconciling themselves to the theory of vicarious punishment, may find that to them it in no way manifests the righteousness of God, may be unable to see anything in Scripture which warrants the theory. . . . And even so I may venture to say that the most resolute decliner of such theories in regard to the work of Christ for our redemption, may use the language of Isaiah liii., and all that other language of Scripture which so corresponds with it, in sincerity, as expressing what all inadequately he feels and sees when he tries to contemplate the agony of the garden and the darkness of Calvary. He can see and accept the fact, while he declines all theory respecting it" (*Tracts for Priests and People*, Vol. I. p. 144).

William Kirkus (1865). — "With the exception of that statement of it which we find in the Articles of Religion and the Homilies, the Anglican doctrine of the Atonement belongs to a period of Church history when the *fact* of redemption was deemed far more important than any

theoretical *explanation* of it; and when 'the wisdom of words' had not made 'the cross of Christ of none effect.' The Liturgy belongs, for the most part, to that period of sacred reticence, when men were afraid to attribute to the Divine Being those mental conflicts and spiritual contradictions which constitute the misery and weakness of their own lives. They made no attempt to reconcile the justice and mercy of God, for it had never occurred to them that these divine attributes could possibly be at war. The prayers and praises of the early church ask for, and gratefully acknowledge, a stupendous blessing; which only can, and really does, find an adequate explanation in the inexhaustible resources of the love of God. But they never attempt to limit that love, or to determine the modes of its operation" (*Orthodoxy, Scripture and Reason*, p. 137. See also pp. 133–230).

John Henry Newman (1865). — "Why Christ's death was requisite for our salvation, and how it has obtained it, will ever be a mystery in this life."

J. Baldwin Brown (1869). — "From one point of view, this tendency may be regarded as a reaction, and a reaction in a healthy direction, though extreme, against the mercenary and mechanical views of the Atonement which have obscured this great portion of 'the whole counsel of God.' . . . So many finite deaths due as the penalty of human transgression, one infinite death sums them all, and quits the debt — is the exposition which we have often heard of the mystery of the Atonement. That sum in arithmetic — bad in arithmetic as in theology — will never bring us near to the heart of the work of the Lord

Jesus. . . . The more we can enlarge the word substitute, until it becomes equivalent to representative, the nearer we can keep to the relation of the head of the body and the members, and their essential sympathy and coöperation, in our conception of what the Lord has done and suffered for mankind, the nearer shall we be to the truth of the matter. . . . The Lord has not redeemed us from suffering, nor from the death which He died. He is redeeming us *by* suffering and *through* death. What He has redeemed us from is the hopeless suffering of the sinner, and the death of the soul that never dies" (*The Divine Mysteries*, pp. 328–330. See also *Misread Passages of Scripture*, Second Series, pp. 91–107).

Bishop Alexander Ewing (1871). — "The Scriptural and unscriptural views may be briefly characterized thus. The first view is, that the incarnation and death of Christ are outgoings of the eternal nature of God acting according to its normal laws, and manifested for others in time as there was need; the second, that it was an exceptional and arbitrary act, on the ground of which God may dispense Himself from the ordinary operation of His laws, and which has its end in itself or towards Him. The first conception has for its foundation that the 'nature of God is the ground of our hope, of which the incarnation and death of Christ are the revelation and proof'; the second, that the proofs themselves are the ground. In the first case the incarnation and death of Christ are conceived of as incidental to the object in view; in the second they are the object itself. This last conception makes the incarnation to have a retrospective or backward aspect towards God;

and the other, a forward or prospective aspect towards man. The first contemplates the reconciliation of man, the second the reconciliation of God. . . . The Reformers themselves were chiefly to blame for the conversion of the summary of results into technical terms for operative causes" (*Present Day Papers*, Third Series, "Reconciliation," pp. 9, 22. See also First Series, "The Atonement").

R. W. Dale (1875). — "But these representations of the death of Christ as a Ransom, as a Vicarious Death, as a Propitiation, though they illustrate the cause of His sufferings and their effect, and contain all that is necessary for faith, do not constitute a theory. As they stand, they are not consistent with each other. . . . These illustrations of the nature and effect of the death of Christ are illustrations, and nothing more. They are analogous to the transcendent fact only at single points. The fact is absolutely unique" (*The Atonement*, pp. 355–358).

"The general movement of European thought of which I have spoken is rendering it impossible to retain theological theories which were constructed in the sixteenth century. Men whose whole life is rooted in Christ, . . . are conscious that the rivets which fastened their doctrinal definitions are loosening — they hardly know how or why; that their theological theories, as distinct from their religious faith, are dissolving and melting away. . . . They have not lost sight of sun and stars; they will tell you that with their increasing years the glory of the sun is brighter to them than ever, and that the stars are more mysterious and divine; but they want a new astronomical theory. The sun and stars are God's handiwork; astronomical

theories are the provisional human explanations of Divine wonders" (*The Evangelical Revival and Other Sermons*, p. 21).

Dean R. W. Church (1875). — "I see the suffering; I am told, on His authority, what it means and involves. I can, if I like, and as has often been done, go on and make a theory *how* He bore our sins, and *how* He gained their forgiveness, and *how* He took away the sins of the world. But I own that the longer I live the more my mind recoils from such efforts. It seems to me so idle, so, in the very nature of our condition, hopeless, just in proportion as one seems to grasp more really the true nature of all that went on beyond the visible sight of the cross, all that was in Him who was God and man, whose capacities and inner life human experience cannot reach or reflect" (*Life and Letters*, p. 274).

John Pilkington Norris (1875). — "The deep comfort of the doctrine who can tell? But it is *not* the comfort of sin being made less penal, it is *not* the comfort of being accounted righteous when we are unrighteous, it is *not* the comfort of being told that Another has borne for us the punishment that we deserved" (*Rudiments of Theology*, p. 69. See also pp. 266–268, 273, 311).

Norman MacLeod (1875). — "He certainly never recurred to the conception of the sufferings of our Lord as penal, or to those notions of the nature of salvation which it involves. . . . Would to God we could lose our Calvinism, and put all the teaching of Christ and His Apostles in a form according to fact and not theory" (*Life*, pp. 281, 425).

J. B. Mozley (1875). — "But viewed as acting on this mediatorial principle, the doctrine of the Atonement rises altogether to another level; it parts company with the gross and irrational conception of mere naked material substitution of one person for another in punishment, and it takes its stand upon the power of love, and points to the actual effect of suffering love in nature, and to a parallel case of mediation as a pardoning power in nature. . . . That doctrine was, in fact, as much a reform upon the *pagan* doctrine of substitution, as the Gospel was upon paganism in religious truth in general. The doctrine of Scripture, so far from being the doctrine of mere substitution, is a protest against that doctrine; it makes accurate provision for moral claims; it enforces conditions on the subject of the sacrifice; it attributes a reasonable and rational ground of influence and mode of operation to the sacrifice. . . . And so also there is a kind of substitution involved in the Scripture doctrine of the Atonement, and a true kind; but it is not a literal but a moral kind of substitution. It is one person suffering in behalf of another, for the sake of another; in that sense he takes the place and acts in the stead of another, he suffers that another may escape suffering, he condemns himself to a burden that another may be relieved. But this is the moral substitution which is inherent in acts of love and labour *for* others; it is a totally different thing from the literal substitution of one person for another in punishment" (*University Sermons*, pp. 173–175. See also *The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, pp. 369–372, for an admission that the theory of satisfaction cannot be held as a truth

of reason or made intelligible to the reason or sense of justice).

Frederic Myers (1879). — "This Atonement of Christ . . . is to be received by faith rather than by the understanding; it cannot be fully explained, either in its causes or its consequences. And it is most important thus to think of it: for much of the theology which has been hitherto most commonly connected with it, has been not unreasonably a stumbling-block and a rock of offense equally to the self-sufficient and to the humble" (*Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology*, p. 247).

Newman Smyth (1879). — "Now human love has in it three essential elements; there are three primary colours in love's perfect light; and these three are, the giving of self, or benevolence; the putting self in another's place, sympathy, or the vicariousness of love; and the assertion of the worth of the gift — of the self which is given — self-respect, or the righteousness of love. Under the conceptions of vicariousness and the assertion of its own worth involved in perfect love, the Christian doctrines of atonement and redemption need to be regarded; and when considered from any lower point of view, as that of law or government, the sacrificial work of Christ is hardly lifted out of difficulties and shadows into a pure moral light" (*Old Faiths in New Light*, p. 278).

Daniel R. Goodwin (1880). — "But in relation to the Divine attributes, precisely *how* it is *objectively* effectual, *why* it is necessary, the *process* of the propitiation, in short, the *modus operandi* in or upon the Divine mind, we may not presume to scan or set forth. As usual in such cases,

men have proposed many theories, as: The ransom theory, the satisfaction theory, the substitution theory, the moral exhibition theory, the governmental theory, etc. While all these theories have a portion of the truth, they may all be pushed too far and too exclusively. . . . But we may not represent it as a mere ransom from the devil, from hell, or from sin, or from justice; as a bargain — a *quid pro quo;* or as a 'quenching of the flames of the Father's wrath in the blood of the Son'; or as a 'wresting of the sword of Divine vengeance from the Father's hand'; or as a suffering of 'the very pains of the damned,' or of precisely the kind and degree of punishment due to the sinner; or as a mere scenic exhibition of any of the Divine attributes, or of any amount of human suffering, for moral effect or governmental purposes; nor may we say, with Luther, that 'Christ was the greatest sinner in the universe' because upon Him were laid the sins of the whole world" (*Some Thoughts on the Atonement*, p. 59).

Dean Stanley (1881). — "What is Redemption? It is, in one word, deliverance. . . . Deliverance — how, or by what means? By one part of Christ's appearance? by one part of Christianity? by a single doctrine or a single fact? By all — by the whole. Not by His sufferings only — not by His death only — not by His teaching only; but 'by the mystery of His holy incarnation — by His baptism — by His fasting — by His temptation — by His agony and bloody sweat — by His precious death and burial — by His glorious resurrection and ascension, and by the coming of the Holy Ghost.' This wide meaning of the mode of Redemption was a truth sufficiently

appreciated in the early ages of the Church; and then it was piece by piece divided and subdivided, till the whole effect was altered and spoiled. Let us go back once more in the Litany to the complex yet simple whole. Let us believe more nearly as we pray. The particular forms used may be open to objection. We might wish that some features had been omitted, or that other features had been added. But there remains the general truth — that it is by the whole life and appearance of Christ we hope to be delivered" (*Christian Institutions*, p. 270).

Richard F. Littledale (1883). — "According to this view, then, it is the *Life* of Christ which has wrought out Atonement in the highest sense, while the *Death* of Christ, albeit essential as the seal and crown of the self-dedication of that life, and as completing its sacrificial character, has to do mainly with the secondary and lesser sense of Atonement. . . . Christ's death, in ancient Christian theology, did not pervade by any means as much space as it has done for several centuries past, but it was regarded as a single incident, of transcendent importance and value indeed, but still only a single incident in the great chain of events from the Incarnation to the Ascension. . . .

"It remains a mystery, and although thousands of divines have pondered and written upon it, no explanation yet offered has proved satisfactory to the Christian understanding, and least of all that which views it as a vicarious punishment, inflicted upon Christ in the stead of sinners" (*The Atonement: A Clerical Symposium*, pp. 8, 16).

J. J. Lias (1884). — "A certain theory of Atonement, which, though by no means excluded by the language of

Scripture, is not laid down in Scripture itself, has been insisted upon as the very keystone of the Christian faith. The rejection of this theory has frequently been regarded both by supporters and opponents of Christianity as the rejection of revealed religion. The object of these lectures is to show that there is no ground whatever for such a supposition; that the theory in question was not propounded by the first preachers of the Gospel, nor by their successors for the next fifteen hundred years, and that it is not accepted by the vast majority of Christians of our own time. Consequently a man may be a very good Christian without believing it, and a very serious hindrance in the way of belief is thus removed. . . .

"No Œcumenical Council was ever assembled to decide on the way in which Christ's offering of Himself availed to put away our sins. No early Father attempted to dogmatise on the subject. It was reserved for Protestant theology to make the Death of Christ rather than His Incarnation the keystone of the Gospel system, and to make the acceptance of a particular theory respecting that Death, not only the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*, but the indispensable requisite for the salvation of the individual soul. . . .

"Thus, then, we find the popular theory that Christ made atonement for our sins by bearing the Father's wrath against sin in our stead, to be not only without the slightest support from the Church before the Reformation, but we find it rejected by some theologians of the greatest note after that period. It forms no part of the theological standards of our own or of the Lutheran Churches. It is

repudiated by Calvin (?); it is expressly rejected by Jonathan Edwards" (*The Atonement Viewed in the Light of Certain Modern Difficulties*, pp. vi, 44, 62).

Dean Farrar (1885). — "I say at once, and without fear of contradiction, that no theory of the Atonement ever formulated, no scholastic explanation of the Atonement ever devised, has been accepted by the Universal Church, or can put forth the slightest claim to catholicity. . . . And the cause of all these errors, and of the human theories from which they spring, is obvious. They spring from ignoring the fact that it has not pleased God to give us the plan of salvation in dialectics; from the bad tendency to torture isolated expressions into the ever-widening spiral *ergo* of unlimited consequences; from tessellating varied metaphors into formal systems; from trying to construct the whole, when God has given us knowledge only of a part; from the bad rule of ecclesiastical opinionativeness and tyranny, *consequentiae equipollent revelatis*. . . . Of the blessed effects of the Atonement in relation to man we know or may know all; of the mysterious acts, of the operative cause, we know and can know nothing" (*Report of Tenth Church Congress of the P. E. Church*, pp. 41–43. See also *A Clerical Symposium*, pp. 64–88).

Randolph H. McKim (1885). — "We who stand for the objective view owe a debt of gratitude to you who have maintained the opposite view. You have sifted out a great deal of chaff from our conceptions on this subject. You have cleansed our temple for us. With your whip of small cords you have driven out those materialistic and commercial ideas which had intruded themselves into the

sacred precincts of this doctrine. Who is not thankful to see the scales and balances, and the arithmetical tables, and the ledgers with debit and credit accounts, disappear from the sanctuary of the doctrine of the Atonement? They *have* disappeared" (*Tenth Church Congress*, p. 47).

William R. Huntington (1885). — "How shall any man of his own motion, and out of his own head, venture to do what 'Holy Church throughout all the world' has never done — namely, to set forth, in precise theological terms, the Christian doctrine of the Atonement? Minute definitions of the dogma there have been without number, some of them backed by more, some by less, of recognised authority, but nowhere, save in the few broken words, 'Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven,' 'was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate,' 'suffered,' 'was buried' — nowhere save here can the voice of the Church Universal be justly said to have set forth any credenda of Atonement. . . . With respect both to the process and to the act we are, and, under the limitations of this life present, must always be, to a great extent agnostic. . . . 'There they crucified Him' — that we can understand. It is an event in time. But of the mysterious title, 'Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,' who shall say what that means? It carries us out into the unvisited region of eternity. . . . The penalty He did not bear, the burden He did" (*Tenth Church Congress*, pp. 33, 37. Reprinted in *Theology's Eminent Domain*, pp. 63 *sq.*).

Bishop Arthur C. A. Hall (1885). — "We hear objections to a theory of vicarious Atonement in which a man innocent and faultless bears the penalty of others' sins,

which are laid to his account, and then, by an equally fictitious imputation, his merits are put to the account of men still guilty. That is not the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement, but springs from an un-Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. . . . The sacrifice which He offers is representative, and not vicarious. His merits are *imparted* and communicated rather than *imputed*. He is our Leader and our Head rather than our Substitute" (*Tenth Church Congress*, pp. 45, 46. See also *The Forgiveness of Sins*, pp. 12, 43, 44, 92–96).

William Milligan (1885). — "On the one hand, there is the merely legal or juridical view of that work, which has a paralysing effect upon the life of the Church. Taken by itself, it leaves the impression upon the mind of something outward and unreal. The truly awakened conscience cannot be satisfied with a mere verdict of acquittal at the bar of Divine justice. What it needs, and can never be at peace without having, is deliverance from sin itself, is a moral and spiritual change, through which there shall be produced a walk with God instead of a walk in sin. And this change must be involved in the very process of redemption. . . . Thus we ought to find ourselves drawn to a theology, less one-sided and more pervaded by Catholic elements than that of the Reformation, because dealing more with life than with death" (*The Resurrection of our Lord*, pp. 288 *sq.*).

"The Church has had bitter enough experience of the evil effects of that system of legal theology which has so long held possession of the field. She has seen a wide gulf opened between a supposed salvation in Christ and life in

Him. She has seen a so-called orthodoxy, cold and hard, reigning in her pulpits and her pews, until at last many of the occupants of both, unable to endure their dissatisfaction longer, and having no better substitute, have been constrained to abandon theology, if not also Christianity, altogether. She has seen words expressive of the most solemn realities of the eternal world played with as if they were a set of counters without meaning. She has seen a preaching, boasting itself to be that of the only gospel, so separated from sweetness of moral tone and beauty of moral conduct that the faith of weak Christians has trembled in the balance, while a merely outward formalism has passed gaily through the Church and the world, smiling at its own accomplishments. All this the Church has seen, until it may be doubted whether her life, looked at on a large scale, has not become an obstacle to the progress of Christianity, instead of being, as it ought to be, the most powerful argument in its favour" (*The Ascension of our Lord*, pp. 365 *sq.* See the whole of Note B).

Bishop B. F. Westcott (1886). — "The Incarnation is commonly made to depend upon the Fall. And the whole tenour of revelation, as I conceive, leads us to regard the Incarnation as inherently involved in the Creation. . . . We are coming to understand, in a word, what is the true meaning of that phrase 'vicarious suffering' which has brought at other times sad perplexity to anxious minds; how it excludes everything that is arbitrary, fictitious, unnatural, external in human relationships; how it expresses the highest energy of love which takes a friend's sorrows into the loving heart and taking them by God's grace

transfigures them, satisfying every claim of righteousness, justifying every instinct of hope, quickening the spirit of self-surrender, offering within the sphere of common life a faint image of forgiveness, of redemption, of reconciliation" (*Christus Consummator*, pp. 104, 123).

Archbishop W. C. Magee (1887). — "But it is one thing to say that the sacrifice of Christ's death has had a reconciling or an atoning efficacy, and quite another thing to say that this atoning efficacy consists in this or in that fact or circumstance. It is one thing to say that propitiation means the removal of *an* obstacle to forgiveness, and quite another thing to say what that obstacle was, and how it has been removed. On this latter point it is most instructive to observe the guarded silence of Scripture. Texts there are in abundance setting forth the idea that in *some* way Christ's death has removed *an* obstacle to our forgiveness — an obstacle existing not on the human but on the Divine side — an objective, not a subjective, hindrance to our forgiveness; but where are the texts which profess to explain, still less to formulate scientifically, the nature of this obstacle and the precise manner of its removal — to tell us, that is to say, wherein consists the atoning efficacy of the death of Christ? The truth is, that this whole notion of Atonement by satisfaction of justice is not the revealed doctrine of the Atonement; it is a *theory about* the doctrine of Atonement. It is an attempt — one of many attempts — and a comparatively modern one too — to do just that which Scripture has refrained from doing — namely, to explain the Atonement, to make the deep mystery of it no mystery, to reduce it to a form in which we may be able,

as it is said, 'to grasp' it, to receive and understand what is called 'the Gospel plan of salvation.' I confess to a rooted distrust of all such attempts. . . .

"The truth is, that all these theories, and their name is 'Legion,' are only so many attempts to make that clear which God has not made clear, by fastening on some one of the many and purposely varied expressions in which He has shadowed forth for us the great mystery of the Atonement by means of partial analogies in human nature and human life, as if that one were the only true aspect of it, and then, by expanding this analogy — imperfect and partial as it must necessarily be — into some elaborate theory or system which rests on it like a pyramid upon its apex, sure to topple over under the blast of the first searching and honest criticism that is directed against it" (*The Atonement*, in "Helps to Belief" Series, pp. 107–110).

George MacDonald (1889). — "If I explain the atonement otherwise than they explain it, they assert that I deny the atonement; nor count it of any consequence that I say that I believe in the atoner with my whole heart, and soul, and strength, and mind. . . . Because I refuse an explanation which is not in the New Testament, though they believe it is, because they can think of no other, one which seems to me as false in logic as detestable in morals, not to say that there is no spirituality in it whatever, therefore I am not a Christian! What wonder men such as I have quoted refuse the Christianity they suppose such 'believers' to represent! . . . To do what He wishes is to put forth faith in Him. For this the teaching of men has substituted this or that belief *about* Him, faith in this or

that supposed design of His manifestation in the flesh. It was Himself, and God in Him that He manifested; but faith in Him and His Father thus manifested, they made altogether secondary to acceptance of the paltry contrivance of a juggling morality, which they attribute to God and His Christ, imagining it the atonement and 'the plan of salvation'" (*Unspoken Sermons*, Second Series, pp. 241, 247).

ARTHUR JAMES MASON (1859). — "No one can rest with confidence upon what is, on the face of it, an artifice, a scheme. What are called forensic doctrines have seemed to satisfy many hearts, but only so far as they were right metaphors, parables hinting at a fuller truth which was consciously or unconsciously felt to lie behind them. If our Lord's work be regarded as a cleverly devised legal contrivance, it repels instead of attracting; or if it does not actually repel, it invites criticism and admiration rather than worship and devotion. It is only when we strongly apprehend the naturalness of it all that we are able to embrace it with a hearty faith. Our Lord's redeeming work may be infinitely complicated. It may have many more aspects and a greater number of effects than we can imagine. It would not be natural were it otherwise; for all that is natural is complex. But its complications must be those which belong to life, capable of being resolved into a simple and majestic unity, and not the complications of a studied mechanism. . . .

'It will be seen that, on this view of the Atonement, there is no need to resort to the language of substitution, which has so often alienated thoughtful minds. That

language is neither scriptural nor ancient, and therefore has no special claim upon the adhesion of the Christian conscience. Indeed, it seems to be studiedly excluded from the New Testament. . . . So far therefore as the language of the New Testament goes, there is no reason for supposing our Lord to have been substituted for us in His Passion. But the objection to a theory of atonement by substitution lies deeper than the meaning of a preposition. If the one object of the Divine justice had been to inflict a condign punishment, perhaps the theory might have been more tolerable. But we have seen that such was not the case, and that an equivalent penalty could not satisfy God, instead of the removal of the sin. . . .

"And yet, however we may labour to set forth in human words the nature and character of the Atonement, it is certain that no complete account of it can be given. It is too far-reaching for our understanding. We are, no doubt, intended to inquire about it, to dispel false notions about it, to bring together facts which throw light upon it. But there is a danger in doing so, lest men should rest in a theory of redemption rather than on the fact itself. We are not saved by what we think about the Cross of Christ, but by the Cross itself" (*The Faith of the Gospel*, pp. 172, 205–207, 209).

Arthur Lyttelton (1889). — "The fault of many of the theories of the Atonement has been that, though none of them failed to be partially true, they were limited to one or other of the various aspects which that mysterious fact presents. It is certain, again, that of this complex fact no adequate explanation can be given. . . . The truth of the

vicarious sacrifice has been isolated till it has almost become untrue, and, mysterious as it undoubtedly is, it has been so stated as to be not only mysterious, but contrary to reason and even to conscience. . . . The truth of the wrath of God against sin and of the love of Christ by which that wrath was removed, has been perverted into a belief in a divergence of will between God the Father and God the Son, as if it was the Father's will that sinners should perish, the Son's will that they should be saved; as if the Atonement consisted in the propitiation of the wrathful God by the substituted punishment of the innocent for the guilty. . . . Nothing is more common than to hear the doctrine of the Atonement stated as if the work of Christ consisted in His endurance of our punishment in order that we might not endure it. . . . Attempts have been made to establish a quantitative relation between our Lord's sufferings and the punishment which is thereby remitted to us, to prove that the eternal nature of the Sufferer made His death equivalent to eternal punishment. But even if such attempts, in so mysterious a region, could succeed, it would be vain to establish a quantitative equivalence where there is no quantitative relation. Eternal punishment is 'eternal sin' and as such could never be endured by the sinless Son of God" (*Lux Mundi*, pp. 285, 307, 309).

Aubrey Moore (1889). — "Forensic fictions of substitution, immoral theories of the Atonement, 'the rending asunder of the Trinity,' and the opposing of the Divine Persons, like parties in a lawsuit, were the natural corollaries of a theory which taught that God was above morality and man beneath it" (*Lux Mundi*, p. 80).

R. C. Moberly (1889). — "When in fact we enter upon the domain of explicative theories, we have not only left the sure ground of the Creeds, and embarked upon views which may or may not be correct, but we find, as a fact, that the modes of thought which seemed adequately to explain the doctrine to the conscience of some ages, have not only failed to satisfy, but have actually shocked and offended others. The teaching that God was angry, but that Jesus, as a result of gentler mercy, and through His innocent blood, appeased, by satisfying, the wrath of the Father, and so reconciled God to us: . . . the teaching that a debt was due from humanity to God, and that Jesus, clothed as man, alone could deliver man by discharging God's debt: these — be they popular blunderings, or genuine efforts of theology — may, in their times, have both helped and wounded consciences: but whether they be to us as helps or hindrances, it is of the utmost importance that we should discriminate them, and others which may have succeeded to them as theories explanatory of the Atonement, from our cardinal belief in the Atonement itself" (*Lux Mundi*, p. 251).

"The difficulties which are generally felt about Christian atonement arise neither from the Evangelical history of the Cross itself, nor even from anything in the original apostolic proclamation of the fact, or of the doctrine of the Cross: but rather from the inadequacy of certain more or less current explanations, logical and inferential, of the original apostolic doctrine. Such inferential structures (the most untrue of which has considerable relation to truth) are precisely the things which ought to be closely

re-examined and reconstructed. They are no part of the original tradition. They are practically almost unknown in the earliest ages of Christianity. They are the work of human intellect, honest, instructive, — and visibly inadequate. They are stages in the human assimilation of a truth more fundamental and inclusive than the assimilating power of human intellect. It does not take any exceptional knowledge of the history of the doctrine, especially in the earliest Christian centuries, to detach them from the doctrine itself, and, if not fully to correct them, at least to see the elements in them which are most obviously open to question and correction. . . .

"The untenable elements of thought which were often introduced into the theological explanation of the Atonement (itself substantially always held in truth) from Origen to Anselm, and from Anselm to Luther, may be broadly said to have arisen out of exaggerated or disproportioned use of such metaphorical phrases as Redemption, Ransom, and Deliverance out of the dominion of Satan. The untenable elements of thought which have been too often characteristic of the atoning theories of popular Protestantism, may be said to have arisen out of a still more mischievous misuse of such phrases as those which constituted our second group, Propitiation, Reconciliation, and Justification. Out of these words have been drawn — perversely enough — the conceptions of an enraged Father, a victimised Son, the unrighteous punishment of the innocent, the unrighteous reward of the guilty, the transfer of innocence and guilt by fictitious imputation, the adroit settlement of an artificial difficulty by an artificial, and

strictly irrelevant, transaction" (*Atonement and Personality*, pp. xi, 342).

Louis Durand (1890). — "Incompatible avec la notion de justice, la substitution, en tant qu'on l'envisage comme donnant pleine satisfaction à l'offensé, n'est pas moins incompatible avec la notion de l'amour. Satisfaction reçue et pardon généreux sont choses qui s'excluent l'une l'autre. . . . De là la nécessité de l'œuvre du Rédempteur, non pas pour payer à notre place, lui juste, la peine que nous avions méritée, mais pour nous inspirer la vraie repentance, nous faire mourir au péché et nous réconcilier avec Dieu. C'est ce que Jésus-Christ a fait, ou c'est ce que Dieu a fait par lui, spécialement par sa croix. La croix de Jésus-Christ est le jugement de ce monde. Jésus a subi la mort dans la gloire de son innocence, afin de juger et de punir le péché dans nos consciences, en même temps qu'il nous donnait le témoignage suprême de son amour" (From Eleven Theses presented to the Vaudois Society of Theology, quoted in E. Petavel-Olliff, *Le Problème de l'Immortalité*, I. 408 *sq.*).

John Fulton (1892). — "When we consider the endless controversies of mediæval and modern theologians concerning the Divine means and method of human salvation, it is truly humbling and most instructive to turn to the sublime simplicity of the Nicene Creed. In popular theology one often finds something like a controversy between the persons of the Godhead, the Father standing as an impersonation of inexorable vengeance, and the Son as an impersonation of infinite goodness and Divine compassion. . . . The truth is that popular theology contains in it a

large amount of unconscious Manicheism, and offers to popular faith one God to be dreaded and another God to be loved. Naturally that theology takes little note of the great Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. . . . The Nicene Creed states the whole truth, and states it without one syllable of interpretation which our Lord and His Apostles withheld. It exalts nothing beyond measure, and depresses nothing from its due importance. . . .

"What an amazing contrast have we here to the endless intellectual muddle, the pretentious jargon and the arrogant absurdities of individual doctors, sects and churches that have undertaken to be wiser than the universal Church of Christ! Theories of the plan of salvation have cleared away no difficulties; they have made many. Some of the most effective and profane assaults that have ever been made upon Christianity have been grounded upon one or other of those theories; so that one might well hesitate before concluding whether those assaults, or the unauthorised theories which made them possible, are the more profane. I think it, therefore, necessary to insist that any theory whatever, and whether it be true or false, which pretends to pass one line beyond the limits of the reverent reserve of the Nicene Creed, is no part of Christianity, and is only too likely to be both untrue and presumptuously profane" (*The Chalcedonian Decree*, pp. 112–114).

"No doctrine of Christian faith has suffered more from attempted definitions than the Sacrificial Atonement of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, of which the Church is now making its special annual commemoration. In the

truest sense the Atonement was a *Mystery*, having its outward and visible manifestation in His Agony and Bloody Sweat, His Cross and Passion, His Precious Death and Burial, and in the effect of these exhibited in His glorious Resurrection and Ascension. But behind these awful and tremendous facts, transacted in the sphere of time and space, was a Divine fact of Reconciliation and Redemption, the mode, method, and character of which are hid among the unsearchable things of God. Within the past generation there has been a just and reverent recoil from the former vain attempts to tear aside the veil which hides that part of the Great Transaction; but there should be no feeble or halting proclamation of the fact itself as it is asserted in the Catholic Symbol of the Christian Faith. There is no need to resort to Augustinian theories, or mediæval definitions, to Calvinistic scholasticism or Puritan theology, all of which, and all alike, are purely speculative and essentially rationalistic. The true doctrine of the Atonement by which our Blessed Lord made a 'full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world' is best expressed in the language of the Nicene Creed: 'For us men and for our salvation He came down from heaven, and was incarnate of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, and was made man; and was crucified also for our sakes under Pontius Pilate, and suffered, and was buried; and rose again on the third day, according to the Scriptures; and ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father': all this was 'for us men and for our salvation'; each and every part of it 'for our sakes.' That, and that only, is the true and

Catholic doctrine of the Atonement" (*The Church Standard*, April 2, 1904).

George B. Stevens (1892). — "The conclusion is inevitable that these expressions must not be treated like scientifically precise formulae, but like human forms of thought — the most useful forms of thought which were available, for the illustration and enforcement of truths and relations which are beyond the full reach of definition by any human analogies. Few, if any, of those systems of thought which, like those of Anselm or Grotius, have been formed by a strict carrying out of some one particular analogy, or thought-form, have proved satisfactory to Christian thinkers generally, as is shown by their constant effort to penetrate beneath the figures of ransom and forensic imputation to the moral and spiritual realities which underlie them. . . . What are the limits of their legitimate use in theology? is another question. That there are limits, most Christian thinkers will agree, as is shown by the general disfavour into which the theories of equivalence and purchase have fallen. . . .

"The idea that δικαιοσύνη here means the necessity of punishing sin leads to the view that God punished Christ with the full penalty of the world's sin, — a view which annuls the very idea of punishment, since punishment for sin can be inflicted only upon those who commit it, and the notion of punishing an innocent person is the essence of injustice and a contradiction in terms. . . . Two problems, then, press for solution: (a) In what sense is Christ's death *for us*, and His sufferings *instead of* our punishment? and (b) How does His vicarious work meet the demands

of the law, and satisfy the ethical requirements of God's holy nature in respect to sin? Neither of these inquiries is explicitly answered by any statement contained in Paul's letters" (*The Pauline Theology*, pp. 253, 254, 101, 243. See also pp. 244, 245).

"The essence of Paul's thought does not lie in such notions as those of a deified law, quantitative equivalents, and literal substitutions and transfers, but of the conception of a fuller realisation in Christ of God's perfections in His treatment of mankind than was otherwise possible" (*Theology of the New Testament*, p. 412).

A. M. Fairbairn (1893). — "The [Anselmic] theory was throughout a piece of forensic speculation; it was the relations of God and man interpreted in the terms of Roman law, though as modified by Teutonic, and as applied in the penitential discipline of the Church. As such it was fatal to the kingdom of God as a reign of grace. The satisfaction which compensated the offended secured the legal quittance of the offender; the debt paid could not be a debt forgiven; to deny salvation or reward to any man so redeemed was to deny him his most manifest rights. If grace was saved by God being made to provide the person who satisfied, then the whole became a preconcerted transaction, a sort of commercial drama, a legal fiction sanctioned by the offended for the good of the offender. Or if the notion of forgiveness was retained by the act being transferred from the satisfied Father to the satisfying Son, then the ethical union of the Godhead was endangered and the most serious of all heresies endorsed" (*The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, pp. 123 *sq.* See also pp. 100, 174 *sq.*, 310–320, 479–487).

William N. Clark (1894). — The work of Christ is to be interpreted in the light of His Person. This we may hold for certain, that whatever was done in this great Divine work was done straightforwardly. The Person who was active did what as a person it was normal and natural for Him to do, and the work was a true expression of Him. In that person, Jesus, we recognise both the divine and the human, and discern God in humanity. We are sure, therefore, that the simplicity and sincerity of God will be manifest in His work, when we rightly understand it. All was genuine. There can have been no fictions or unrealities in it, and no transactions that were not expressive of eternal verity. Christ was not regarded by God as anything that He was not, nor are men, in their relation to Christ, viewed as anything but what they are. There is no unreal changing of places, or imputation to any one of character that does not belong to him. Christ, working straightforwardly from His own person, acts according to truth. Nor would it appear that such a work was done in pursuance of some special plan or device, an invention of the Divine mind or an expedient of the Divine administration to serve some special purpose. When God has come into humanity for the broad purpose of rendering effective His saving grace, we may be sure that He will simply act out His eternal nature, in ways that are normal to Him. God's work is not the fruit of special device or planning, but proceeds from the inner necessity of His character. Christ acted out His real self, never doing anything that did not correspond to the real state of His mind and affections, and always simply following the motive with which He began. . . .

"If grace comes simple and whole-hearted into the world, it does not come to satisfy legal claims or win law-righteousness. Neither with God who gives it nor with man who receives it, nor yet with Christ through whom it comes, is the Christian salvation a salvation by satisfaction of law. It is not procured, imparted, or received on the terms of law; that is to say, it is not procured by works or earned by merit, whether of men or of Christ. Men are not saved by the payment of debt, or by legal satisfaction, or by transfer of merit from Christ to them. God does not deal with men through Christ in the character of lawgiver, or judge, or in any special character, but in His real character as God. His own very self, in personal relations with His creatures as their very selves; and the method of His saving word is that of grace, which does not wait for any one's merit or earning, but freely gives. . . .

"What view of the work of Christ is to be presented here? Not exactly any one of the great historic theories. Not, of course, the ancient theory that Christ offered a ransom to Satan; not that Christ paid to God a satisfaction equivalent to the sins that God was to forgive; not that Christ was punished for the sins that God was to forgive; not that Christ dealt with God as moral governor, and set right the governmental relations of men; and not that His work was intended exclusively to bring men to repentance. It is out of the two convictions above recorded [that the work is to be interpreted in the light of the Person, and as the work of a single motive in God, namely, the motive of free grace] that the present approach to the subject is made. The work of Christ has

been described by various adjectives. It has been called forensic, commercial, vicarious, substitutionary, penal, vice-penal, governmental, ethical, moral. But the adjectives that lead most helpfully into the subject are 'direct' and 'vital.'

"When it is said that the work of Christ is direct, it is meant that the end in view was sought not indirectly, but directly, by a work of the same kind with the result that was to be accomplished by it. The end in view was the great reconciliation, or the establishment of moral and spiritual fellowship between God and man; and toward that end Christ wrought directly. His work was not a transactional ground for the desired fellowship, but the direct and reasonable way into the fellowship itself. And when it is said that the work of Christ is vital, it is meant that by His vital unity with God and men He was the means of effecting true union of men with God. His personality is the meeting-point for the great reconciliation.

"The adjectives that were lately cited have been applied to the work of Christ mainly to express in some form the transactional idea. That work has been regarded as a transaction to which God and men might afterward refer as the basis of their reconciliation, and has been called substitutionary, penal, and the like. According to this idea Christ justified God in saving men; according to the idea that is here presented, Christ is God's direct means of saving men. One view makes Christ the ground of reconciliation; the other makes Him the way of God to men and of men to God, the meeting-point of God and men, and the starting-point of the saved humanity. In the latter

view, reconciliation is not regarded as an agreement or a settlement of differences, but as a spiritual union of persons, a meeting of God and men in genuine spiritual fellowship. That the Christian reconciliation is thus personal and spiritual when it becomes a matter of experience, all Christians know. What is now asserted is that the work of Christ as Mediator and Redeemer was of the same order with the result that it brought about, — not something different from it on which it might be based, but something like it in which the result itself might be realised; and further, that this work proceeded from the Divine-human constitution of Christ Himself, to the Divine-human experience of spiritual reconciliation and fellowship" (*An Outline of Christian Theology*, pp. 332, 336–339. See generally pp. 246–259, 316–362).

George Harris (1896). — "Until recently the usual representations of atonement were justly open to the charge of immorality. . . . The imputation of our sins to Christ has been so stated that it seemed as if all regard for righteousness had been overlooked. The penal suffering of Christ was regarded as the philosophy of atonement. It was believed that God laid on Christ the penalty of our sins, or a sufficient equivalent to that penalty. The atonement was represented as an arrangement satisfactory to God, but incomprehensible to us. The fact that character and its consequences cannot be transferred from one person to another was contradicted by the theory that Christ suffered what we otherwise should have suffered. It is not an exaggeration to say that atonement was represented as a device by which God escapes from apparently in-

superable difficulties to the forgiveness of sinners, as if it would be impossible for God to forgive outright, even on genuine repentance, but becomes possible by reason of the sufferings and death of Christ. The love of Christ making its great way to men at the cost of suffering is the motive which leads men to repentance, but has been represented as the motive which induces God to forgive. This disappearing theory fails to satisfy because it is immoral, because it places salvation somewhere else than in character, because it converts the sympathy and love of Christ into legal fictions, because it places the ethical demands of justice above the ethical necessities of love. . . . When the doctrine of atonement is traced through its successive phases, as a ransom paid to the devil, as the satisfaction of justice, as the vindication of Divine government, and finally as the great motive power which transforms character, it is seen that there has been a progressive moral evolution. The doctrine of redemption through sacrifice remains, but is no longer made to rest on an unethical philosophy" (*Moral Evolution*, pp. 407 *sq.*).

John Watson [Ian Maclaren] (1896). — "One joyfully anticipates the place this final idea of God will have in the new theology. . . . No doctrine of the former theology will be lost; all will be recarved and refaced to suit the new architecture. Sovereignty will remain, not that of a despot, but of a father; the Incarnation will not be an expedient, but a consummation; the Sacrifice will not be a satisfaction, but a reconciliation; the end of Grace will not be standing, but character; the object of punishment will not be retribution, but regeneration. Mercy and

justice will no longer be antinomies; they will be aspects of Love, and the principle of human probation will be exchanged for the principle of human education" (*The Mind of the Master*, p. 269).

Charles Cuthbert Hall (1896). — "The soul hungers to find that starting-point. It cannot take Jesus Christ and Him crucified as an incident, an after-thought, an heroic rescue devised in an emergency. It feels instinctively that the Cross must be the result of some deeper cause. It demands to be led to that deeper cause, that it may make it the starting-point of thought. Such a starting-point is provided in the formula: The Atonement not the cause of God's Love, but Love the cause of the Atonement. . . . The effect of this view [that the Atonement is the cause of Love] seems to be the introduction of discord into the Holy Trinity, setting the Father against the Son, and the Son against the Father in their respective attitudes towards man. The Father is stern and wrathful; the Son is tender and pitiful; the Father has lifted His hand to strike and destroy; the Son, moved by a holy passion to save, has flung Himself into the very path of descending judgment, to receive its shock upon His own Person. Can this be our deepest and best thought of God? . . . One result is a form of clinging to Christ which practically separates Him from God. . . . The other result is substantially the rejection of the Atonement as something unworthy of God; the setting aside of Jesus as Mediator, from the feeling that God is too great, too noble, too good to demand the blood of an innocent victim such as Christ was, before He will be induced to love man. There are

those who deny the Atonement out of respect for God. . . . What, then, is the Atonement to God? Ask that question in the light of these preceding thoughts, — what man is to God, and what sin is to God. Man is the dear object of God's love; sin is the intolerable outrage against God's nature, filling God's universe with lawlessness and misery. Atonement is the supreme effort of God's love, by His own suffering, to save man from that sin which makes Him an object of God's wrath. . . . There is no longer any occasion to call in question the morality of God in exacting suffering from an innocent Being to satisfy anger stirred by the sins of the guilty. Such a conception of God vanishes like a grim nocturnal shadow before the dawn" (*The Gospel of the Divine Sacrifice*, pp. 7, 12, 13, 75).

George Park Fisher (1896). — "On the subject of the Atonement, theology seeks for a point of view where all appearance of arbitrariness in the doctrinal explanations of the New Testament as to the purport and effect of the sufferings and death of Christ, shall disappear — where the historic facts shall interpret themselves in accordance with these explanations. . . . It is plain to keen observers that, in the later days, both within and without what may be called the pale of Calvinism, there is a certain relaxing of confidence in the previously accepted solutions of some of the gravest theological problems. This appears among many whose attachment to the core of the essential truths formulated in the past does not wane, whose substantial orthodoxy, as well as piety, is not often, if it be at all, questioned, and who have no sympathy with agnosticism, in the technical sense of the word. . . . Even by

them the formulas respecting . . . the mode in which the Saviour's death affects the mind of God and lays a basis for the proclamation of forgiveness, . . . the formulas on these themes are looked upon with at least a modicum of distrust. A larger space is remanded to the region of mystery. There is a tendency to enlarge the domain of the unrevealed" (*History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 547, 551).

Alexander V. G. Allen (1897). — "As one contemplates the many and conflicting theories of the atonement, or the vast amount of profound and subtle thought expended in efforts at its elucidation since the time of Anselm, the vitality of opinions which seem to have been refuted, the apparent impossibility that common agreement should be reached, — in view of this one is tempted to look with more complacency upon the liturgies of the ancient Church, — the work of the bishops in their capacity of pastors dealing directly with the people and not dominated by monastic aspiration. In the ritual of the altar, no effort is made to explain the great transaction on Calvary, but it is held up before the people as if it needed or could have no explanation, or as though the simple event in itself spoke with direct plainness and power to the Christian heart. The late Dr. Bushnell experienced this passing mood, which has, however, a representative significance, when at the close of his book on the Vicarious Sacrifice he urged the retention of the altar language, notwithstanding that it had been 'so long and dreadfully misapplied by the dogmatic schemes of expiation and judicial satisfaction'" (*Christian Institutions*, p. 373. See pp. 352–374).

Henry Wace (1898). — "It has been a danger in the-

ological thought on this subject, from even the earliest times, to lay such stress on some of the images, by which that Atonement is illustrated in the Scriptures, as to present it in the light of a kind of formal and material transaction; as though it consisted, for example, in the payment of a ransom or the discharge of a debt . . . and the nobler appreciation of the mystery which is due to St. Anselm, the great Archbishop of Canterbury, has been observed to be too much pervaded by feudal conceptions of the satisfaction by which offenses against superiors, or against an external law, could be expiated. . . . But just as the Mosaic Law itself, with its Divinely ordered regulations, fell away at once before the revelation of the eternal laws of religion and morality in Christ, so must any artificial rule of action, any law due to special forms of human society and experience, be put aside, when considering the deepest and most essential elements of God's relation to us" (*The Sacrifice of Christ*, pp. 36–38).

Marvin R. Vincent (1899). — "In this matter we must allow words to tell their own story. We must not begin with theories and then fit the words to the theories. The words were selected to embody facts, and our conception of Justification and Atonement must be based upon the usage of the words, and the relation of that usage to the representations of Scripture generally. Our first question is therefore: Do the terms of the Old and New Testaments exhibit the ideas of judicial procedure and satisfaction to Divine justice as the fundamental ideas of Justification and Atonement? I believe that they do not; but that they set forth other and quite different ideas. . . .

The New Testament terms concur with those of the Old Testament to the effect that if we desire to find in the Scriptures the idea of a satisfaction to Divine justice, we must seek for it outside the terms used to describe atonement for sin. The idea is not in them. I do not know any term or any passage in the New Testament which declares that Christ was a satisfaction to Divine justice, a propitiation of the wrath of God, a compensation to offended majesty. . . .

"The New Testament habitually represents the atonement of Christ as bearing upon *man* and his sin rather than upon *God;* as finding its great result in personal character; as averting God's wrath, not by the payment of a penalty or consideration, but by getting out of the way the sin which stands in the way of reconciliation between God and man. It is not God's offended dignity which is thrown into the foreground, but man's lost and wretched condition on account of sin, and God's yearning and effort to save him from his sin, and to restore his manhood to its original divine ideal. The atonement is put, in the New Testament, as the consummate expression of God's great love for mankind; as the outgoing of God's love and power in order to save it by reconciling it to Himself" (Unpublished Seminary lecture, from which Dr. Vincent kindly permits quotation).

Bishop Alfred M. Randolph (1899). — The Atonement is a *doctrine* concerning a *fact.* "The fact is the death upon the cross, the revealed doctrine explaining the fact is that 'Christ died for our sins,' that we have redemption through His blood. *How* His death redeems us by securing

the forgiveness of our sins, that is, the *method and philosophy* of the Atonement, is not a part of the doctrine necessary to faith. It is a subject for thought and speculation," under conditions and limitations. "But a doctrine, involving a theory of the Atonement and explaining its philosophy, is not a necessary element of saving faith. We may adopt a theory which seems to us reasonable, or *we may reject all theories of the mode in which the Atonement is accomplished*, but if we reject the fact that Christ died, and the doctrine revealed in connection with the fact that 'He died for our sins,' then we have rejected the Christian faith" (Article in *The Protestant Episcopal Review*, Jan., 1899, p. 189).

Richard W. Micou (1899). — "Not the doctrine of the At-one-ment, in any form, but the death of Christ itself in its spiritual power is the objective ground of the forgiveness of sins, and no doctrine can adequately state such a transcendent fact. . . . Recent theology has returned to the Pauline and Greek conception of Christ's unity with men which made His perfect obedience and sacrifice of will the act of the race, to be accepted by each in faith. . . . God is the Father, and all His dealings with us must be interpreted ethically, in terms of *righteous* human fatherhood and love, not of sovereignty and impersonal Law" (Outline Notes of Lectures in Systematic Divinity, pp. 52, 57).

Samuel D. McConnell (1901). — "It may be ages yet before we recover from the misfortune of having had the truth of Christ interpreted and fixed by jurists and logicians instead of by naturalists and men of science" (*Evolution of Immortality*, p. 134).

P. J. Forsyth (1901). — "The Anselmic theory of satisfaction is now out of date, and has little more than a historic value. With it and its habit of mind have gone also the various substitutionary schemes and commercial transactions into which it has been degraded. They are all more juridical than moral. They fail to satisfy the modern conscience; they fall coldly on our more sympathetic religious intelligence" (*Religion and Recent Art*, p. 259).

E. Griffith-Jones (1901). — "There are not wanting serious signs that the old juridical language fails to appeal as it once did to the spiritual consciousness of a large section of Christian believers. It sounds artificial; it stands aloof from the dominant ideas of the time; there is not a little in it which shocks the moral sense of many devout minds that are earnestly desirous of arriving at something like a consistent theory of the Atonement" (*The Ascent through Christ*, p. 289).

P. T. Forsyth (1902). — "There is a deepening evolution of human thought in this regard. The efforts to pluck the heart from its mystery are not a series of assaults renewed with blind and dogged courage on an impregnable hold. They form the stages of a long spiritual movement of slow battle, of arduous illumination and severe conquest. . . . And the progress is no less sure because it is neither continuous nor direct. We have much to drop on the route as a condition of getting home. We have to save truth by losing it, though it seem part of our soul. We shed the husk to grow the tree. And in this matter of Atonement some things are clearly learnt to be wrong,

some are as clearly found to be true as we move from faith to faith. We have outgrown the idea that God has to be reconciled, . . . that Redemption cost the Father nothing, . . . that Christ took our punishment in the quantitative sense of the word, . . . that forgiveness cost so much that it was impossible to God till justice was appeased and mercy set free by the blood of Christ, . . . that the satisfaction of Christ was made either to God's wounded honour or to His punitive justice" (*The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought: A Theological Symposium*, pp. 62, 64–67).

Walter F. Adeney (1902). — "Each conception of the Atonement that has held possession of the mind of the Church at successive epochs has interpreted itself in harmony with the ruling ideas of the age. . . . But with the abandonment of the old demonology, the decay of feudalism, the reluctance to admit the abstract claims of law as such, the feeling that religion must be regarded spiritually and not as a business affair, every one of these theories is swept away and cast into the limbo of dead beliefs. Or, if here and there a champion is found for one or other of them, we feel that his argument is purely academic" (*Ibid.*, pp. 151 *sq.* See also Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, art. "Mediator," III. 321; *The Theology of the New Testament*, pp. 123, 160, 166, 190, 192, 244–247).

John Hunter (1902). — "The moral order requires no special and external vindication of its majesty. God does not need to be appeased, for His laws never fail to punish sin in their own good time and way. But compensation He does not exact or need. It is not the suffering of

the sinner, but his restoration to goodness and a life of conscious harmony with the Divine will that satisfies the holy and righteous God. Propitiation, expiation, and substitution, in their current interpretations and forms, are as little in accord with what we see to be the order of things in the universe as they are with the tone and tendency of the teaching of Jesus and the real and profound needs of the enlightened soul. . . . It is not by imputing, but imparting righteousness; not by substituting His obedience for ours, but by inspiring us to obey; not by displacing, but reinforcing our personal will and activity, Jesus Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God" (*Ibid.*, pp. 316, 326).

Theodore T. Munger (1902). — "If an intelligent man, having laid aside all preconceptions of the Atonement, were to begin the study of it afresh, the first thing he would notice is that it has not only passed through many phases, but that mutually excluding theories of it have been held, and that these theories bear each the impress of its age and often of its region, and reflect the environing social institutions. . . . As he continues his study he finds that each theory is subdivided by minor and qualifying theories, and that these often bear the impress of some individual mind or some school of philosophy. . . . More and more does our seeker become convinced that the theories simply neutralize one another, and that, so far as throwing any light upon the truth itself is concerned, they may be left by the wayside as milestones to mark their distance from the generic fact out of which they sprang. For that he begins to search, and he finds it, of course, in Christ Himself. One

thing he has gained, and an immense gain it is, he has got rid of theory and dogma, and come into the essence of a *Life*. . . . No mysterious necessity, no governmental exigency, no expiation of guilt or propitiation of wrath or satisfaction of justice, can be found in it, unless found in the heart of fatherhood and in the relation of father and son" (*Ibid.*, pp. 355, 357, 363).

"It would have a moral God, a Divine government truly moral, a moral atonement, and not one involving essential injustice, nor clouded with mysteries that put it outside of human use; an atonement resting on God's heart, and calling into play the known laws and sentiments of human nature, and not one constructed out of a mechanical legality; an atonement that saves men by a traceable process, and not one that is contrived to explain problems that may safely be left to God; an atonement that secures oneness with the Christ, and not one framed to buttress some scheme of Divine government constructed out of human elements" (*The Freedom of Faith*, p. 33).

H. L. Wild (1902). — "The mistake of subsequent writers has lain in placing the emphasis too exclusively upon the death of Jesus as the means of redemption. The faith that brings forgiveness, as St. John's Gospel makes quite clear, is faith in a living Person and in His life of willing sacrifice seen as a proof of love to God and men. The true life lies in the assimilation of the human life to the life of God. The true life therefore is one sacrifice to love, of which death is the consummation and final proof. It was perhaps natural that later writers should take the death as the symbol of the whole: the loss thereby involved

has none the less been serious, seeing that it is this that has all too often obscured the full glory and brightness of Jesus' doctrine of God. We cannot be too often reminded that the central idea of Jesus' teaching is that of God as a loving Father, and that it is this that forms the sole basis of the hope of forgiveness, as it is the spring of all true conduct whether in Jesus or in His followers. . . . It is the perfect love of God that demands a return of perfect love manifested in obedience to His will in sacrifice for men. This Jesus gave, winning others thereby, and entered into His glory; this others are to seek to give in Him" (*Contentio Veritatis*, pp. 161 *sq.*).

Bishop Phillips Brooks (1904). — "Now what relation this death of Jesus may have borne to the nature and plans of God, I hold it the most futile and irreverent of all investigations to inquire. I do not know, and I do not believe that any theology is so much wiser than my ignorance as to know, the sacred mysteries that passed in the courts of the Divine Existence when the miracle of Calvary was perfect. . . . You say that it appeased His wrath. I am not sure there may not be some meaning of those words which does include the truth they try to express; but in the natural sense which men gather from them out of their ordinary human uses, I do not believe that they are true. Nay, I believe that they are dreadfully untrue. I think that all such words try to tell what no man knows. If this be so, then it seems clear that all we have to do with in the death of Jesus is its aspect toward, its influence upon humanity. We are concerned with that which Jesus spoke of, its powerful effect to work upon the lives

of men" (*Sermons for the Church Year*, Seventh Series, pp. 257 *sq.*).

J. R. Illingworth (1904). — "Yet it does not explain wherein that rescue from sin consists — the intimate, essential nature of the Atonement. And it may well be that, under the present limitations of our knowledge, no such explanation could be made. But it is round this point that controversy has so often raged, and counsel has been so often darkened. Men have translated the doctrine of the Atonement into the favourite categories of their age, passing modes of thought which were valid for their own generation, but inadequate for another. And so the doctrine has come down to us encumbered and obscured by the obsolete methods of its by-gone presentation — methods that in their day successfully emphasised its reality, but which, when retained after they have gone out of date, only make it seem to be unreal. We must remember, therefore, that belief in the fact of the Atonement has persisted without change, behind all variations of its intellectual expression, inspiring alike the sanctity of Anselm and the penitence of Abelard, for all their divergence of view, and proving its reality, like other forces, by its manifest power in the world. . . . It is in harmony, therefore, with all human analogy, that an absolutely unique person should perform an absolutely unique service to mankind; vicariously, not in the sense of 'instead of them,' but in the sense of 'for their sake,' while they in turn are enabled by His Spirit to appropriate His work, till, from being a thing outside them, it becomes their very own, and, in Pauline language, Christ is formed in them. The first step in this

process is man's justification, the work which he could not do, the step which he could not take for himself; while its second stage is his sanctification, which involves the appropriation of the work done for him, by the active co-operation of his own free-will" (*Christian Character*, pp. 19–21).

E. H. Archer-Shepherd (1906). — "The cause why the New Testament doctrine of the Atonement is so much disliked, is in large measure to be found in the immoral ideas which have been read into it — ideas which are worthy of the heathen who smeared their idols with human blood. The New Testament writers throw little light on the nature of the Atonement. They state the fact unequivocally; and with that they are content" (*Burning Questions in the Light of To-day*, p. 42. See pp. 30–53).

The Catholic Encyclopædia (1907). — "That great doctrine has been faintly set forth in figures taken from man's laws and customs. It is represented as the payment of a price, or as a ransom, or as the offering of satisfaction for a debt. But we can never rest in these material figures as though they were literal and adequate. As both Abelard and Bernard remind us, the Atonement is the work of love. It is essentially a sacrifice, the one supreme sacrifice of which the rest were but types and figures. And, as St. Augustin teaches us, the outward rite of sacrifice is the sacrament, or sacred sign, of the invisible sacrament of the heart. It was by this inward sacrifice of obedience unto death, by this perfect love with which He laid down His life for His friends, that Christ paid the debt to justice, and

taught us by His example, and drew all things to Himself" (II. 58).

Bishop Charles Gore (1907). — "It will appear plainly that it was a true instinct which caused the Catholic Church to define its faith in terms of the doctrine of God and the person of Christ, and to leave the belief in Christ's atonement and the inspiration of Scripture undefined. . . . There have been different theories — as Origen's and Anselm's, and Abelard's and Calvin's — which we have all come to recognise as in various ways inadequate. And the Church has never corporately faced the question raised, or embodied its faith in any formula, while all the time the doctrine is liable very easily to be so isolated, and distorted in popular belief, as to become a dangerous and misleading error. . . . And the idea of vicarious punishment — Christ punished that we might be 'let off' — has, more than anything else, tended to alienate the best moral conscience of mankind from Christian teaching. . . . There is no shadow of a doctrine of imputed righteousness in the New Testament, such as will suffer us to imagine that there can be any final reconciliation of an individual man with God, on any other basis than likeness of character" (*The New Theology and the Old Religion*, pp. 131, 134, 136, 142).

"The idea of injustice has been introduced into the 'transaction' of the Atonement, and has been the most fruitful source of difficulty; — but quite unnecessarily. There is a story that when Edward VI. was a child, and deserved punishment, another boy was taken and whipped in his place. This monstrously unjust transaction has been taken by Christian teachers as an illustration of the

Atonement; and it is truly an illustration of the Atonement as they misconceived it. But the misconception is gratuitous; there is no real resemblance in the two cases. For first, what is represented to us in the New Testament is not that Jesus Christ, an innocent person, was punished, without reference to His own will, by a God who thus showed himself indifferent as to whom He punished so long as some one suffered. . . . Secondly, God is not represented as imposing any specially devised punishment on His only Son in our nature. . . . What is ascribed to the Father is that He 'spared not' His only Son by miraculously exempting Him from the consequences of His mission; . . . Thirdly and lastly, the Christ (as represented in the New Testament) did not suffer in order that we might be let off the punishment for our own sins, but in order to bring us to God" (*St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, Vol. II, Note D).

See also Archbishop Thomson, *The Atoning Work of Christ*, pp. 178–181; F. W. Robertson, *Sermons* on "Caiaphas's View of Vicarious Sacrifice," "The Sacrifice of Christ," and "Reconciliation by Christ"; Benjamin Jowett, *St. Paul's Epistles*, vol. II., Essay on "The Doctrine of the Atonement"; *Tracts for Priests and People*, Nos. iii. and xiii.; *The Atonement: A Clerical Symposium*, about one half of the Essays; E. Mulford, *The Republic of God*, cap. ix.; W. Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, II. 137, 141–154; D. Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, pp. 81, 89, 91, 283; *Progressive Orthodoxy*, cap. iii; A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 403–411, 418–433, 492–507; H. C. Trumbull, *The*

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J. Ll. Davies, *The Work of Christ;* J. McLeod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement;* John Young, *The Life and Light of Men;* F. M. Iams, *Reconciliation; A Reasonable Faith,* by Three "Friends"; J. B. Heard, *Old and New Theology;* D. N. Beach, *Plain Words on our Lord's Work;* J. M. Whiton, *The Divine Satisfaction;* C. Giles, *The Incarnation and Atonement;* H. N. Oxenham, *The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement;* A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought;* P. Waldenström, *The Reconciliation;* P. G. Medd, *The One Mediator;* J. Steinfort Kedney, *Christian Doctrine Harmonized;* C. C. Everett, *The Gospel of Paul;* Samuel Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All;* John Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity;* J. T. Hutcheson, *A View of the Atonement;* D. W. Simon, *The Redemption of Man,* and *Reconciliation by Incarnation;* A. Sabatier, *St. Paul,* and *The Doctrine of the Atonement;* John Garnier, *Sin and Redemption;* B. F. Westcott, *The Victory of the Cross;* J. Scott Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement;* James M. Wilson, *The Gospel of the Atonement;* W. P. DuBose, *The Soteriology of the New Testament, The Gospel according to St. Paul, The Gospel in the Gospels,* and *Priesthood and Sacrifice; The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought: A Theological Symposium;* H. C. Sheldon, *System of Christian Doctrine;* T. Vincent Tymms, *The Christian Idea of Atonement;* W. L. Walker, *The Cross and the Kingdom;* G. B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation;* L. F. Stearns, *Present Day Theology;* H. C. Beeching and Alex. Nairne, *The Bible Doctrine of Atonement;* Lonsdale Ragg, *Aspects of the*

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# INDEX

# INDEX


Abelard, 133, 201–205
*Acceptilatio*, 210, 238
Admissions by conservatives, 18, 24, 25, 29, 42, 43, 45, 46, 54, 58, 60, 74, 76, 81, 85, 183–186, 215, 242, 243, Appendix.
Alexander of Hales, 196
Allen, A. V. G., 33, 124, 133, 138, 258, 259, 304
Ambrose, 62, 84, 90, 95, 98
'Ανακεφαλαίωσις: see *Recapitulatio*
Anglican statements, 8, 240, 241, 243, 246, 248
Anselm, 6, 8, 10, 72, 99, 103, 108, 114, 117, 118, 258–260; influence of, 7, 141, 144, 194, 195, 198, 201, 206, 207, 209, 211–216, 232, 253–256
Anselm's theory, 6, 7, 120–194, 217, 219; antecedents of, 72, 73, 78, 95–99, 103–119; value of, 132–143, 253–263; defects of: see *Defects*
'Ανταλλαγή, 23
'Αντάλλαγμα, 44, 61
'Αντάξιος, 69
'Αντί, 33, 51, 53, 58
'Αντίλυτρον, 47, 69, 136
Antinomianism, 172, 186, 228
'Αντίψυχον, 47, 48, 51
Apostolic Fathers, 19–25
Aristotelianism, 115–119
Article XXXI., 241
Athanasius, 48–59, 63, 88, 89, 98, 138, 147, 154, 170, 180, 208
Augustin, 50, 62, 86–93, 98, 107, 117, 138, 146, 155, 194, 208

Barnabas, 20
Barnes, Albert, 184, 244
Basil, 50, 70
"Battle of attributes," 173–176, 192, 212, 215, 254
Baur, F. C., 35, 37, 128, 132, 140, 144, 152, 224, 238
Belgic Confession, 222
Bernard of Clairvaux, 133, 203, 206
Bigg, Charles, 39, 40
Bonaventura, 196
Boso, 120–122, 127, 132, 133, 145, 152, 159, 163, 164

Caird, John, 174
Calvin, 214, 222–225, 228, 229
Chrysostom, 66–68
Church, Dean, 144, 253, 275
Clement of Alexandria, 37–39, 107
Clement of Rome, 20
Coleridge, S. T., 185, 248, 268
Commercial analogies, 111, 112, 115, 154, 183–186, 234, 254
Commutation, 108, 109, 111, 112, 154, 193, 219
Council of Trent, 212
*Cur Deus Homo*, 7, 99, 103, 119, 120, 253
Curse of the law, 28, 48, 68, 89, 223, 227
Cyprian, 77, 82–85, 92, 106, 107, 109, 143, 157

Cyril of Alexandria, 68–70
Cyril of Jerusalem, 70, 107

Dale, R. W., 120, 148, 161, 211, 216, 240, 245, 274
Davies, Ll., 165
Death of Christ, 17, 20, 21, 27, 28, 38, 40, 42, 50–52, 56–59, 65, 70, 73, 77, 78, 90, 98, 123, 217
Debt, sin considered as, 53, 56, 58, 71–73, 91, 109, 124, 127–131, 154–156, 162, 164, 183, 191, 236, 255
Deceit of devil, 44, 60–63, 91, 92, 94, 132
Defects of Anselm's theory, 143–194, 254–256
Deification of humanity, 18, 31, 39, 50, 60, 71
*De Incarnatione*, summary of, 54–57
Denney, James, 7, 247
Desert, 80, 83
Deterioration of later Fathers, 70–72, 95
Deutsch, S. M., 202, 203
Didache, 19
Δικαιοσύνη, 169, 254
Diognetus, Epistle to, 21–24, 36
Dogma, antecedents of, 5; judged by history, 3, 4, 10
Dorner, Dr., 33
Dualism, 173–181
Duns Scotus, 190, 198, 209–211, 213
Dwight, Dr., 242

Edwards, Jonathan, Jr., 216, 242
Edwards, Jonathan, Sr., 243
Emmons, Nathaniel, 242
Equivalence, 51, 59, 62, 69–71, 108, 109, 127, 140, 156, 196, 223–225, 235, 238
Erasmus, 117
Erigena, 95, 190
Eucharistic office, 241
Eusebius, 47, 48

Farrar, Dean, 115–117, 129, 281
Feudalism, 113, 114, 147, 148, 176
Fisher, G. P., 17, 21, 26, 78, 109, 130, 139, 257, 303
Foliot, Gilbert, 174
Forensic form of theory, 167–172
Forgiveness, 154, 161, 163–166, 173, 234, 262

Garden, F., 9, 271
German law, 109–112, 153, 199
Gnostic defect, 173, 178
Governmental theory, 237–240
Greek Fathers, later, 60–75
Greek theology, 71–73, 262, 263: see *Post-Apostolic, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*
Gregory Nazianzen, 50, 63–66
Gregory Nyssen, 44, 50, 60–63, 208
Gregory the Great, 62, 90, 94, 97, 107
Grotius, 165, 210, 237–240
Gwatkin, H. M., 64, 230

Hagenbach, K. R., 53, 117, 118, 128, 140
Hallam, Henry, 228
Harnack, A., 27, 33, 40, 51, 64, 66–68, 74, 79, 90, 94, 97–99, 107–109, 111, 123, 144, 145, 148, 165, 172, 178, 179, 181, 199, 207, 225; error of, 81, 84, 109
Heard, J. B., 167
Hegel, 115
Heidelberg Catechism, 222
Hermas, 19

Hilary, 32, 50, 86, 209
Hippolytus, 39, 50
Hodge, A. A., 19, 165, 210
Hodge, Charles, 165, 184, 185, 210
Honour of God, 124–130, 147–153, 158, 159
Hugh of St. Victor, 195
Huidekoper, F., 35, 44
Humanity, deification of: see *Deification*

Ignatius, 21
Imputation, 48, 88, 200, 226–230, 236
Incarnation, contingency of, 17, 50, 65, 75, 187–190, 209; primary, 16–18, 25, 26, 29–32, 45, 49, 65, 75, 187–190, 256, 262
Indulgence, 84, 94, 107, 194, 196
Infinite guilt, 155, 198, 210, 255
Innocent III., 133, 173, 198, 200, 215, 220
Institutional features of theory, 109, 112, 114, 147, 148, 154, 167, 182, 190
Irenæus, 29–37
Isidore, 62

John of Damascus, 50, 62, 66, 74, 95, 116
Juridical theory, 6, 167–172, 201
Justice of God, 125, 131, 148–150, 166, 173–176, 186, 206; retributive, 168, 225, 226
Justin Martyr, 26–28

Kemble, J. M., 113
Kingsley, Charles, 113

Lactantius, 85, 94
Latin Fathers, the, 75–99
Latin theology, 5, 262, 263
Legalism, 78, 80, 82, 91, 103–105, 140, 167–172, 174, 213, 214, 239, 247, 254, 262
Leo the Great, 62
Lias, J. J., 15, 279
Lidgett, J. S., 20, 120, 147, 210, 218, 220, 245
Lindsay, T. M., 29
Liturgies, 71, 241
Luther, 62, 213, 220, 221, 227, 228
Λύτρον, 23, 33, 136

Magee, Archbishop, 183, 243, 268
Magee, W. C., 185, 285
Maine, Sir Henry, 104
Mediator, 32, 93, 98, 176
Melanchthon, 221
Merit, 79, 80, 83, 86, 94, 105, 106, 109, 169, 193, 214; of Christ, 130, 131, 139, 144, 181, 197, 201, 207, 209, 214; transfer of, 109, 131, 185, 196, 200
Mistranslations of Fathers, 23, 28, 33, 59, 70, 89, 90
Moberly, R. C., 7, 20, 58, 115, 120, 157, 186, 190, 204, 245, 290
*Modus* of redemption, 16, 66, 134, 232, 249, 256, 261
Moral theories, 136, 201–205, 240
*Mors æterna*, 224
Munger, T. T., 167, 193, 310
Mystical identity, 18, 32, 33, 47, 48, 50, 51, 63, 65, 69, 73, 88, 182, 187, 200, 205, 206
Mythology, 174, 176, 178, 237

Nash, H. S., 258
Neander, A., 25, 28, 173, 181, 215, 216
Necessity of Christ's death, 27, 51, 65, 87, 94, 138, 139, 146,

188, 194, 195–199, 202, 206–208, 211
Nestorian defect, 179–181
Nicene Fathers, 46–60
Norris, J. P., 23, 34, 58, 275

Obedience of Christ, 30, 123, 139, 217, 218, 224
Objective atonement, 25, 134–137, 190–193, 198, 199, 208
Οἰκονομία, 64
Origen, 34, 39–45, 107
Orthodoxy, 232, 248, 256
Osiander, 229
Oxenham, H. N., 19, 35, 45, 196, 211

Passive satisfaction, 200, 216–219, 229
Patristic teaching, the, 15–99; characteristics of, 15–19, 24, 25, 45, 46, 71–77, 96–99
Penal suffering, 22, 28, 40, 47, 52, 54, 58, 69, 72, 73, 89, 90, 96, 125, 139, 195, 199, 200, 206, 208, 215, 219–226, 242
Penalty of sin, 160–162, 262
Penance, 79, 94, 106, 112
Penitential discipline, 79–84, 105–109, 112, 141, 142, 193
Personality, defective sense of, 157, 175
Peter Lombard, 62, 133, 203, 207
Post-Apostolic Fathers, 25–46
Post-Nicene Fathers, 60–75
Propitiation, 25, 29, 37, 40, 41, 47, 67, 79, 82, 83, 85–87, 94, 95, 106, 137, 222, 223
Purgatory, 107

Racial antecedents, 103–105
Radulphus Ardeus, 95
Ransom to devil, 33–37, 43–46, 63, 91, 122, 195, 201, 206, 207, 257
Reaction, the modern, 231–249
*Recapitulatio*, 27, 30, 32, 50, 73
Redemption by Christ's teaching, 17, 26, 30, 38, 39, 94
Reformation doctrine, modern, 9; obstacle to faith, 10; obsolescent, 244, 246–249
Reformers, the, 212–231
Richard of St. Victor, 195
Ritschl, A., 86, 97, 149, 152, 203, 207, 211
Rivière, Abbé J., 25, 28, 32, 33, 42, 45, 49, 53, 59, 64, 69, 70, 74, 76, 81, 84, 120, 121, 140, 174, 204, 207
Robert Pulleyn, 205
Robertson, F. W., 160
Roman law, 105, 109, 113, 167, 199
Rufinus, 62

Sabatier, A., 5, 121, 174, 175, 237
Sacrifice, 19, 20, 40–42, 88, 90, 96, 98, 135, 207
Satisfaction, 78, 105, 109, 126, 154; in the Fathers, 18, 24, 25, 28, 39, 42, 45, 53, 57–59, 72–74, 88, 97, 98; by Christ, 79, 81, 84, 97, 126–131, 139, 140, 154–166, 181–186; by man, 79, 82, 86; by obedience, 139–141, 150, 151, 158–162, 182, 198, 217, 218, 224; by punishment, 25, 112, 125, 139, 140, 158, 219–226
Saxon Confession, 221
Scholasticism, 115–117
Scholastics, the, 194–212
Seeberg, R., 39, 94, 112
Shedd, W. G. T., 18, 24, 35, 42, 46, 59, 64, 74, 90, 146, 165, 168, 215, 226
Simon, D. W., 120, 137, 138, 240, 244

Sin, nature of, 155–157, 234, 262: see *Debt*; penalty of, 160–162, 262
Socinus, 165, 233–237
Sovereignty, divine, 138, 168, 239
Stanley, Dean, 53, 167, 278
Stevens, G. B., 9, 115, 121, 139, 145, 156, 160, 176, 214, 226, 240, 245, 246, 295
Strauss, D. F., 3, 174
Subjective atonement, 136, 191, 203
Substitution, 22, 28, 33, 38, 41, 42, 47, 51–53, 65, 67–69, 73, 74, 78, 91, 96, 109, 111, 112, 115, 160, 181–186, 200, 221, 223, 229, 230, 243
Sulpitius Severus, 86
Supererogation, 106, 123, 130, 139, 150, 151, 163, 217

Tertullian, 28, 76, 77–82, 92, 105, 119, 143
Thomasius, Gottfried, 169, 182
Thomas Aquinas, 197–200, 213
Thomson, Archbishop, 74, 165, 213
Turretin, F., 183, 231, 241
Tymms, T. V., 9, 36, 173

Ueberweg, F., 191

Vicarious, 42, 52, 69, 181, 182, 207, 243

Wergeld, 110, 111, 113, 154
Wessel, 176
Westminster Confession, 226, 241
Whiton, J. M., 162
Wilson, J. H., 43, 46, 169, 177, 178
Wood, C. J., 111, 186
Würtemberg Confession, 222

Young, John, 120, 162

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209

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